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THE FATHERHOOD OF THE PRIEST

THERE is a growing curiosity in the world today concerning the reason why the Catholic priest is called father. There are many outside the Church who vehemently deny the priest's claim to fatherhood, whereas many of the faithful, while they readily assent to the paternity of the priest, are unable to offer any solid arguments in favor of their position. The principal reason why both Catholics and non-Catholics cannot understand the reason for regarding the priest as a father is because they fail to understand the notion of fatherhood. Some have gone so far as to maintain that fatherhood is a relation to be found in God alone; and these object to the application of the term to others in view of the words of Christ, " Call none your father upon earth; for one is your father, who is in heaven." [1] This objection, of course, totally disregards the context in which Christ's words were spoken. Our divine Lord does not restrict paternity to God the Father,

[1] *Matt.*, xxiii, 9.

although, as we shall see in the course of these pages, it is God alone Who is Father in the fullest sense of the word, and the term is applied to others only in so far as they participate in His paternity. Others are under the impression that fatherhood is the relation of the principle of generation in only natural created beings. This materialistic concept rules out not only the fatherhood of the priest, but that of God as well.

An understanding of the solution to this problem has great practical importance, for the relations between priest and people are, to a great extent, determined by whether or not the priest recognizes the faithful as his children, and the faithful in turn regard the priest as their father. The recognition of this mutual relationship will result not only in a more zealous, understanding priesthood, but also in a more enlightened, militant laity. When the priests see in the faithful their own spiritual children whom they must nourish, protect and instruct in the supernatural life, they cannot but be inspired with a more loving, all-embracing solicitude for the problems of their subjects. When this paternal solicitude is manifested in the daily life of the priest, there will arise a bond of the utmost confidence between him and the faithful which will induce them to bring all their difficulties to him as a child to his father; they will ever be running to the priest for that nourishment, encouragement and guidance which are so necessary for existence in the spiritual life. When, as today, however, priests and people lose consciousness of their respective relationships of fathers and children, the closest bond of mutual confidence between the priesthood and the faithful is thereby relaxed and a distance and diffidence often grows up instead.[2]

Besides the practical importance of this question, it is of great theoretical value in as much as its solution implies an investigation of the most fundamental theological problems together with their intimate relations among one another. In order to understand the priest's claims to fatherhood it is neces-

[2] Cf. H. E. Manning, *The Eternal Priesthood* (The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Md.: 1944), pp. 22-23.

sary to be acquainted with the Church's teachings on such important doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the efficacy of Christ's Passion, grace and its communication through the sacraments, and especially on the Christian priesthood. Moreover, a knowledge of the important philosophical concept of analogy is of the utmost necessity.

The precise end we have in view in writing this article is to show that the priest is truly and formally a father. We are not concerned here with the priest's non-formal claims to fatherhood, first of all because these are multitudinous and hence could not be adequately treated in so brief a study, but more especially because such claims are of relatively minor importance once the priest's formal claims to fatherhood have been established.

As far as we have been able to ascertain, very little has been written previously on this subject. It is true that some of the Fathers of the Church, such as St. John Chrysostom, have, in passing, alluded to the priest's claim to paternity by reason of his sacramental ministry. But there seems to be no *ex-professo* treatment of the subject, certainly not in English.

The method we shall follow is theological. We shall attempt to draw from principles of faith a theological argument which demonstrates the priest's formal claims to paternity. First of all, we shall examine the concept of fatherhood, then show how Christ participates most intimately in the fatherhood of God. We shall then proceed to show that Christ is a father by reason of His priesthood. From this fact follows the logical conclusion that since the priest shares in the priesthood of Christ, he, by that very fact, participates in the divine paternity.

I. The Notion of Fatherhood

Of the origin of the word " father " very little is known for certain. The word has the aspect of an agent noun in " fater " and " father." It is doubtfully referred to by some as a cognate of the Sanskrit root $\overline{\text{PA}}$, meaning " protect " or " keep." Thus in Latin we have the verb *pascere*, whence are derived the

words "pastor" and "pasture." Possibly the word is taken from the Anglo-Saxon *fēdan*, meaning "to feed," which has the form *feden* in Middle English. In modern English this becomes "feed." Whatever the origin of the word "father," it is one of the terms of intimate relation which occurs with slight changes of form in nearly all the Aryan and Indo-European tongues.[3]

Strictly speaking, a father is the proper active principle of generation in perfect living beings, while "fatherhood is the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings."[4] Relation is the name given the order that exists between two things, which two things are in some way referred to one another. In every relation we can distinguish the principle or subject which is referred to, the term to which the subject is referred, and the reason for the reference. This latter is called the foundation of the relation. We have a clear example of a relation in teaching; the teacher is the subject of the relation, while its term is the pupil, the foundation of the relation being the act of teaching.[5]

Generation, in its wider sense, is nothing more than a change from non-existence to existence.[6] However, we are concerned here with the strict meaning of generation which signifies the origin of any living being from a conjoined living principle by way of a similitude of nature in the same species.[7] Three things, therefore, are required in order that there be a true generation. First, both the generator and the being generated must be living. Consequently, perspiration and such things, although they have their origin within a living body, are not properly said to be generated. Secondly, it is required that the generator be conjoined, that is, he must produce the generated being from his own substance. Hence the first man cannot be said to have been generated in the strict sense because God did not produce

[3] Cf. *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, V, 351; also *The Century Dictionary*, III, 2153.

[4] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 28, a. 4.

[5] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 28, aa. 1, 2; also Aristotle, *Metaph.*, V, 15.

[6] ". . . communiter . . . generatio nihil aliud est quam mutatio de non esse ad esse (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 2).

[7] *Ibid.*

him from His own substance, but formed him from the slime of the earth.[8] Thirdly, it is required that the one generated proceed from the generator by way of a similitude of nature, and not only by way of generic similitude, but there must be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature.[9] This definition of generation is verified only in perfect living beings in as much as only perfect living beings proceed from a conjoined living principle by way of similitude in the same specific nature. The principle of a true generation is called a father,[10] the term being the son, while the relation of the father to the son is fatherhood.

We refer to the subject of this relation as principle, rather than cause, advisedly. "The word principle signifies only that whence another proceeds."[11] But the ". . . term cause seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another. . . ."[12] The necessity of the use of the word principle rather than cause will be evident as we proceed, particularly in our consideration of fatherhood within the Godhead, in which there is a procession from, but no dependence upon, the principle of generation.

A father is said to be the proper active generative principle inasmuch as in some imperfect generations, such as human generation, there is required a duality of principles, the one active, the other passive. The proper active principle in such cases is the father, while the maternal principle, although endowed with a certain limited activity, is properly said to be passive.[13]

[8] *Gen.*, iii, 7.

[9] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 2; III, q. 28, a. 1, ad 4um; I, q. 100, a. 1; I-II, q. 81, a. 2; also P. M. Gazzaniga, *Praelectiones Theologicae*, Tom. III, Dissert, II, Cap. III; also J. Gonzalez, *Com. in I part. D. Thomae*, Tom. II, Disputatio II, Sect. I.

[10] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 32, a. 2; q. 40, a. 2.

[11] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 33, a. 1.

[12] *Ibid.*, ad 1um . . .

[13] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 92, a. 1. The recent theory concerning an equality of active principles in generation is no longer tenable in the light of modern physiological findings. It is now generally admitted by competent scientists that not only

It must be noted that generation is a natural process, and that nature intends as the term of the generation not only the production of a being, but also the producion of a being in its perfection.[14] Consequently, when a being which has not yet reached its perfection results from the essential act of generation, nature demands that the generating process continue until the being attains its perfection. This means that the education and discipline of the offspring and all that these imply, such as nourishment and protection, are related to generation as integral parts.[15]

Types of Fatherhood

We can distinguish five various types of fatherhood, namely: 1) divine fatherhood within the Godhead; 2) fatherhood of divine adoption; 3) God's fatherhood of natural creatures; 4) human fatherhood; and 5) the fatherhood of human adoption.

(1). Within the very Godhead Itself is to be found fatherhood in its fullness, which is the archetype of all other paternity and of which all fatherhood is but a participation. Thus St. Paul speaks of this fatherhood as that from which " all paternity in heaven and earth is named." [16] God is a Father because He truly generates a Son. By an examination of the mystery of the Holy Trinity we shall see that the relation of the First Person to the Second Person is that of fatherhood in the fullest sense of the word.[17]

The procession of the Divine Word from God the Father is a true generation because the Word proceeds by way of intellectual action, which is a vital operation. He proceeds from a conjoined living principle because He receives the very nature

is the father the proper active principle in as much as the spermatozoon actively penetrates the ovum, but also because of the established fact that the spermatozoon is gifted with extraordinary powers of locomotion while the ovum is relatively immobile.

[14] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 41, a. 1.

[15] Cf. *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 102, a. 1; Suppl., q. 41, a. 1.

[16] *Ephes.*, iii, 15.

[17] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 27, a. 2.

of the First Person of the Trinity. He proceeds by way of similitude [18] in as much as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived. He proceeds in the same nature because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same.[19] All fatherhood, whether it be in heaven or on earth, is derived from this divine paternity within the Godhead. All other types of fatherhood are but participations of this true and perfect paternity of God by which the Father gives the Son His whole nature.[20]

"The terms 'generation' and 'paternity,'" says St. Thomas, "like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, 'I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.' This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures." [21]

(2). That fatherhood which approaches more closely than all other types to true and perfect paternity is the adoptive fatherhood of God, by which He communicates His divine nature to creatures. God is not the natural father of the creature to whom He thus communicates His nature, for the divine nature is in no way due to creatures. Thus this type of fatherhood is called one of adoption; for it is by adoption that one takes a stranger as his own heir and child.[22] By the fatherhood

[18] Cf. *Coloss.*, i, 15.
[19] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.
[20] Cf. St. Thom., *In Epist. S. Pauli ad Ephesios*, Cap. III, lect. 4.
[21] *Summa Theol.*, q. 33, a. 2, ad 4um.
[22] Cf. *Ibid.*, III, q. 23, a. 1.

of divine adoption men become the heirs and sons of God. The charter of this adoption is to be found in the Gospel of St. John, in the Synoptics, and in the Epistles of Sts. Paul, John, Peter, and James.[23] According to their teaching, men are begotten, born of God. God is the Father of men because He is the principle of a new life in them, a supernatural life, a life of grace. This fatherhood is not a natural one, for the new life which men receive is in no way due to them by nature.[24] Yet, as we shall see, it differs greatly from human adoptive fatherhood, for it adds inestimably to man's intrinsic worth. Indeed, it has the primary formal nature of fatherhood; here there is a true generation, true new life, and it is God Who is the principle of this new life. There is even a certain participation of nature, for we become the adopted children of God.[25]

Men can never by their own merits become sons of God.[26] Consequently, this fatherhood of divine adoption is something which is entirely gratuitous. Moreover, it infinitely surpasses human adoption " for as much as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him whom he adopts worthy (to be adopted), but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy." [27] Indeed, this adoptive fatherhood is perfect, for by it the " creature is likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father . . . and this likeness perfects the adoption; for those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due." [28] Thus this type of fatherhood approaches more closely than all other types the divine natural fatherhood, from which " all paternity in heaven and earth is named." [29]

(3). Considering the relation of God to those of His creatures whom He has not endowed with His sanctifying grace, we again

[23] *John*, i, 12, 13; *Matt.*, v, 9, 44, 45; *Luke*, xx, 35, 36; *Rom.*, viii, 14-16; *Ephes.*, i, 5 ff.; *Gal.*, iv, 4-7; *I John*, i, 3; *I Peter*, i; *I James*, i, 18.

[24] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 1; q. 114, aa. 2, 5.

[25] *II Peter*, i, 4.

[26] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 2.

[27] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 23, a. 1.

[28] *Ibid.*, ad 3um.

[29] *Ephes.*, iii, 15.

find the notion of fatherhood verified in God. This, however, will not be perfect fatherhood, for, as has been said, paternity, in the strictest sense of the word, is to be found only within the Godhead. But this divine paternity is reflected in God's relationships with His creatures, and in other ways, as we shall see. Between God and natural creatures we do not find the relations of true paternity and filiation, first of all, because the act by which creatures proceed from God is not, properly speaking, a generative one, but rather a creative one. Moreover, God does not produce creatures by way of a similitude of His nature, but by way of a similitude of His essence, divine nature implies divine operation, and the only instances of creatures who operate in a divine manner are those who are gifted with God's grace.[30] So while natural creatures participate in the essence of God, they do not partake of God's nature. Then, too, natural creatures do not proceed from God as from a conjoined living principle because God produces them from nothing and there is no medium between the Creator and the being created.

However, God may be said to be the Father of natural creatures because, as the principle of their being, He produces them in a certain likeness of His essence.[31] This likeness will be more perfect as we approach nearer to the true relations of fatherhood and sonship. Thus God is called the Father of some creatures by reason only of vestige, as in the case of irrational animals.[32] Of the rational creature, God is Father by reason of the likeness of His image.[33] Thus we read in the Book of Deuteronomy: " Is he not thy father, that hath possessed thee, and made thee, and created thee? " [34] But God is not only the principle of the being of natural creatures; He is also the director and governor of their being in as much as the production of being is not the ultimate end of the divine action, but is or-

[30] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, aa. 3, 4; q. 112, a. 1; q. 113, a. 9; q. 114, a. 3; II-II, q. 19, a. 7.

[31] *Ibid.*, I, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2um.

[32] *Ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 7; q. 33, a. 3; q. 93, a. 6.

[33] *Ibid.*, I, q. 45, a. 7; q. 33, a. 3; q. 93, a. 2.

[34] *Deuteronomy*, xxxii, 6.

dained to a higher end. Creatures, however, of themselves, are incapable of knowing and attaining this end, and so it is necessary that God conduct them to it. In this sense He may be said to be their Father; " for it belongs to a father to beget and to govern." [35] Thus while God may be rightly called the Father of natural creatures, He is not formally a father in this sense in as much as the formal notes of fatherhood are lacking in His production of such creatures.

(4). Among men we find a relation of paternity, that of human fatherhood, which is but a shadow of the divine paternity. But it is fatherhood precisely because it is a reflection, a participation, however weak, of the divine paternity within the Godhead. The term fatherhood, therefore, is applied to creatures in an analogical sense in comparison with its application to God.[36] Unlike the relationship that exists between the first and second Persons of the Blessed Trinity, the nature of the begetter and begotten in human generation is not numerically, but only specifically, the same.[37] Human fatherhood is but a reflection of divine paternity because human generation is far less perfect. This deficiency is found not only in the principles of human generation, but also in the human generative act. While God enters in to supply the form in human production, His action in this instance is not properly generative, but rather creative, in as much as He produces the human soul out of nothing. It is the secondary principles in human production who place the specificially generative act. God gives the motion that results in the generative act, and it is for this reason, as well as because of the fact that he supplies the form for the resultant being, that He can be called the father of the natural man. However, His paternity here is but a faint reflection of the plenitude of His fatherhood; the being that is produced as a result of His action and that of the human parents, who are the secondary principles in human production, receives the specific

[35] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 3.
[36] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 6, ad 1um.
[37] *Ibid.*, I, q. 33, a. 2, ad 4um.

nature not of the primary principle of its production, but rather of the secondary principle.

Unlike the divine generation within the Godhead, human generation is fraught with many imperfections. First of all, the principles of human generation are imperfect, and they are imperfect precisely because they are material and multiple. Moreover, the generative act is imperfect, because in man, who is finite, it is temporal. This means that not only does man have to wait until he reaches a certain stage of development before he can place the generative act, but, once he has placed that act a period of time must elapse before the completion of the process of generation. Moreover, when essential generation has taken place, the being is far from having reached its perfection. The child at generation and for a long time after birth is incapable of maintaining its own existence. Consequently, closely bound up and included in the idea of human generation is the notion of education, which includes the nourishment, protection, instruction, and training of the child. These notions are inseparable from the concept of human generation, " for nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man . . ." [38] It is for this reason that St. Thomas says that a father is the principle not only of generation, but also " of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life." [39]

It is the function of the human father, then, not only to generate, but also to nourish, to protect, to instruct, and to train his children. Indeed, in every generation which is not perfect (and there is only the one perfect generation) some or all of these functions will be necessary, depending on the nature of the being generated.

The proper active principle of human generation is, then, truly a father, for from his own living substance there proceeds a new living being of the same specific nature. And the precise reason that the proper active principle of human generation is

[38] *Summa Theol.*, Suppl. q. 41, a. 1. [39] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

called a father is the fact that he partakes of the plenitude of fatherhood " from whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." [40]

(5). Men participate in the divine paternity in yet another way when they assume as their own children and heirs those whom they have not generated. Since one who partakes of this type of fatherhood is not the principle whence the life of the child proceeds, he is not said to be the natural father of the child; his fatherhood is one of adoption. Thus paternity of this type does not partake of the intrinsic formal nature of paternity. Consequently, in human adoption, the father adds nothing to the intrinsic worth of his adopted child. However, such a father does have a claim to paternity in as much as, in lieu of the principle of the child's generation, he brings this generation to its integral perfection by performing the secondary functions of a father. As we have seen, these latter functions, although extrinsic, partake of the integral nature of fatherhood. So, although this type of paternity is far less perfect than any we have yet considered, it does, nevertheless, merit the name of fatherhood.

A clear notion of the different types of fatherhood and their relative importance may be had from the following illustration showing the various degrees of paternity in relation to the divine paternity, which is in the Godhead.

II. The Fatherhood of Christ

As we have seen, one is a father formally, in as much as he participates in the divine fatherhood of God the Father from " whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." [41] He Who participates more fully than all others in this divine principality of the Father is His divine Son, Jesus Christ. Christ is a father because He generates men into a new life. He begets new creatures who participate in His own nature [42] much more intimately than men, by human generation, share in the nature

[40] *Ephes.*, iii, 15. [41] *Ephes.*, iii, 15. [42] II *Peter*, i, 4.

of their natural fathers. Christ is the principle of man's participation in the divine nature in as much as, through his human nature, He merited this gift for men through His Passion, and in as much as He efficiently communicates it to them through the sacraments.[43]



Christ's fatherhood of men became a necessity with the loss of supernatural life by the first father of men. Adam, by his sin, forfeited participation in the divine life not only for himself but also for all his descendants. God had decreed, however, that man's participation in the divine life should be restored. Moreover, He had determined the manner in which this restoration

[43] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 64, a. 3.

was to be effected. The sons of Adam were not to be born into this world in a supernatural state, but God had ordained that men already born should be " reborn in a new manner so as to die according to the first birth and live according to the second." [44] Sacred Scripture assures us of the necessity of this new birth in order that men may participate in the divine nature. As the foundation of this doctrine we have the words of Christ to Nicodemus, " Unless a man be born from on high, he cannot see the kingdom of God." [45] The very idea of birth implies a son or children who are generated and a father who generates. Therefore, in order that men may have life in God, is it necessary that they have a father to generate them into this new life.

Just as Adam is the father of the human race in so far as he virtually contained as sons all men who were to proceed from him as from a principle, so, too, Christ, the second Adam, is the new Father of men in as much as by His passion He merited for all men a participation in the divine nature. Indeed, Christ is in a much truer sense the Father of men in as much as He gives them spiritual life, a participation in the very life of God, whereas Adam bequeaths to them only passing, human life in a corrupted human nature, which, because of its corruptibility is incompatible with the eternal life. It is for this reason that as sons of Adam we must die, but as sons of Christ we have eternal life.

Christ is not only the second Adam; He is also the " last Adam," for " there is no other name under heaven given to men,

[44] Fray Luis de Leon, *The Names of Christ* (New York: 1926), p. 46.

[45] *John*, iii, 3. *Note*:—The Greek text has " gennethe anothen " which may mean: " born again "; " born anew "; or " born from on high." Some of the Fathers and Doctors, St. Thomas among them, prefer " born from on high," and there is little doubt that this is the correct signification. The context in 3:31 shows that this is the true meaning. It is not the fact of a rebirth that is emphasized but the spiritual quality of the rebirth. The sense of the passage is: spiritual rebirth is the first requisite for entry into the kingdom of heaven, which, contrary to the general expectation, is here asserted to be a spiritual kingdom. Cf. M. J. Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Jean* (Paris: 1936), p. 74.

whereby we must be saved." [46] There is no other father to be expected who can free men from the deadly effects transmitted through their generation by the first Adam, and can give them a new life, a new nature, which is a participation in the divine nature. What Adam would have bequeathed to his sons, had he remained faithful, was lost by his sin; and, as a consequence, his sons are born in a nature that bears the deadly effects of his sin. Christ's sons, however, participate in the all-perfect nature of God Himself. Therefore, Christ's fatherhood exceeds Adam's as the divine and perfect exceeds the human and corrupt, as unsullied supernature exceeds corrupted nature. The comparison of the two Fathers of men and of the inheritances left their respective sons, as given by St. Paul in the fifth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, shows the infinite superiority of Christ as the Father of man.

" But not as the offence, so also the gift.

For if by the offence of one, many died;	much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.

And not as it was by one sin, so also is the gift.

For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation;	but grace is of many offences unto justification.
For if by one man's offence death reigned through one;	much more they who receive abundance of grace and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ.
For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners;	so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just." [47]

As sons of Adam, therefore, men are sinners worthy of condemnation; but as sons of Christ they are saints, worthy of eternal life.

Christ, then, is the Father of all men virtually in that He merited for them by His passion a participation in the nature

[46] *Acts*, iv, 12.

[47] *Rom.*, v, 15-19.

of God. But He is also the actual Father of each individual man to whom He communicates His divine nature, to whom He applies the merits of His passion by generating them into a new life.

This generation is effected through the sacrament of Baptism.[48] In Baptism, Christ " actually implants within us that which we begin to receive in him and which He performed in Himself for us, that is, the destruction of our guilt and its expulsion from our soul . . . At the same time He inserted a germ—a seed, we might call it—of his spirit and grace, which, enclosed within our soul and cultivated as it should be, might afterwards sprout at its appointed time, increase in strength, and grow to the measure of the ' perfect man ' . . ." [49] It is by Baptism that men are incorporated in the passion and death of Christ,[50] for, as the Apostle says, we are saved " by the laver of regeneration." [51] In Baptism all the requisites for a generation in the strictest sense of the word are verified. There is the production of a new living being, for through this sacrament man becomes a " new creature." [52] There is a communication of the same nature because by the grace given in Baptism men become partakers of the divine nature of Christ, " by whom," says St. Peter, " he hath given us most great and precious promises that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature." [53] Men, in the sacrament of Baptism, proceed from Christ as from a conjoined living principle in that the grace merited by His passion is communicated to them through His human nature.[54] Hence it is that Christ is truly a father, and men by the " laver of regeneration " become His sons.

It was in view of the fact that through their divine Mediator men were to die as sons of Adam and live as sons of Christ

[48] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 39, a. 8, ad 3um; q. 69, a. 8.

[49] Fray Luis de Leon, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[50] . . . per baptismum configuratur homo passioni et resurrectioni Christi, inquantum moritur peccato et incipit novam iustitiae vitam (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 2).

[51] *Titus*, iii, 5.

[52] II *Cor.*, v, 17; *Gal.*, vi, 15.

[53] II *Peter*, i, 4.

[54] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 5.

that Isaias called Christ " the Father of the world to come." [55] However, it must be noted that Christ is not the natural father of men, for the nature which He communicates to them is in no way due to them.[56] Hence its communication is entirely gratuitous; [57] it is by adoption that men become sons of Christ. Because Christ's fatherhood is one of adoption does not mean, however, that it is less than human paternity. On the contrary, His fatherhood is the highest participation in the paternity of God the Father; it is God Himself who gives the form to Christ's fatherhood, since the nature which Christ communicates is divine. Obviously, then, Christ's fatherhood is in the supernatural order and exceeds human paternity as heaven exceeds earth.

Despite the infinite superiority of Christ's paternity over human fatherhood, it is not the plenitude of paternity which is proper to the First Person of the Blessed Trinity Who generates a Son in an identity of nature; for men proceed from Christ only by way of a similitude of nature. Moreover, Christ, in Baptism, does not generate sons who have reached their final perfection. The grace, the participation in Christ's divine nature which they receive, is but the " seed of glory." [58] And as the sons born of Christ have not attained their perfection, He has provided for their growth, nourishment, strength, and protection through the medium of the other sacraments.[59] Consequently, Christ's work as the Father of each man is not complete with his essential generation, but continues until he reaches the stature of the " perfect man " in the life of glory.

Christ, acting as the perfect and all-loving Father, nourishes His children throughout their lives with the spiritual food of His own Body and Blood. He strengthens them and gives them

[55] Pater futuri saeculi. (*Isaias*, ix, 6).

[56] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 2, a. 12.

[57] Cf. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 1; q. 114, aa. 2, 5.

[58] Gratia gratum faciens hoc modo comparatur ad beatitudinem sicut ratio seminalis in natura ad effectum naturalem; unde . . . gratia semen Dei nominatur (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 3).

[59] Cf. *Ibid.*, III, q. 62, a. 2; q. 65, a. 4; q. 72, a. 1, ad 3um.

courage to meet life's battles in the sacrament of Confirmation. And when His children are enfeebled with the disease of sin, He places His healing hand upon them in the sacrament of Penance and restores them to health. When His children are weak and famished and at the point of death, He is with them in the sacrament of Extreme Unction, giving them added vigor to fight on to the end. It is also the duty of a father to rule and to govern.[60] Christ, being " the Father of the world to come," sees to its rule and governance by communicating His power and grace in the sacrament of Holy Orders, by which men are constituted His magistrates. A father must also propagate his species. Christ provides for the perpetuation of His divine society, and assures its members of all the supernatural helps necessary for their perfection, by giving special grace for this purpose to those who are united in the holy sacrament of Matrimony.

The fact that it is Christ Who is the author of the grace necessary for man's integral generation into the supernatural life, and the fact that this grace is transmitted through the sacraments is a matter of divine faith. Hence, because Christ is the principle of grace by which men become His sons and grow to spiritual perfection, there can be no doubt that He is the Father of all to whom He communicates His grace in the sacraments.

Christ is the Father of men because He is the great High Priest. In decreeing that the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity should become Incarnate, God primarily intended that He should be the Father of men. It was included in the divine plan that Christ's fatherhood of men should be the immediate consequence of His priesthood. Indeed, the humanity, mediatorship, and priesthood of Christ were all ordered to His paternity by which He was to restore to men their life in God.

While the Incarnation in itself did not constitute Christ a priest, His priestly ordination is simultaneous with the Incarnation, " since the mission received from the Father to redeem

[60] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 3.

the world through His sacrifice, dates from this instant." [61] " In becoming incarnate, the Word of God assumed, so to speak, all the qualifications for and all the rights to the priesthood. By the dignity of His person and by the perfection of His holiness and His religion, He fulfilled all the requirements of a perfect priest. Yet He was not formally a priest. . . . For Jesus Christ to be a priest, it was necessary, not only that He become flesh, but that He be specially called and constituted priest by His Father . . ." [62] But Christ was constituted priest in as much as " He was sent upon earth by His Father precisely for the purpose of representing men and offering up the sacrifice which would reconcile them with God." [63] Consequently, Christ participates in the divine paternity because He is the great High Priest; for by His priestly sacrifice He became the new Father of men in as much as by it He merited for them a participation in the divine nature, by which they become sons of God.[64] And because Christ thus shares in the divine paternity, He can truly be said to be a father; for this is the primary formal claim to supernatural fatherhood.

III. The Priest's First Formal Claim to Fatherhood—Participation in the Divine Paternity

Christ is the Father of men because He is the great High Priest. Moreover, He is the only High Priest of the New Law, as is evident from the following words of the Council of Ephesus: " If anyone say that the very Word of God did not become our High Priest and Apostle, as though this were to be said of another one . . . let him be anathema." [65] Christ the Priest is the source of all priestly power; He " is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood." [66] As we have seen, it was as High Priest that Christ eminently fulfilled His role as the Father of men.

[61] J. Tixeront, *Holy Orders and Ordination* (St. Louis: 1928), p. 21.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 17. [63] *Ibid.* [64] *Rom.*, v, 2; viii, 16.
[65] *Conc. Ephesinum*, Anathematismi Cyrilli, Can. 10; Denz., 122.
[66] Christus . . . est fons totius sacerdotii (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 22, a. 4).

Since His Ascension into heaven, however, Christ is not present upon earth as a visible priest. Nevertheless, in as much as He is the everlasting propitiation for sin,[67] " always living to make intercession for us," [68] He continues to function as our High Priest in heaven.

Although Christ the Priest is no longer visibly present upon earth, the fruits of His priesthood are being daily transmitted to men. Since our divine Lord understood perfectly the nature of man and his need for visible signs and institutions,[69] He established upon earth a visible priesthood,[70] whose members He empowered [71] to communicate to men the redemptive grace merited by His priestly sacrifice. The members of this visible priesthood, however, are not so much Christ's successors as they are in very truth partakers of His priesthood. They are more than representatives of the great High Priest; for they act in the very person of Christ.[72] For this reason St. Paul could say: " For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ." [73] Thus the priest becomes identified with the great High Priest in all his ministerial acts. His official acts are Christ's acts, for Our Blessed Lord Himself says of His priests: " He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me." [74] The members of the priesthood of the New Law, then, are equipped with Christ's divine authority and the plenitude of His power so that they can bring to men the salvific effects of His sacrifice. They are thus made sharers in the eternal priesthood of Christ; in fact, the priesthood of Christ and that of His ministers is one and the same thing.

[67] I *John*, ii, 2.
[68] Heb., vii, 25.
[69] Cf. *Catechis. Concilii Trident.*, Pars II, cap. I, # 14.
[70] Cf. *Conc. Trident.*, sess. XXII, cap. 1; Denz., 938.
[71] *Matt.*, xxviii, 18-20.
[72] Sacerdos . . . novae legis in persona ipsius (Christi) operatur (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 22, a. 4).
[73] II *Cor.*, ii, 10.
[74] *Luke*, x, 16.

Christ instituted the priesthood of the New Law, when, at the Last Supper, He commanded His Apostles to continue the Eucharistic Sacrifice which He had just performed. By the words, "Do this for a commemoration of me," He conferred upon them the power proper to priests of the New Law, the power to offer the same sacrifice.[75] The Apostles and their successors, to whom they were to transmit this sacred power,[76] are thus made participants in the priesthood of Christ. This participation is effected by means of the character of the sacrament of Holy Orders, by which men are configured to the one great High Priest.

Originally, the term character was used to signify an image or figure which was indelibly imprinted or carved in wood or stone. Of its very nature, then, a character is something permanent and ineffaceable. Later, the word came to be used to denote a sign bringing about a resemblance between its bearer and the person in whose name he acted. "Thus soldiers, who are assigned to military service, are marked with their leader's sign, by which they are, in a fashion, likened to him." [77] This figure has been borrowed to designate the instrumental power conferred by certain of the sacraments by which men are configured to Christ and made participants in His priesthood.[78]

"A character," says St. Thomas, "is properly a kind of seal, whereby something is marked as being ordained to some particular end." [79] More specifically, "a character is a kind of seal by which the soul is marked, so that it may receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to Divine worship." [80] If the character is one by which we receive things pertaining to the divine cult, it is passive. If, however, by the character we bestow things pertaining to the divine worship, then it is an active power.[81] While it is true that all sacramental characters are "certain participations in Christ's priesthood, flowing from

[75] *Conc. Trident.*, sess. XXII, cap. 9, can. 2; Denz., 949.
[76] *Conc. Trident.*, sess. XXII, cap. 1; Denz. 938.
[77] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 3, ad 2um.
[78] *Ibid.*, a. 2.
[79] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 3.
[80] *Ibid.*, a. 4.
[81] Cf. *Ibid.*, a. 2.

Christ Himself," [82] the character of sacred ordination is a much fuller participation in His priesthood, and is the closest configuration to Christ in His office as Priest. By configuration is meant the conformity of the priest to the one great High Priest. Just as Christ is the image of the Father,[83] so the priest is the image of Christ, because by the character of Sacred Orders the priesthood of Christ is impressed upon him, thus making him the minister of the grace merited for men by the priestly act of Christ. By this character the priest is invested with divine authority and given the power to act in the very person of Christ. In a word, he thus becomes " another Christ."

It is by the sacramental character of Holy Orders, then, that men are configured to Christ, the great High Priest, and are given an intimate share in His priesthood. Since, however, the fatherhood of Christ immediately flows from His priesthood, whoever shares in Christ's priesthood, by that very fact, participates in His divine paternity. Therefore, when one is ordained a priest of the New Law, he immediately by that fact becomes a father of men. Virtually, he becomes the father of all men in as much as Christ merited the grace of adoption for all. It is for this reason that St. John Chrysostom says that the priest is " the common Father of the whole world." [84] At the same time the priest is the actual father of all those to whom this grace is communicated through the sacraments, and particularly the sacrament of Baptism. Thus St. Gregory, St. Jerome, and St. Alphonsus rightly call the priest " the Father of Christians." [85]

Unlike a natural father, the priest does not have to wait until he begets a child to become a father. His ordination, therefore, is not analogous in this respect to Matrimony which confers sacramental grace for properly disposing its recipients for

[82] *Ibid.*, a. 3.

[83] *Coloss.*, i, 15.

[84] Quasi communis totius orbis pater sacerdos est (*In I Tim.*, cap., ii, Hom. VI; P. L., 62, 529.

[85] Cf. St. Alphonsus, *Dignity and Duties of the Priest* or *Selva* (New York: 1888), pp. 144, 234.

the generation of offspring, but the moment a man becomes a priest he likewise becomes a father. By his priesthood, which is one with the priesthood of Christ, all men who are children of Christ have been begotten. For this reason the priest is the father of every person, living or dead, who has become a child of Christ by Baptism. Moreover, the priest is the virtual father of all men, even those who are not Christians, since by his priesthood, which is one with Christ's priesthood, there is merited for all the grace to become sons of Christ. Thus the priest shares in the supernatural adoptive fatherhood of Christ, which is the closest possible participation in the fullness of divine paternity. While there are many other reasons why the priest can lay claim to the title of spiritual paternity, these are of relatively minor significance when compared to this intimate participation in the fatherhood of God.

IV. The Priest's Second Formal Claim to Fatherhood—The Sacramental Ministry

We have arrived at the priest's claim to paternity by his participation in the one, eternal priesthood of Christ. But, unlike the claim to natural fatherhood, this is not one which comes simultaneously with the exercise of the particular functions of a father. In the natural order, one is not a father until he actually and personally generates a creature like unto himself. But before the priest personally generates he is a father; for he participates in the divine paternity by the very fact that he is a priest. Since his priesthood and that of Christ are one, the moment he shares in the priesthood he is the father of all those who have become sons of God through the saving grace of Christ the Priest. Should a priest never personally communicate to others the principle of divine life, he would nevertheless be a true father, for by his priesthood he participates in the fatherhood of God, which is the fundamental formal claim to paternity. However, even if we were unable to come to a knowledge of the participation of the priest in the

divine paternity by his sharing Christ's priesthood, it would be evident that the priest is a father since he performs those functions which are proper to a father. In other words, each and every duty which belongs to the integral nature of fatherhood is, in the supernatural order, a function proper to priests of the New Law.

From the very notion of fatherhood we know that it belongs to the paternal office to beget offspring and to bring that offspring to its integral perfection. The requisites for the life of an individual in the natural and supernatural order are parallel. Everyone recognizes the five following indispensable needs for the natural life of the individual man: birth, growth, nourishment, the removal of disease, and the increase of waning strength. Therefore, the supplying of the foregoing necessities belongs properly to the office of a father. In order to live the supernatural life man must be born spiritually, and his life must be preserved and increased. But, as we have seen, man is born into the supernatural life by the influx into his soul of the grace won for him by the priestly sacrifice of Christ. It is this grace which is the principle of man's new life. Consequently, the one who communicates to man this grace and preserves it in his soul is properly a father because by so acting he performs functions which pertain to the very nature of fatherhood.

For the communication of this divine life to the souls of men Christ instituted the seven sacraments of the New Law. It is well to note that He instituted seven sacraments, not more nor less, because the requisites for the individual and social life of man in the supernatural order, as well as in the natural order, are seven. *The Catechism of the Council of Trent*, in a beautiful analogy between the natural and spiritual life which it borrows from St. Thomas, shows the fittingness of seven sacraments for the communication and preservation of supernatural life.

> In order to exist, to preserve existence, and to contribute to his own and to the public good, seven things seem necessary to man: to be born, to grow, to be nurtured, to be cured when sick, when

weak to be strengthened; as far as regards the public weal: to have magistrates invested with authority to govern, and, finally, to perpetuate himself and his species by legitimate offspring. Analogous then as all these things obviously are, to that life by which the soul lives to God, we discover in them a reason to account for the number of Sacraments. Amongst them, the first is Baptism, the gate, as it were, to all the other sacraments, by which we are born again to Christ. The next is Confirmation, by which we grow up, and are strengthened in the grace of God: for, as St. Augustine observes, " to the Apostles who have already received baptism, the Redeemer said: ' stay you in the city till you be imbued with power from on high.' " The third is the Eucharist, that true bread from heaven which nourishes our souls to eternal life, according to these words of the Saviour: " My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." The fourth is Penance, by which the soul, which has caught the contagion of sin, is restored to spiritual health. The fifth is Extreme Unction, which obliterates the traces of sin, and invigorates the powers of the soul; of which St. James says: " if he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him." The sixth is Holy Orders, which gives power to perpetuate in the Church the public administration of the sacraments, and the exercise of all the sacred functions of the ministry. The seventh and last is Matrimony, a sacrament instituted for the legitimate union of man and woman, for the conservation of the human race, and the education of children, in the knowledge of religion, and the love and fear of God.[86]

Of these seven sacraments the first five are necessary for the life of the individual. Therefore, the minister of these five sacraments is truly and formally a father, for in administering them he generates a new creature and brings that creature to its perfection. By virtue of his sacerdotal office, the priest is the ordinary dispenser of the grace of the sacraments and it pertains to the very essence of the priestly office to administer the first five sacraments. Moreover, it is the five functions performed in the administration of these sacraments which constitute the integral nature of fatherhood. Consequently, by virtue of his sacramental ministry the priest is formally a father.

The priest is not the minister of the sacraments of Holy

[86] *Catechis. Concilii Trident.*, Pars II, Cap. 1, # 20-21. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 1.

Orders and Matrimony because the grace communicated by these sacraments is not directly ordained to either essential or integral supernatural generation. The needs supplied by these two sacraments are necessities not of the individual, but of the social order. Both provide for the perpetuation of society, the one by giving the grace to actually constitute men fathers in the supernatural order, the other by imparting the grace to dispose men to become good fathers in the natural order. But neither to constitute men fathers nor to directly dispose men for the fitting exercise of the paternal functions pertains formally to the office of a father. Hence, in so acting one does not function formally in the office of fatherhood, although such action is intimately connected with it. Consequently, any man in assuming the office of either a natural or supernatural father must do so of his own accord. Neither his natural or spiritual father can compel him to do so, for they have no authority in this matter, which is ordained to the public and not the individual good.

Since it pertains to the very essence of the priesthood to administer those sacraments, and only those sacraments, which are directly ordained to spiritual birth and integral supernatural generation, is is evident that the priestly office is, of its very nature, a paternal office. The priest is the principle of the transmission and the preservation of divine life in the souls of men. The divinity of Christ the priest is, of course, the primary principle of this divine life, but because the Great High Priest is no longer visibly present upon this earth He has deputed His priests to act in His person in the communication of this supernatural life. That Christ has given those who are configured to Him by the sacramental character of Holy Orders the power to communicate this new life by administering the sacraments necessary for man's generation and continued existence in the supernatural order is a doctrine defined by the Church,[87] and evident from the words of Sacred Scripture.[88]

[87] Joannes XXII, *Constitut.* "*Gloriosam Ecclesiam,*" 23 Jan., 1318; Denz. 486. S. Pius V, Bulla "*Ex omnibus afflictionibus,*" 1 Oct., 1567; Denz. 1058.

[88] *I Cor.*, iv, 1; *Matt.*, xxviii, 19; *Luke*, xxii, 19; *John* xx, 23; *James*, v, 14.

While the divinity of Christ is the primary principle in the communication of grace, there are, besides the sacraments themselves, two secondary or instrumental principles, one of which is conjoined to the divinity, the other of which is separated from it. The humanity of Christ is the secondary conjoined principle, whereas the priest is the secondary separated principle. This distinction of secondary or instrumental principles in this case, however, is something accidental to the nature of fatherhood; the separated principle here has the same power as the conjoined principle in as much as the latter has given the plenitude of His power to the former.[89] Moreover, since the priest, the secondary principle of supernatural life, is an animated instrument, he operates personally in spiritual generation. The role of the priest in the transmission of divine life through the sacraments is more easily seen from the following diagram:

	Primary		The Divinity of Christ
The Principle of Supernatural Generation	Secondary or Instrumental	Animated	Conjoined . . . The Humanity of Christ
			Separated . . . The Priest
		Inanimated	The Sacraments

Just as human parents are the secondary principles in human production, priests are the secondary principles of the communication of spiritual life. Hence the following statement of St. Thomas concerning human parents is likewise applicable to priests in the supernatural order: "Parents are the principles

[89] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 64, a. 3; *Matt.*, xxviii, 18; *John*, xx, 21.

of our being . . . ," that is, secondary principles after God.[90] Since, then, those who share in the priesthood of Christ, are truly principles of integral supernatural generation and since such principles are formally fathers, there can be no doubt of the priest's formal claim to fatherhood by reason of his sacramental ministry.

We shall now show how in administering each of the sacraments necessary for integral spiritual life the priest performs a function proper to the office of fatherhood. The sacrament by which men are born into the supernatural life is Baptism.[91] For this reason, St. Paul refers to it as " the laver of regeneration." [92] Through Baptism sanctifying grace is infused into men's souls so that they become partakers of the divine nature and are thus made sons of God. Since, however, it is the priest who is the ordinary minister of Baptism and since this sacrament effects a true generation, the priest in administering it is performing the primary function of a father. It is by a right inherent in the sacerdotal office that the priest administers this sacrament, for ". . . by Baptism a man becomes a participator in ecclesiastical unity, wherefore also he receives the right to approach Our Lord's Table. Consequently, just as it belongs to a priest to consecrate the Eucharist, which is the principal cause of the priesthood, so it is the proper office of a priest to baptize, since it belongs to one and the same to produce the whole and to dispose the part in the whole." [93]

The priest, then, is a spiritual father participating in the supernatural fatherhood of Christ, for he is the principle of man's generation into the divine life. Hence, says St. John Chrysostom: " It is to priests that spiritual birth and regeneration by Baptism is entrusted. By them we put on Christ and are united to the Son of God and become partakers of that blessed head. Hence we should regard them as more august

[90] Deus . . . est nobis essendi . . . primum principium. Secundaria vero nostri esse . . . principia sunt parentes . . . (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 101, a. 1).

[91] *Conc. Trident.*, sess. ii, cap. II; Denz. 895; *Rom.*, vi, 1-8.

[92] *Titus*, iii, 5.

[93] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 67, a. 2.

than princes and kings and more venerable than parents. For the latter begot us of blood and the flesh, but priests are the cause of our generation from God, of our spiritual regeneration, of our true freedom and sonship according to grace." [94] From these words of the great Father of the Church it is obvious that he ascribes to the priest the conferring of divine sonship, which is the effect of the priestly sacrifice of Christ, in whose priesthood he participates.

Baptism alone, however, like human birth, does not fulfill all the implications integral to generation. Should the newly born spiritual child be left to himself, he would not grow to maturity, he would be helpless against the attacks of the enemies of the spiritual life, or he would die from the lack of care and nourishment. Just as in the natural order it is necessary that a child be brought to maturity and strengthened so that he will be able to repel any advances of the enemies of his natural life, so, too, the spiritual child must be strengthened so that he will be able to ward off any attack upon his supernatural life. For this purpose he receives a more abundant infusion of grace in the sacrament of Confirmation. This sacrament is compared to Baptism as growth to generation. Confirmation brings the child to spiritual maturity,[95] for by it " the fullness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual strength that belongs to the perfect age." [96] By the character impressed upon the soul in this sacrament, the recipient has a perpetual title to actual divine assistance in the defense of his spiritual life.

In administering Confirmation, the priest is perfecting and bringing to spiritual maturity the child he begot in Baptism. He is thus performing a paternal act which pertains to the integral generation of his offspring. While the simple priest is not the ordinary minister of Confirmation, when he does administer this sacrament, he is performing a function which

[94] *De Sacerdotio*, lib. iii, n. 6, in *PG* XLVIII, 643-44.

[95] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 72, a. 1.

[96] In hoc sacramento (Confirmationis) datur plenitudo Spiritus Sancti ad robur spirituale, quod competit perfectae aetati (*Ibid.*, a. 2).

belongs primarily to the sacerdotal office, for to confirm is an act of Orders. While the general practice of the Church has ever been that Bishops should administer this sacrament, the fundamental reason why they can administer it is because of the power they have by reason of their sacerdotal character. This is evident from the fact that in the Eastern Churches the priests are commonly the ministers of Confirmation and their administrations are recognized by the Church as valid.[97] However, the Bishop, not the priest, is the ordinary minister of this sacrament, as the Council of Trent explicitly declares.[98] For valid administration of Confirmation the priest needs the delegation of the Supreme Pontiff. But since by delegation the character received in Holy Orders is in no way changed, the fact remains that the power to confirm arises from the sacerdotal character, even though this power may not be validly exercised without proper delegation. Thus the administration of this sacrament, whether by a Bishop or a simple priest, is an act that is performed primarily in virtue of participation in Christ's priesthood. And of its very nature it is a paternal act, for it has for its purpose the integral generation of offspring.

Not only must a child be free from outward attacks, but he must be nurtured so that the life within him may be preserved and perfected.[99] In view of this fact Christ instituted the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist for nourishing the supernatural life of His children. The effect of the Eucharist is signified in the manner in which it is given, that is, by way of food. " And, therefore, this sacrament does for the spiritual life all that material bread does for bodily life; namely, by sustaining, giving increase, restoring and giving delight." [100] Thus could Our Lord truly say, " My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." [101]

Just as man's natural life is sustained by material food, so,

[97] Cf. *Const.* " *Etsi Pastoralis,*" Benedicti XIV, Denz. 1458.
[98] Sess. vii, *Canones de Sacramento Confirmationis,* can. 3; Denz. 873.
[99] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 1um.
[100] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 79, a. 1.
[101] *John,* vi, 56.

too, his spiritual life is sustained and invigorated by this Bread of Life. This spiritual food not only augments the supernatural life received in Baptism, but " whatever losses the soul sustains by falling into some slight offenses, these the Eucharist, which cancels lesser sins, repairs in the same manner, not to depart from the illustration already adduced, that natural food, as we know from experience, gradually repairs the daily waste caused by the vital heat of the system. Of this heavenly Sacrament justly, therefore, has St. Ambrose said: 'This daily bread is taken as a remedy for daily infirmity.' " [102]

The priest alone is the ordinary minister of this Living Bread, as is evident from the words of Christ to His Apostles, " Do this for a commemoration of Me," by which words priests alone were designated.[103] Since the dispensing of the Eucharist is manifestly a spiritual feeding, a means of preserving and augmenting the supernatural life given in Baptism, and since such an act is proper to a father, there can be no doubt that the priest in administering this Sacrament is functioning formally as a spiritual father.

Besides nourishing his children, a father also has the duty of restoring them to health when they are afflicted with sickness and disease. This is done in the natural order by procuring the proper medicaments and providing special care. In the sacrament of Penance, Christ has provided for the cure of His spiritual children who are suffering from the disease of sin; for " as a father hath compassion on his children, so hath the Lord compassion on them that fear him." [104] It is He " Who forgiveth all thy iniquities, who healeth all thy diseases." [105] In this sacrament there is applied the grace that heals the wounds of the soul. Penance also makes provision for the paternal instruction and admonition necessary for the preservation and improvement of spiritual health. Just as the natural child must

[102] *Cathechis. Concilii Trident.*, Pars. II, cap. 4, # 52.

[103] Cf. *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 845, § 1; also *Conc. Trident.*, sess. xiii, c. 8; sess. xxiii, c. 1.

[104] *Psalm* cii, 13.

[105] *Ibid.*, 3.

be taught the habits of good health, so, too, the child of God must be instructed in the rules for safeguarding his spiritual health. Thus this sacrament furnishes not only a cure for spiritual sickness, but it also gives individual instruction and direction which will enable its recipent to live the supernatural life to the fullest.

Priests, and priests alone, are the ministers of this sacrament, for Christ's words, " Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained," [106] were directed to them alone. As can be readily seen, all the duties of the minister of the sacrament of Penance are paternal ones; a father is obliged to care for his child in time of sickness, and to rule, govern and instruct him so that he may reach the perfection of life. Therefore, the priest's role in this sacrament is above all else that of a father.

A father must care for his children not only in time of mortal sickness, but he must provide a cure for their less serious illnesses. Moreover, after the child has been restored to health, it is the duty of his father to see to the removal of any defect, debility, or weakness which results from the sickness. The father must especially take care that the enemies of the life of the child are not permitted to take advantage of such debility and weakness. In the supernatural order the child is often sick with the less devastating disease of venial sin. Moreover, he is being constantly weakened by the effects which remain after sin, especially original sin.[107] Because of the debilitating effects of these remains of sin, the spiritual child needs special strength and assistance to overcome those who would prevent his attaining the perfection of his supernatural life. The time at which the enemies of his soul will be more prodigious than ever in their efforts to take advantage of such weakness is at the hour of death, for this is the last opportunity they have of preventing the child of God from reaching the stature of " the perfect man " in the life of glory.

Provision has been made for this need in the sacrament

[106] *John*, xx, 23.

[107] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, Suppl., q. 30, a. 1.

of Extreme Unction, for ". . . in the other sacraments, our Redeemer prepared the greatest aids whereby during life Christians may preserve themselves whole from every grevious spiritual evil, so did He guard the close of life, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction, as with a most firm defense. For though our adversary seeks and seizes opportunities all our life long to be able in any way to devour our souls, yet there is no time wherein he strains more vehemently all the powers of his craft to ruin us utterly, and if he can possibly, to make us fall from trust in the mercy of God, than when he perceives the end of our life is at hand." [103]

Extreme Unction not only cures the disease of sin, but it also removes all the debilities that result from sin.[109] It also gives strength to the child of God at the very moment he needs it most, so that he may overcome the violent assaults of his enemies and thus attain the perfection of life. " The proper ministers of this sacrament," says the Council of Trent, " are the presbyters of the Church by which name are to be understood . . . either bishops or priests, rightly ordained by the imposition of the hands of the priesthood." [110] Since, then, priests are properly the ministers of Extreme Unction, and in as much as the functions performed by the ministers of this sacrament pertain directly to the paternal office, the priest in administering it is truly a father.

Thus the sacramental ministry of the priest in the supernatural order corresponds to the office of fatherhood in the natural order. However, the fatherhood of the priest, even in this respect, infinitely surpasses human paternity; for, as St. John Chrysostom so beautifully puts it: ". . . God has given to priests greater power than to our natural parents, and so much greater as the future life excels the present. For our parents begot us to the present life, but priests to the life to come, and the former cannot ward off from their children the death of the

[108] *Conc. Trident.*, sess. xiv, cap. 9, Denz. 907.
[109] *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit.
[110] Cf. *Canones de Extrema Unctione*, can. 4; Denz. 929.

body, nor hinder disease from attacking them, whereas the latter often preserve souls that are ill and about to die . . . And not only in our regeneration have they the power to remit sin, but they also have the power to remit sins committed after regeneration. Moreover, parents according to nature can be of no assistance to their children if they chance to offend anyone in dignity and power. But priests have often reconciled them, not with kings or princes, but with God himself when incensed against them." [111]

Conclusion

We have established by solid theological arguments that the priest is truly the spiritual father of all. But such argumentation is of little value if its conclusion is not to be the driving force of priestly life. This doctrine imposes upon the priest the obligation of seeing in himself a spiritual father, for to be ignorant of this God-given role is to fail to understand the nature of the priesthood with the consequent impossibility of properly discharging its sacred obligations. In realizing that he is the spiritual father of the whole world, that it is of the very essence of the priestly office to take the place of Christ here on earth as the new Father of men, the conscientious priest cannot fail to see his obligation to conform himself more and more to His divine Model. He will study eagerly the life of Christ in search of His paternal virtues so that he may know just what virtues should be the special equipment of his own priestly life. Children are something of their father, they become like their father; and since the priest is a father who stands in the place of Christ, he must strive to have, in so far as it is possible, every paternal virtue which is to be found in Christ Himself so that his children, through him, may be more perfectly conformed to their Blessed Saviour. The matter of uncovering and delineating the precisely paternal virtues in the life of Christ is a study well worth development, as it will afford the priest very definite ideals to

[111] *De Sacerdotio*, lib. III, n. 6, in *PG* XLVIII, 644.

guide him in preparing himself for the fitting exercise of his paternal office.

In recognizing the nature and obligations of his role as spiritual father, the priest cannot but have a greater appreciation of the divine Fatherhood within the Godhead as well as of the participations in this divine Paternity by himself and human fathers. He will understand that all his strivings, as indeed the efforts of all fathers, are but a reflection of the eternal divine action within the Blessed Trinity. He and all fathers are thus seen in their admirable roles as cooperators with God in the communication of life.

Since the priest is to communicate and preserve spiritual life throughout the world, his obligations are without limit. First of all, there is the duty of teaching men that he is really and truly their father, and that consequently they have the right to expect of him every possible means of help for preserving and increasing the supernatural life in their souls. This the priest must teach by word; but the truth and implications of this doctrine will be more eloquently preached by the example of his life. The priest who is ever eager to communicate and preserve the divine life in the souls of men lets pass no opportunity to administer the Sacraments. Never will he go to the confessional without giving a word of paternal instruction and encouragement to lead his children to a more abundant sharing in the treasures of the spiritual life.

Just as no problem which concerns the progress of the natural life of his children escapes the vigilance of a human father, so, too, no action which has to do with the spiritual development of the child lies beyond the orbit of sacerdotal duty. In as much as every human action is good or bad and therefore beneficial or detrimental to spiritual life, it is difficult to conceive of any human affair which does not concern the priest. This does not mean that one can do nothing without first consulting a priest, but it does imply that the priest has the duty of equipping his children with the knowledge necessary to perform all their actions well, to supernaturalize them, thus making them meri-

torious for improved spiritual health here below and for the perfection of spiritual life in the world to come. Nor is it always necessary that the priest personally perform all his paternal functions. There are, indeed, many which can and must be delegated, just as in the natural order parents must depute others to assist them in educating and safeguarding their children.

While spiritual fatherhood imposes upon the priest the cares and obligations of a father, it lays upon the faithful the duties of children. They are bound to love, honor and respect the fathers of their spiritual lives. When the faithful begin to see the priest as he really is, the father and guardian of their souls, they will rush to him with all their problems, and much of the evil and unhappiness which results from a lack of paternal care and advice will be avoided. Those who are wracking their brains for a cure for the evils of our times and especially for the delinquency of the young will find their answer in a closer relationship between priest and people. In the spiritual life all men are children, and when they find in their priests all-loving fathers who are eagerly awaiting to help them, evils will be eradicated and progress in virtue and happiness will come and come quickly.

Should this doctrine become a living fact, a truth, which as God intended, would influence men's lives, there would be thrown open wide the road to peace, peace in the Church, peace in the world, peace in the hearts of men. The faithful would have at their service an army of zealous fathers whose only thought would be to assist them in progressing in the spiritual life. The priests would have to work more, it is true; they would be overburdened, but they would be filled with a happiness which is but a foretaste of the eternal joy that will be theirs when, at the end of their labors, they can report to their Master: "I have suffered the little children to come unto you."

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TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL INSTRUMENTS

THE instruments of physics, like Gothic architecture, Roman roads, and the pyramids, are among the most admirable of man's exterior achievements. Galileo, at the dawn of modern science, measuring the fall of bodies, seems almost among the ancients by contrast with the decimal points in the physics of today. Micromicrovolts and micromicrofarads are common expressions in the ordinary textbook. The electron-microscope has extended man's eyes to the molecular level. The weights and charges of even sub-atomic particles have flashed across films and meters. By radar techniques, measuring time lapses down to the millionths of a second, man has bounced electromagnetic energy off the moon. Long before Hiroshima, atoms had been smashed in laboratories; and since the end of the war, physics has disclosed the synthesis of at least four new man-made elements. A German scientist claimed, after the war, to have devised a thermopile to detect temperature differentials of a millionth of a degree. In the region of the very large, a new giant telescope to be assembled on Mount Wilson, will make the stars, the fine print of night, seem as near and as clear as the morning headlines. On every side, the vistas of modern physics are stretching even farther toward the very large and the very small. As spectacles improve weak vision, the instruments of physics have focused on the metrical aspects of the universe with a sharpness that excites as much amazement as it imparts knowledge.

An instrument does not stand isolated, even though in some aspects of positivism, it is viewed as a sheer detached and passive register of actual laboratory events. The betatron, the cathode-ray oscilloscope, and other such devices seem at first sight to be as self-sufficient and as self-revealing as the Moses of

Michelangelo or a symphony. But they are not. Instruments, whatever be their purpose, have relations without which they lose their meaning—the tide without the ocean. These relations, not only with a view to clarifying physics but also with reference to various forms of positivism and pragmatism, stand in need of philosophical assessment.

Measurement, like everything else that the physicist deems meaningful, is an interaction between facts or physical events. As Lenzen has written, " The fundamental physical concept is that of the space-time coincidence of two points—the similarity of the two points with respect to spatial position and temporal position." [1] In nature, there is no hierarchy between measure and the measured. Whatever priority be accorded to the instrument is thus not owed to it in its own right. Evident by a philosophical analysis, the equivalence of measure and the measured is endorsed by both the special and general theories of relativity which make it permissible when A is moving relative to B, to say simultaneously that B is moving relative to A; relativistically, for example, it can be said that the sun moves around the earth just as truly as a helio-centric view may be accepted. Being in physics does not stand alone with intrinsic nature and intrinsic dignity. Scientifically, it makes no difference whether man bites dog or dog bites man.[2]

Instruments acquire their logical rank from the physicist. In the scientific method, man is thought to be a merely passive observer—a photosensitive plate exposed to external events. But in a global view, scientific method, or more accurately the scientist, cannot be so regarded. Scientific method is not self-sufficient. In opening, closing, directing, and focusing its camera, this method is truly and totally dependent on the larger, vital, active, and non-inertial power of the human spirit. Here at the very onset of measurement, man thus intervenes with a qualita-

[1] *The Nature of Physical Theory*, New York, 1931, p. 43.

[2] " Nun ist es klar, dass . . . der Akt der Messung nichts anderes ist als ein physikalisches Ereignis, dessen Ausgang sich rein empirisch beobachten lässt." Wind, E., *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik*, Tubingen, 1934, p. 4.

tive judgment, according at least a logical priority to his meter as opposed to the measured object. Whatever be the reasons, a yardstick is said to measure the table-top, and the Geiger counter is said to register an amount of radioactivity. The converse of these statements, however deftly put, is meaningless even at first sight. It is obviously a vicious circle to use a sun-dial to measure the sun and, under the same aspect, to use the sun to measure the sun-dial. If the sun-dial imparts meaningful knowledge, as obviously it does, it is part of a hierarchical arrangement and not an arc of the vicious circle.[3]

Such a hierarchy, however, cannot be grasped by the procedures of physics. Empirical science equates realities. The method of the calculus, which provides the language of science, proceeds as if all differences were simply matters of addition and degree in which, for example, the number *two*, if allowed to decrease continuously in a series of infinitesimal quantities, approaches the number *one*, and *one* in turn by infinitesimal steps tends toward *zero*. The difference then between the instrument and the object would be regarded as a matter of degree in physics with the instrument considered as an attenuated object [4]—the counterpart of Hume's view of ideas as faint

[3] The works of Aquinas are replete with references to the hierarchy in the universe. Perhaps the most important characteristic of scholasticism, as opposed to the persistent errors of pluralism and monism, is its insights into hierarchy with all the pregnant meaning of that term in being and in knowledge. Directly appropriate to the problem at hand is the following Thomistic analysis: "Ostendit [Aristotle] quod in substantialibus praedictis non possit esse processus in infinitum per modum circulationis. Et dicit, quod si aliqua predicata substantialia praedicantur de aliquo ut genera, non praedicantur ad invicem aequaliter, idest convertibiliter, idest quod unum genus sit alterius, et e converso . . . Si ergo hoc praedicatur de illo ut genus, sequeretur quod ipsum quod particulariter conveniebat alicui, e converso particulariter recipiat praedicationem illius quod est idem respectu ejusdem esse partem et totum, quod est impossibile." *In I Anal. Post.* 32.

[4] Though a full treatment of the scholastic notion of measure would require a parenthesis too long to be inserted in this discussion, it is of interest to note that the scientific standard of measurement is that which is minimum in a given genus—the smallest unit; the notion of measure in metaphysics involves comparison with the maximum, *id quod est maxime tale in aliquo genere.* There are many more contrasts that could be made, e. g., the position of scientific measure, with its mathematical form, in the order of truth as opposed to metaphysical measure—

sense impressions. But obviously, such an account is unsatisfactory. Knowledge, as reason and experience testify, cannot be explained by simple attenuation. There is a leap between the logical and the ontological orders, a difference in kind, emphasis, and dignity. The instrument is viewed as superior and can no more be but an object, thinly cut, than a plain by simply being made longer can become a mountain.

A scientific instrument is designed to replace man. In genuine philosophy, truth is seen as the conforming of mind with reality; man sees being as it is. In physical measurement, on the other hand, two realities—the instrumental data and the measured object—are viewed as fitted conformingly with each other within a larger system, understood and validated by its inner articulations. A scientific instrument thus divorces truth from man, denying the mind's power to grasp reality intrinsically and affirming systematic simplification as the final norm of truth. In this way, man never really knows reality as it is but only as it relates within system. Somehow this layout, with the scientist standing off as an onlooker rather than engaged as a term in the truth-relation, is thought to provide greater objectivity.[5]

Before displaying the weakness of a mere systemic truth-

modus, species, et ordo—which is in the order of goodness. The implications of the third transcendental attribute are also stimulating in this regard. In the line of the unity of each and every being in itself, a measure, as the philosopher views it in metaphysics, expresses an intrinsic likeness between the measured and the measure. In science, on the other hand, measure is always extrinsic and transitive; it is a case of predicamental measure as one might immediately suspect from the role played in physics by the category of quantity to which predicamental unity is reduced.

[5] The elimination of so-called anthropomorphism is one of the chief aims and claims of modern physics and modern positivism. Planck writes, ". . . so können wir kurz zusammenfassend sagen, die Signatur der ganzen bisherigen Entwicklung der theoretischen Physik ist eine Vereinheitlichung ihres Systems, welche erzielt ist durch eine gewisse Emanzipierung von den Anthropomorphen Elementen, speziell den spezifischen Sinnesempfindungen." *Wege zur Physikalischen Erkenntnis*, Leipzig, 1934, p. 5. In view of what is to follow about the body-centered character of all measurement, it could be suggested that empirical science is the most anthropomorphic of the purely intellectual disciplines and that the problem of pure science is a meaningless question.

standard in the wake of the real truth-relation where man is an ultimate (because immanent) agent, an important distinction must be made. The modern mathematician and mathematical physicist no longer study quantative being (*ens quantum*) but mere quantity. That is why they can no longer accept truth as the adequation of mind and being. Rightly sheer quantity is considered as meaningful only within system, since, as an inert, plural reality, it has no actuality of its own with which a mind can conform. Quantative being (*ens quantum*), on the other hand, is intelligible as a type of being. It was *quantum* and not *quantitas* which Aquinas and Aristotle defined in their classic formulation.[6] Divorced from entity, quantity is sheer multiplicity, indeterminate within itself and hence dependent on what is outside of it to confer meaning, value, and purpose. Being is so rich that it can be itself and be intelligible. Quantity is so poor that it can only be made intelligible by what is exterior to it. Quality is naturally intelligible since it is an actualizing and formal attribute. It has something of its own and is not dependent on what is outside of it. Quantity alone is sub-intelligible, but there is something self-revealing, self-significant, and self-beautiful about the qualities of nature, the greenery of grass, the orchestra of birds in a forest, the Alpine glow, and the moonbeams playing on the sea. Quality can conform to a mind because *it is*; when the mind affirms that something is, it attains to a deeper layer of reality than all of systematic science. A blind man can correlate the whole spectrum mathematically within a system, but he has no idea of color as *it is*. Similarly, more is known about the ocean by saying that it is blue or by saying that *it is* than by knowing the number and nature of its molecules, the depths of its floor, and the courses of its tides. To say that *something is* is to range beyond mere system and admit a principle of interiority which physics can never recognize.

The law of non-contradiction, as viewed by Aristotle's logic

[6] Aristotle said; (Met. V 13, 1020 a 7) "ποσὸν λεγεται τὸ διαιρετὸν εις ενυπάρχοντα."

and by modern mathematics, is a principle of consistency. In contrast to this logical approach, the law of non-contradiction is primarily and ontally a principle of being, referred to some status (actual or possible) of existence in its own right. Being can never be anything except its own " it-ness " as had from within, in its own right, with its own originality. Pure system embarks on the infinite relationships of a fluid universe. *Being*, on the other hand, considered as an immediacy or the analogue of what Kierkegaard viewed as " inwardness," [7] either exists, as being in its own right, i. e., ' stands out ' from nothingness; or it does not exist at all. In realism, it is either known in itself or not known at all. To know anything about its ' it-ness ' implies that we know its intrinsic character. Unless this intrinsic character is somehow grasped, nothing is known at all, not even in scientific canons. For to be not-nothing on the part of the object and to recognize this fact on the part of the subject, both imply a mode of existence and a mode of knowledge in terms of interiority. Mere system is thus unable to gain a hold on reality. How can being be understood in terms of what is outside of it? What indeed lies outside being? Equating being and nothing-ness is but another way of describing the fluid-drive in the universe of modern science when it becomes a philosophy, a fluidity that Aristotle predicted if first principles of *being* are denied and that enforces itself from any point of view which is followed in tracing out the farthest contours of strict scientific method. The purely instrumental cognition glorified by modern physics, the Hegelianism of idealistic or Marxian shades, and pragmatism, despite James' furious rejection of Bradley's " relation " [8]—all of these spurious approaches to reality lead to mere fluidity, the swift, sheer by-passing of reality as *it is*. Being is not a gushing stream. Somewhere beneath, there is bed-rock.

If knowledge could never take place in a purely systemic

[7] Cf., for a pointed treatment of ' inwardness,' Kierkegaard, S., *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, transl. by D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton, 1941), *passim*.

[8] *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, New York, 1922, pp. 92-122.

universe, then an instrument and instrumental cognition do not stand alone. If man knows not-nothing, as obviously he does, then pure systemism has been superseded by a type of meaningful, mental compenetration of things in themselves and as they are. This penetration is not channeled through an infinity of relations *among objects* but by an immediacy *between object and Man.* Man is not a mere news-reel camera. In Lavelle's choice and frequent figure, man is not a mere spectator but part of the spectacle as well.[9] He has a power beneath and beyond that of instruments. The immediacies, the inwardness, and the a-transitive aspects of this knowledge process are stubborn facts. But they elude mere instrumentation. Modern positivism seeks to rid physics of its so-called anthropomorphic elements and to make man a register like his instruments, a mere observer as the physicists themselves like to say. But instruments cannot replace man. The reading of a scientific instrument eventually involves something more than simply another instrument. It is the merit of Heidegger and of the existentialists in general to insist on the hierarchy between man and the object-world, though they overstate the position which a genuine realist would adopt. Heidegger's prefixes are especially expressive. " That which is purely before us (Vorhandenheit) manifests itself as a tool, so that it may, however, again be drawn into the service (Zuhandenheit) of the business concerned, namely, of the datum (Befindlichen) as again acted

[9] For a succinct statement of L. Lavelle's thought, cf. his *La Présence Totale,* Paris, 1934. Lavelle is not pantheistic, as his later works especially make clear. God, he writes, cannot give us being without giving us liberty. However, confronting earlier critics who charged him with pantheism, he points out that pantheism has at least one merit of preserving a type of dignity for man: " On se rassurera sur ce point en voyant Lachelier lui-même consoler Boutroux qui avait encouru dans sa thèse le même reproche: ' Votre conclusion était sans doute panthéistique; mais il me semble qu'on a bien tort aujourd'hui d'être si scrupuleux sur cet article; ce qui est à redouter, ce n'est pas le panthéisme, mais c'est, sous le nom de positivisme, le pur phénoménisme qui ôte toute réalité à la nature, et à plus forte raison à Dieu, de telle sorte que, ce qui, de votre part, scandalise quelques-uns de vos juges, m'a, au contraire, édifié." *Op. cit.,* p. 15. Lavelle has written convincingly against the tendency to view reality as a systematic sum. As against Pantheism, Lavelle's own philosophy suggests the analogy of being.

upon." [10] The being before us and the being at hand are both in the service of the Dasein, accomplishing its tasks by their means.

In truth, man enjoys a peculiar status, living, as Aquinas stated it, on an horizon.[11] He shares the intimate depths of the world below him by his body; by his rational power, he partakes of the highest type of activity, intelligence. Considering man as an ultimate (i. e. immanent) term in the truth-relation and by opposition to the relativity theory when it becomes a philosophical dogma with its notion that all frames of reference (points of view) are equivalent, it may be agreed with Heidegger that metaphysical questions must be asked in relation to the concrete existence of the questioner.[12] It is a merit of existentialism in general to have called attention to such a theme. In this light, the privileged position of man's body has been italicized by Marcel, attempting to write off the heavy debt of Cartesianism in modern times which reduces the corporeal aspect of man to the status of mere objects like those studied by physics. In Marcel's view, which is emphatically not idealistic but a statement that any realist could adopt to express the intimacy between knower and known, " the more I tend to lay stress on this objectivity of things, in cutting the umbilical cord which binds them to my existence, to what I have called my organico-psychic presence to myself—the more I tend to affirm the world's independence with respect to me, its radical indifference to my destiny, to my goals—the more this world so proclaimed to be the only real one tends to become a spectacle felt as illusory, an immense documentary film

[10] " Die pure Vorhandenheit meldet sich am Zeug, um sich jedoch wieder in die Zuhandenheit des Besorgten. d. h. in der Wiederinstandesetzung des Befindlichen zurückzuziehen." *Sein und Zeit,* Halle an der Salle, 1935, p. 73.

[11] Man's soul, " in confinio corporum et incorporearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens aeternitatis et temporis, recedens ab infimo appropinquat ad summum." *Summa Contra Gentiles,* II, 81.

[12] ". . . das metaphysische Fragen muss im Ganzen und je aus der wesentlichen Lage des fragenden Daseins gestellt werden." *Was ist Metaphysik?,* Bonn, 1929, p. 7.

offered to my curiosity but which in the end conceals itself by the simple fact that it is a stranger to me." [13]

If instrumentation alone provides valid knowledge, an infinite circuit of instruments is required. One object impresses mechanical energy on another which in turn actuates another, and so *ad infinitum*. But what of man's own physical nature? In the manner of a purely physical object, man's body is " energized " as any instrument recording a laboratory event, say, for instance, a galvanometer responding to a surge of electric current. But this body is a *favored* instrument. The impressions made on it, the analogues of the needle-deflections, Lissajous patterns, and other " pointer-readings " are read and interpreted by a mind that is substantially united with the body.[14] In brief, the instrument and the reader of the instrument are one and the same being or, in more forceful form, the instrument reads itself. By recognizing this reality, the infinite regression is avoided. In the subject of knowledge is the way of escape from the purely transitive, instrumental, and open-circuited road of a systemic universe where nothing could either be or be known. In the words of Chesterton, it is the mark of man not only to know, like the animal, but to know that he knows.

The intimate, personal, and organico-psychic relation of

[13] " Seulement, par une anamolie qui se dissipe à la reflexion, plus je mettrai l'accent sur cette objectivité des choses, en coupant le cordon ombilical, qui les rélie à mon existence, à ce que j'ai appelé ma présence organo-psychique à moi-meme—plus j'affirmerai l'indépendence du monde par rapport à moi, sa radicale indifférence à ma destinée, à mes fins propres—plus ce monde ainsi proclamé seul réel se convertira en spectacle senti comme illusoire, un immense film documentaire offert à ma curiosité, mais qui en fin de compte se supprime par le simple fait qu'il m'ignore." Marcel, G., " L'Etre, Répère Central de la Reflexion Métaphysique," in *Etudes Philosophiques*, Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Ghent, p. 111.

[14] For purposes of simpler exposition, the body-soul terminology has been employed rather than the more accurate descriptions in terms of matter-form. It is simple to make the proper substitution and changes to bring the whole discussion within the framework of correct hylomorphic cosmology where it belongs. The reference to the body as " favored " or " privileged " indicates that it is not simply a geometrical or an inorganic physical body. The distinction in question here is somewhat *technical* and need not be made in a general discussion to relate physics and philosophy on some *fundamental* principles.

knower and known is bespoken by the standards used in measurement which are all relative to our body. Some English standards have even preserved enough of their etymological genes to indicate this reference of other bodies in terms of our own. A " foot " refers to part of the human anatomy; " mile " translates the old Roman concept of a thousand paces (*millia passuum*) ; a " pound " from the Latin *pondus* is connected with the sense of weight or effort. " In order to observe that a material body has weight," Lenzen says, " I may support the body with my hand. The muscles attached to the hand exert a force which is experienced through kinesthetic sensations." [15] A day is associated with nature's dictate of a twenty-four hour cycle to man's body with its schedule of eating and sleeping, work and play. Though the continental system has abandoned this so-called anthropomorphic terminology, it remains a resurgent fact that in deed, if not in name, our standards of measurement are always based on magnitudes comparable to man's body. Astronomical figures baffle us until we relate them to light years or quantities equally familiar; the microscopic is said to be small, but the standard for the smallness is our own size; it is our body which gives meaning to the scale. James asks: " what possible meaning has it to say that, when we think of a foot-rule or a square yard, extension is not attributable to our thought? Of every extended object the *adequate* mental picture must have all the extension of the object itself." [16] In other words, the thought of a foot, according to James, has to be a foot long. Whatever be the author's meaning of such remarks can be left to the chronicler of his system. But certainly in the nature of being and of knowing, it remains true that man understands dimensions as he understands everything else—by becoming them. There is a whisper of this becoming in the fact that all measurements must be brought back, for their meaning, to the familiar world of our own body and its

[15] " Procedures of Empirical Science," in *The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, 1-5, p. 22.

[16] *Op. cit.* p. 30.

dimensions. The body is in an eminent way the medium by which man knows the external world.

Man, it was said, is the very instrument which he reads. He is a calibrated scale. An instrument and interpreter all in one, he is, as it were, the very measurements which he makes. It is this profound and intimate union of matter and spirit which deepens his spiritual knowledge of the material world, the ideas which he forms and the measurements which he makes. Such a substantial union escapes the finest detector equipment which physics could ever devise. But it enables man to talk meaningfully about the world and to enter into an innermost contact with its hard and fast actuality. Without such a personal, interior relationship, man would never know anything. By means of this relationship, since he is, as it were, the very measurements which he makes, he is installed on the inside of such measurements, looking at the world, so to say, through their eyes, a world indeed that does not either flee man or overwhelm him but where he feels himself familiar and at home.[17]

Man, as the "specially favored" frame of reference—to employ a language that is meaningless in relativity mechanics—has been overdrawn in certain forms of existentialism. The Heidegger Dasein is one example. For Sartre, man is his own situation (*l'homme est sa situation*). But without, like existentialism, impeding the mind from a knowledge of the nonmetrical *that is*, it can be truly said that man's body has a priority in measurement. This body-centered character of mensuration is a fact that physics, in its positivist purge of anthropomorphic elements, simply cannot put away. It is as human as man. In a broad sense, there are three mechanical properties

[17] One of the tragedies of the age of science, with its astronomical figures of time and place which tend to dwarf man and its insistence that the qualitative world of common-sense objects is illusory, has been the feeling of man that he is a stranger in his own home, the universe. On this point, cf. Riezler, K., *Physics and Reality*, New Haven, 1940, p. 5. The atom bomb which ended a war to establish freedom from fear has left man trembling in utter terror. Uneasy over the prospects that the bomb may not be *controlled*, there is now a type of fear of freedom.

of things which physics measures: length, weight, and time. All other quantities—force, energy, velocity, and the like—are combinations of the three fundamental magnitudes.

In Newtonian mechanics, for example, force is the product of mass and acceleration. But this is a measure of force rather than force itself. A psychologist, if he himself were incapable of emotion like, say, an encephalograph, could only interpret the writhing, tears, smiles, twitches, and other facial expressions of a subject as merely physical distortions like the wrinkling of a coat-sleeve when the elbow bends. However, being capable of emotions himself, the psychologist from the gestures which he sees can identify the feelings of others as similar to the states which he experiences internally and signifies by similar movements. He knows the *inner* state of other persons by reference to his own feeling. So it is with the entities in physics.[18] The notion of force can be grasped most fully by the sense of matter's resistance to our own personal assaults against it. Even more, it is the experience of force and effort which specifies these objects and the means of measuring them. It is only such an experience which makes measurements both possible and meaningful, permeating them with a breath and a being that the simple transitive operations completely overlay from the physicist's view. It is this experience of opposition—not merely measurements of it—which identifies the object, force, suggests a device to measure it, and makes way somehow into every concept and context, no matter how symbolic, where the notion later occurs. Nor is the experience of such a crude reality as force simply associated with the early history of physics, like the tadpole-stage of the frog, and later completely replaced by readings and formulae. Every physicist must at some time or other have such a psychophysical experience of force for himself.

[18] Dr. Allers points out the role of self in the penetration of substance: "There is only one point in the whole field of possible experience where the knowing mind grasps, although hardly in an adequate manner, substance itself, and this is self-experience . . . It is in 'deep' emotional states that consciousness grasps something of the self's very being." "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," THE THOMIST, 4 (1942) p. 619.

Only thus does he ever know what force is, how to measure it, how to manipulate the mathematical quantities which the measurements provide, and how and where to apply his figures to other concrete situations. In this first and often underestimated experience of force, a decision is thus taken which is crucial for physics and the physicist. Without such a body-referring, familiar experience the world would forever remain a stranger to man, unknown, undiscoverable, and unconquered. Finally, even if the concept of force, based on experience, were subsequently replaced by a more " objective " definition, it would still be true that this secondary definition, during its steps of derivation, would be conceived with respect to this pristine experience, if only, by the contrast involved, to explain it away. Any idea that we have even of the minutest particle and most complicated wave, is derived, represented, and re-aligned by analogy to something of the physicist's experience as a man. Being a man involves thinking with respect to the corporeal world, the material object of our cognition. It is not surprising that the physicist finds himself unable to escape his humanity in the general sense that even thoughts about the spiritual must be formed by reference to our direct confronting of the material world and in the more specific sense that, refusing to leave the world of quasi-mechanical things, all the entities of physics must continue to bear the raiment, thin and tattered though it sometimes be, of the familiar world.[19] Husserl has well stated the irreducibility of the qualitative world considered as a sign for the relations which the physicist studies but, like every sign, having a reality of its own.[20] The full implications of a word, for instance, are not given in its meaning. Apart from

[19] " The vocabulary of mechanics—vis inertiae, vis impressa, vis viva; centripetal and centrifugal force; work, energy, least action—shows clearly that the new explorers of the physical world continued to project into it, if not their souls, at least their experiences of effort and resistance, of compulsion and yielding." Nunn, T. P. *Anthropomorphism and Physics*, London, 1928, p. 4.

[20] " Das sinnlich erscheinende Ding, das die sinnlichen Gestalten, Farben, Geruchs- und Geschmackseigenschaften hat, ist also nichts weniger als ein Zeichen für ein anderes, sondern gewissermassen Zeichen für sich selbst.' *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomelogischen Philosophie*, Halle an der Salle, 1928, p. 100.

its character as a sign, it has a reality as oral and as written, its physical as opposed to its intentional nature.

All the other mechanical properties treated by physics can be studied like the reality of force. Time is initially understood, and hence meaningfully measured, in terms of psychological time, *le temps vécu*.[21] When we attempt to formalize this impression, St. Augustine's classic difficulty recurs, and man finds himself unable to make a fully satisfying definition. Time is registered by clocks, but the clocks are set by the time it takes for the earth to move around the sun. But to speak of the "time it takes" for the earth's revolution indicates that we already have a notion of time. This notion determines the means of measurement and makes it possible to apply the measurement and its mathematical developments to concrete situations. Lenzen, rejecting metaphysics, plunges immediately into the notion of measuring time as though it could be made meaningful and physically applicable without this familiar experience of time as *le temps vécu*.[22] Length, as James' remark cited above might suggest, is also measured physiologically and applied, in this light, whenever man's insight sees the proper occasion. The distance in the recent radar path to the moon, traversed with the velocity of light, is understandable because man himself might have trod that same electromagnetic highway with his own feet.

The inaccuracies of measurement are frequently alleged against science.[23] There exists, in fact, a calculus of error which can discern the probable inexactness due to a combination of factors when the factors themselves are known separately and

[21] For a discussion of the concept of time, cf. de Munnynck, "La Notion de Temps," in *Philosophia Perennis*, Regensburg, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 855-868.

[22] *Art. cit.*, p. 11-12.

[23] This seems to be an allegation in the following description: "Ruins are ruins, and to make the scientific method with its dependence on inductive process, its constant employment of statistics, its suppression of the individual, its inevitable tendency to analyze, its rejection of all entities which cannot be numerically expressed, and, in a word, its formidable subjectivity, into what might be called God's Own Method, is now more than ever a hopeless task." Needham, J., *The Sceptical Biologist*, London, 1929, p. 15.

individually.[24] Modern equipments have reduced the margin of error in measurement to almost incredible fractions, as in the symphonic orchestra which usually tunes on the oboe but can now, if it wishes, use a note produced from sure, steady oscillations of vacuum-tube techniques. But measurements can never be clear-cutly absolute because of the ontal variables involved and because man has no way of checking this absolute accuracy except, in turn, by measuring. Precision instruments, in their calibration devices, usually have a coarse adjustment and a fine adjustment on a Vernier scale. But the perfect instrument would require a fine adjustment for the fine adjustment, and so *ad infinitum*. Logically and ontally, inaccuracy is thus inherent in the measuring scheme.

Negligible as errors usually become in contemporary physics, it may be asked whether they may not hide the utter secrets of the universe. Does the structure of philosophy hinge on the refinements which tomorrow's progress may bring to today's measurements? In scientific method, revolutions may occur when error is refined. Matter and light, separated in classical physics, were discovered, with the creation of instruments to detect their finer harmonies, to be quite similar, if not basically the same thing. But before sundown today, an enterprising physicist may have yet made finer measurements which establish another disproportion between mechanics and optics, restoring and even widening the old classical cleavage. Genuine philosophy, however, is exempt from such vagaries. For man is a remarkably immanent instrument.

For instance, in the familiar example of the stick which looks bent in water, why is it called actually straight and only apparently bent? The eye tells us that it is bent. Touch insists that it is straight. In the light of mere sensation, this question could not be decided since there is no more evidence for trusting the data of one sense rather than those of others.[25] It is man's

[24] Cf. von Mises, R., *Probability, Statistics, and Truth*, New York, 1939, pp. 194-242.

[25] Cf. Allers, R., "Remarks on Some Problems Concerning Sensation," *The Modern Schoolman*, 22 (1943) 3-163. From the point of view of instrumentation,

mind, taking account of all the factors in the case, which renders a verdict on the actual shape according as such a decision is needed. Here is observed the astonishing example of a being correcting for *its own* errors. Man is able to surmount the differences between " pointer-readings " or their analogues in the sense order; installed in the realm of intelligibility, the philosopher thus undercuts the revolutions in the concept of sense-measurements by the physicist, guaranteeing himself by this common undercutting principle, namely, being, that no new physical discoveries could possibly be outside its compass.

This self-correction, which pragmatism finds as the constant characteristic of man's thought, is of immediate importance regarding errors in measurement. In a purely transitive instru-

the problems of tri-dimensional perception are of great interest. For a study in the visual estimation of size and distance, cf. Ledvina, J., *A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, Washington, 1941, pp. 84 ff. Instrumental knowledge involves problems like those met in considering the naked eye. " The only heavenly bodies for which we can determine the size by direct observation or of which we can see any detail are those belonging to our own solar family, such as planets and their satellites. But we are made aware of the existence and position of the far-away fixed stars because they are so brightly illuminated that our telescopes gather and transmit to our eyes sufficient light to affect our retina. We are however not able to tell anything about the size and shape of these fixed stars by vision alone, no matter how huge our telescopes." Burton, E. F. and Kohl, W. H., *The Electron Microscope*, New York, 1946, p. 79. In simple terminology, there are two factors to be considered in the light reaching our eyes: the quantity of illumination in the original source and the distance which this quantity must travel, all the while diminishing in intensity according to a well-known physical law. Obviously, then, something more than purely visual sensation is necessary to establish the distances and the sizes of bodies in the remote heavens. In microscopy, a similar problem is met; a cluster of molecules, for example, might be " seen " by the amount of scattering which it produces in the illumination. Two factors are thus involved: the brightness of the illumination and the magnitude of the object under view. A small object under intense illumination would scatter as much light as a larger object more weakly illuminated. Obviously, the microscopic and telescopic techniques of modern physics involve much more than simple visual data. Even the larger molecules made visible by electron microscopy are known and estimated in their magnitude by comparison with the very much grosser definition of a candle power. Their sizes are relative to it. The relation of light to distance is similar to the relation of length and temperature discussed below. Our standard is arbitrary and relative and certainly, as we shall see, involves an insight into something that is intrinsic, not merely transitive.

ment like a vacuum-tube voltmeter, the coarse adjustment is corrected by the finer circuits which, if they are calibrated, must again be adjusted from still another auxiliary source. But in man, the favored instrument, there is a correction by the very being which makes the measurements. This correction need not remove all error. If the mind simply recognizes that there is a possibility of error or that all measurements are relatively inaccurate, error has been corrected or eliminated in the sense of being allowed for in our thinking. At least the error has been interpreted, appraised, and incorporated into the meaning of the measurement by the very instrument which is measuring; to recognize error is to overcome it. The blood of man's real metaphysical self has once again coursed through his veins in physics. Without it, all would be unknowably vacuous. By its graces, the philosopher can even " correct " for future physical findings.

Instruments assist the physicist in probing matter's depths. They help him toward new discoveries and new theories. But the priority of instrument over theory cannot be simply viewed as chicken-and-egg sequence. It has often been said that medieval thinkers failed to appreciate the metrical realities as treated in modern physics because they had no appropriate instruments. Whitehead has said that one of the chief causes for the advance of modern physics has been the development of scientific instruments.[26]

But from another viewpoint, instruments depend on theories, and it can also be justly said that the medievals had no instruments because they lacked appropriate theories. A bolometer depends on the concept of infra-red energy as a wave. The cloud chamber, so widely and fruitfully used in modern physics, depends on the notion of quickly cooling a supersaturated gas and of ionization. It would seem then that a concept of infra-red radiation is necessary in order to detect this radiation or that measuring electric particles presupposes such a measurement. In a more complicated device like the cyclotron, the

[26] *Science and the Modern World*, Cambridge, Mass., 1930, p. 143.

betatron, and the oil-drop assembly for measuring electron-charge, the relation between theory and experiment is even more unmistakable.[27] Is there then another vicious circle or even an infinite series here in modern experimental procedure? Do instruments depend on theories and theories in turn on instruments? Planck, from the viewpoint of the physicist, writes: " Now you cannot put a reasonable question unless you have a reasonable theory in the light of which it is asked. In other words, one must have some sort of theoretical hypothesis in one's mind and one must put it to the test of research measurements. That is why it often happens that a certain line of research has a meaning in the light of one theory but not in that of another. And very often the significance of a question changes when the theory in the light of which it is asked has already changed." [28]

A solution to this problem may be sought and found in the relations of the vague to the considered, purified, and reflex notions of a given being or of being in general. Moreover, before and beneath the discursion of scientific method, there is a primary apprehension of a given reality as reflection richly displays, the grasping of a non-discursive immediate unity which makes a thing *be* an intrinsic, as opposed to inertial, nature. In a physical situation, a reality is thus grasped which is indifferent to being either an instrument or a theory which an instrument verifies. Great discoverers in physics as elsewhere are those who have the sharpest insights. There is an inner unity of reality where instrument and theory mingle and are truly compenetrated as opposed to being merely added to each other like sand mixed with cement while still being sand. Using his scientific method, of course, the physicist can never grasp such a unity of intrinsic principle. He can only deal with the exteriority of being, its plurality and transitive relationships. But before he decides to become a physicist and, even when

[27] Heisenberg, W., *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1936, pp. 16-18.

[28] *Where is Science Going?*, New York, 1932, p. 97.

a physicist, before he decides to reduce an experience to the formalism and discursion of his science, he has had a deep quaffing of the unity in his subject, a primary apprehension which is only later elaborated into discursive form. An instrument is discursively related to a theory only after the two have been apprehended together in an immediate process which is as outside scientific method as it is in the nature of man. Man never feeds the scientific method by being a physicist but only by being a man. The physicist can only prove. He can never discover.

A scientific instrument does more than simply establish a theory. It measures a real event in nature which confirms or denies a theory when regarded from one viewpoint but which, from another, is a fact in its own right. The observed empirical data of physics, the locus of scientific law, is not to be confused with the theoretical backdrop from which these data or laws are deduced. A theory is a supposition, and the apprehended unity of the foregoing example must include at its fulcrum the indirect, provisional relation which it bears to the real. A theory and fact differ in their mode of reference to reality, and the same event may be regarded as a fact in itself or as a complexus of theory, depending on the viewpoint. It is this real event which is measured which is now looming up for consideration, the establishing and calculating of a fact.

Once more the choking noose of the vicious circle seems hanging overhead. The fact measured and the fact measuring are, it was already argued, on the same footing in the ontal order. There is no elevator shaft in physics, there is only an endless single-storied corridor. In a sense, this problem parallels that of the preceding consideration where the instrument-theory relation seemed at first sight to involve an *idem-per-idem* movement. Nature simply presents facts without affirming or denying them. Nature, Bergson said, neither measures nor counts.[29] Why then should one fact be accorded a priority over the other? Why should one fact be endowed with the dignity

[29] *L'Evolution Creatrice*, Paris, 1919, p. 239.

of affirming or denying the other? Two facts, the instrumental structure and the measured data, are not similar simply because they are on the same anti-hierarchical level. Specifically they are very much alike,[30] as examples obviously indicate. A pressure instrument, for instance, operates on a pressure principle, just like the object to be measured. The input phases of a pressure instrument could be, for example, a diaphragm, a piezo crystal, or perhaps a carbon microphone. An electrical instrument is always electrical (or perhaps magnetic since electricity and magnetism are united in the physical view). A diffraction grid to establish the undulatory theory of light is built on the concept of light as a wave. The resonance of one wave with another is a frequent principle of measurement in optics, electricity, and acoustics, not to mention the study of microstructures. Resonance is the interaction of two phenomena having the same frequency; a good example would be a tuning-fork emitting a musical note and causing another fork, capable of the same acoustic frequency, to produce the same note—a fact that is described in the expressive terms of sympathetic vibrations. Caruso was able to break ordinary drinking glasses because, by singing into them, he could determine their natural period of vibrations. The supersonic barrier in aerodynamical problems is basically a problem of resonance. Resonance, the sympathetic tuning of two waves, so widely used for measurement in modern physics, suggests that men like Bergson and Scheler in their emphasis on knowledge as a kind of sympathy had a view of great depth, even though their final epistemologies are inadequate. Resonance is but another example

[30] In this light, Levy's statement is to be rejected: "In the first place, every measuring instrument must be neutral to the system measured." Levy, H., *The Universe of Science*, London, 1939, p. 49. Levy is a dialectical materialist, and it is interesting to relate this notion of neutrality to the whole Marxian theory of man and the universe. Despite the Communist belief in the autodynamic character of reality, Marxism touches in many ways the general theme of positivism in its inertial approach. "Actually, we get our deepest knowledge of the world in the process of changing it." Rubenstein, S., "Soviet Psychology in Wartime," in *The Journal of Philosophy and Phenomelogical Research*, 5-2 p. 184. Reality stands there neutrally for man to change.

of the tendency to use like as a measure of like, a surprising carbon-copy of the original Empedoclean sense of *simile simile cognoscitur* which Aristotle and Aquinas did not discard but simply developed. From the physical viewpoint, there seems to be, from one aspect at least, a mere identity in measurement not only in a general sense but in the specific resonance between measure and the measured. The measurement would seem to be the same fact as the object, involving the same principles, same quantities, and same activities. How can the tautology be avoided?

Against this drab, slate-colored sky which such a problem threatens to cast over physics, philosophy may provide at least a faint streak of light. Unlike the physicist who regards truth as different from being, the philosopher insists that truth and being are convertible. Ontally, truth is being itself.[31] It is not an addition to being, except logically. It is being, as related to mind and as known. In the ontal order, nothing can be added to being. Since *it is*, it would include such additions unless of course they were nothing. It is this profound reality of being which is now to help clarify the apparent vicious circle of the physicist in correlating facts.

The events in the instrument, or, better, the whole of the measuring experience with emphasis on the instrument rather than on the aspects measured can be said to correspond to the reality co-terminous with being and called truth. The measured aspects which the instrument matches correspond to being. Thus there emerges another sample of the principle that being is intrinsically intelligible. The measurement taking place in the laboratory involves the identity of instrumental data and measured fact, just as truth is identified with being. The convex mirror is also concave when viewed differently. When according a priority to the instrument, the scientist is simply emphasizing being as true. He is making a more explicit and more transitive display of what in ordinary language he would re-

[31] For a recent exposition of this notion, cf. Sr. M. Cosmas Hughes, *The Intelligibility of the Universe*, Washington, D. C., 1946, pp. 60 ff.

gard as truth. He is, it was already exhibited and now more fully explained, making logical additions to being, assigning a logical rank to what in the ontal order is on the same level with the object. To make a logical addition to being is to make no real addition. Truth and being are convertible. A thing is spoken of as having aspects of truth and of being, depending on whether we look at this thing from the logical or ontal viewpoint. The instrumental and the measured data are, in like manner, conjoined; aspectually they are distinguished. Hence we can measure like with like and still make sense. The physicist employs a principle which positivism would consider redundant and meaningless but which genuine philosophy insists is the most meaningful, fundamental, and pregnant principle in knowledge. Being is intelligible intrinsically and not in virtue of what is outside of it. Being and its principles are not simply recognized before physics begins and then cut off like an ablative absolute. They are relentless and inescapable.

Pressed to the ultimate deep-freeze levels of his subject-matter and of his method, the physicist faces the facts which he cannot meet but which are none the less real and meaningful in the actual deployment of physics as a human activity and which, because they are fundamental, suggest that empirical sciences are subordinated to a metaphysical reality which gives them power, direction, and responsibilities. Being is its own evidence. There is a point where discursion is abandoned in favor of self-evidence, intrinsic intelligibility, and the union of truth with being on which all realism must eventually be founded. It is this critical juncture, occuring not only at the beginning of science but whenever the physicist measures, from which his real knowledge, however tautological it may first seem, takes its root. Manhattan Island has its sky-scrapers because beneath it there is a mass of solid rock for support. In less favored cities, such buildings would sink away into subterranean sands. It was indicated above that the physicist, as such, can only prove and never discover. There is also a juncture where proof and discovery meet and where being is its own

evidence. The self-intelligibility of being solves the problem of the infinite regression in demonstration. It brings the direct and the demonstrable together at a point where, to use Heidegger's language, a thing is the sign of its own self. Such a juncture makes it possible not only for reasoned knowledge to be reasoned but to be knowledge, an intrinsic contact with an object. Scientific method thus turns out to be something secondary in man. It is man who discovers and man who gives final proofs for his answers in what is evident and, ultimately, self-evident. However much the physicist may think himself to reject the metaphysical as meaningless, the vivisection of his problems and processes shows meta-empirical realities and meta-empirical knowledge that, in dynamic interplay, form the circulatory system of physics providing it with nutrition, growth, and the ability to produce new ideas.

The problem of the logical *versus* ontal orders may be distilled objectively to the *apparently* reduplicative statement that *being is* and subjectively to the *favored* position of man who, since the rank he accords to instruments is of a solely logical nature, really understands what he measures in terms of its own ontal self. Russell and James, though erring by extremism, seem to preserve a dim counterpart of being's self-intelligibility, the first in his doctrine of " neutral monism " and the second in his philosophy of " pure experience " which dates back to Mach. According to James, " any single non-perceptual experience tends to get counted twice over, just as perceptual experience does, figuring in one context as an object or field of objects, in another as a state of mind . . ." [32] Recasting this doctrine, it may be said that a thing is truly *thought* twice over, once in its being and once in the *logical* additions which both scientist and philosopher make to *being* but which, being only logical, insure that we understand something-in-itself and as it is. Purely logical additions, since they are not real, leave us with the same being as ontally existing, thus assuring the objectivity of knowledge. Russell has a whisper of self-intelligi-

[32] *Op. cit.* pp. 17-18.

bility, or at least his substitute for it, by his very term *monism* which at least has the merit of emphasizing, like sympathy, the logico-ontal identity that occurs in knowledge. Of neutral monism, he writes: " This theory may be illustrated by comparison with a postal directory, in which the same names come twice over, once in alphabetical and once in geographical order; we may compare the alphabetical order to the mental, and the geographical order to the physical." [33] The concept of coming " twice over " parallels the thought of James and suggests how logical order can remain logical and by the very fact of logicality, as adding the non-real, can put man into contact with reality-in-itself, not only as it is reality but also, what amounts to the same thing, as it is in itself.

Physics has made it common to speak of approximations. A thing is said to be approximately true. Newtonian mechanics is in this category as a complete system, according to the correspondence principle. Individual measurements within this and within other systems are likewise referred to as being high approximations. The constants of nature are continually being refined and revised. Sometimes the incommensurate appears in physical discussions. Philosophers, accustomed to say that there is no middle course between truth and falsity, are thus confronted with approximations as the apparent violation of the principle of the excluded middle. It has been suggested that the expression *approximate truth* be abandoned and replaced by *approximate knowledge*.[34] However, since knowledge is always either true or false fundamentally, such terminology is questionable. The problem remains then of clarifying the notion of approximate truth. The scientist's belief that all measurements are approximate has led to the notion that all truth is approximate and that therefore nothing is ever true.

Here again philosophy comes aboard. Carnap has stated that

[33] " On the Nature of Acquaintance," *The Monist*, 2 (1914) p. 161. Russell and James are not exactly of the same mind since Russell emphasizes the purely sensory whereas James seems to suggest a truth-relation which is a shade nearer to the traditional notion.

[34] Brunner, A., *La Connaissance Humaine*, Paris, 1943, p. 79.

the following propositions are equivalent: "The moon is round" and "It is true that the moon is round."[35] Since truth is equivalent to being, Carnap's opinion, from one viewpoint, is compatible with a realistic philosophy. Further, in the field of logistics, his two statements can be made symbolically equivalent. But on the other hand, the truth of judgment is neither the truth of being nor the truth of a purely systemic mathematics.[36] It is a factor of unity as opposed to the plurality of terms, a factor of assimilation as opposed to the detached and passive observation of a news-reel camera. To say that a judgment is true raises it beyond the status of a modern mathematical equation and brings it into a status of *being known*, as marked off from merely being.

That "A is approximately B" is then not quite the same as "it is true that A is approximately B," and this second judgment is by no means equivalent to "it is approximately true that A is approximately B." That A is approximately B is an ontal laboratory event. To judge this fact, in the act where man attains to the fullness of truth and hence to the fullness of being,[37] is to see the unity in this laboratory event and to state what actually happens in terms of what happening involves, namely, being. An approximation is recognized and labelled an approximation—another reference that being is intelligible of its very nature. There is thus a bending back over the road to see it as a whole, a thinking, a counting, a coming twice over. As in the case of error, to recognize approximation and to allow for it in our thinking is to overcome approximation. It is not as if truth were an ideal limit,[38] progressively approximated. Truth

[35] Carnap, R., *An Introduction to Semantics*, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, p. 26.

[36] Aquinas says of Aristotle: "Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei, *In Met.* V, 9, 895.

[37] It is in judgment and not in apprehension that man attains to being because it is only in judgment that he attains to truth. St. Thomas, *de Ver.* q. 1, a. 1, *sed contra* 3. Cf. also Maritain, *Réflexions Sur L'Intelligence*, Paris, 1938, chapter 1.

[38] Peirce has provided the following definition of truth which has its counterpart in scientific method: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the

is the whole event, a unity between realities like the instrument and the measured. It is not a term of judgment, a limit or an asymptote. It is the whole unity in the event, being what is is and *being known* as it is. To say that an approximation is an approximation, thus taking it twice over, is not a tautology but a meaningful statement, and the physicist, allowing for approximation in his thinking, proceeds as if he recognized such a meaning.

Lenzen has proposed, as a basis for measurement, a system of standards established by what he calls " successive approximation." The core of his philosophy can be thought out in terms of his own example: In the measuring of length, the rod employed is altered by temperature, contracting with cold and dilating with heat. The measuring rod, however, must be established, in fact, before the temperature itself can be calculated. All thermal instruments, from the ordinary thermometer to the finest thermopile, involve a visual presentation in function of length. Thus there seems to be another of those vicious circles.

Lenzen solves the problem in an unconvincing fashion. He suggests that we select " some standard rod," tracing out the variations in length according to changing temperatures. We thus define temperature " to the first approximation." Equipped now with a temperature scale, the standard of length may now be defined " to the second approximation." But such a solution is really meaningless. No absolute standard has been obtained for either temperature or length by enabling us " quantitatively to define to the first approximation the conditions under which the quantity is defined to the second approximation." [39] Both standards are still relative and arbitrary. The approximate character of the measurement of both temperature and length still remains whether it be of a first, second, or *n*th degree. Lenzen's solution is purely verbal.

confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth." *Collected Papers*, Cambridge, Mass., 1931-1934, vol. 5, paragraph 565.

[39] *Op. cit.*, p. 47.

A solution to the problem is suggested by the principles advanced above. Temperature and length are correlated not by discursive measurements but by an insight into the unity of the being at hand, a unity that is not additive but invisible like being itself. Length and temperature, thought together because they co-exist, are defined simultaneously by that insight of the physicist, as a man, into a reality that as a physicist he cannot reach by discursive formulae. The standard might continue to be arbitrary and approximate, but it is thought twice over, once as length and once as temperature which the length measures [40] or first as temperature and then as length.

Without the recognition of meta-empirical reality and meta-empirical operations, physics would forever remain an impossibility. Even if the physicist doubts and denies such realities as self-evidence and self-intelligibility, he implicitly affirms them, and far from his open claim, through positivism, that the principle of identity is tautological in its ontal sense, he constantly displays and exploits its tremendously rich charge of meaning and value. He interprets a being in terms of its own self. It is as though in setting out to construct a *monumentum aere perennius* man should discover that the only available building material is bronze itself. The monument and the bronze thus go together into the same structure.

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[40] This solution applies to the problem of microscopy raised in note 25 in which there was a problem of determining light by size and size by light. The two are thought "twice over," once as light and once as size.

SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION

THERE is a latent antinomy in the theology of the sacraments in the solution of which the most fundamental issues which divide Catholics and Protestants are raised, and which seems intimately connected with another antinomy which has troubled philosophers, more especially from the time of Descartes to our own day. The problem of how to bridge the gulf between spirit and matter, of how to reconcile the subjective and objective, has called forth solutions ranging from utter materialism to the most extreme idealism. It is but natural to expect that if this antinomy appears in the natural order, when we try to determine the relations of man with nature, it will also appear when we come to consider the relations of man with God, the author of nature. The overly subjective point of view in determining these relations does not begin with the Reformers, but it is they who raised this spiritual subjectivism into a first principle, apply it methodically to every part of theology, especially to the doctrines of faith, grace, and the sacraments. A violent controversy followed, and, as always in controversy, attention was directed to some particular aspects of the subject, while other, more important, aspects were relegated to the background and were forgotten. Later theologians are too often content to follow in the steps of the masters of controversy thus perpetuating a tradition which considers the elements of worn-out dispute as of primary importance in questions of theology, whereas more fundamental aspects of dogma, which have never been challenged, have been therefore overlooked.

In a most general way, the antinomy which concerns us now may be described as a conflict between the objective and the subjective elements of the sacraments, or perhaps, between the external and internal elements. The sacraments are both signs

and causes; and the antinomy appears under both of these considerations. As regards the causality of the sacraments, tradition has crystallized this opposition into the two famous formulas, *opus operantis* and *opus operatum*; and Catholic theologians have ably defended the objective position against the attacks of the subjectivists. But too few of them have defined the objective standpoint in relation to sacramental signification as distinct from causality; some who have attempted it do not seem to have succeded very well.

The heterodox theologians, as usual defending the subjective point of view, seem to have reason and common sense on their side. A sacrament, as everyone admits, is primarily a sign. A sign is a means of communication of knowledge; and if we omit natural signs as outside the question where the sacraments are concerned, the sacraments are symbols, not of things, but of thoughts or of subjective states. Thus a sacrament is essentially subjective, wholly ordained to making known to others our feelings, our desires, our ideas. In the supernatural order, then, sacraments as signs are symbols, means by which we give expression to an inward state of soul, or by which God does so. This subjectivist position leads, of course, to the teaching that the sacraments are signs by which God testifies to our inward sanctity, or by which we profess our faith, or excite it in ourselves or others.

That sacraments are, in some way, signs of the faith that is within us is perfectly true. The traditional formula " sacraments of the faith " (*sacramenta fidei*) is no mere pious phrase, and St. Thomas can write: " The sacraments are so many signs which show the faith by which man is justified." [1] We have so concentrated our attention on one aspect of the sacraments that many would cry " heretic " if anyone other than St. Thomas had uttered these words. It would of course, be heretical to affirm that the sacraments were nothing more than signs professing our faith.[2] If this were the only role of the sacraments

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 61, a. 4.

[2] Cf. Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, nn. 848, 849.

they would be rather unnecessary, since the external profession of faith pertains formally to the virtue of faith, not of religion. Here, as in many cases, the heretics are right in what they affirm, but wrong in what they deny.

Granted this true relationship of signification between the sacraments and faith, the question arises: how can we safeguard the objective content of the sacraments, remaining within the limits of signification, that is, without having recourse to the causal efficacy of the sacraments? This question has, fortunately, long since received a very adequate answer in the well-known doctrine that the formal and specifying element in the sign is the relation (not necessarily real; in technical language, the relation *secundum esse dependentiae*) to the object signified, whereas the relation to the knowing subject is secondary and in no way proper to a sign, since it is common to every act of knowing, whether the object known be a sign or a term in its own right.[3] This teaching, which we take for granted although it is disputed by some philosophers, provides us with the foundation of our solution to the Protestant objection, for the fundamental role of the sign cannot be subjective when its distinguishing feature is the reality to which it points, or rather the relation of dependence on this object, whose place it takes.

Perhaps the object thus signified is itself something subjective, such as faith, so that the original objection returns in full force? The answer usually made to this difficulty is that the object signified is not only faith, but, above all, grace. Yet this is hardly a sufficient reply, for grace is as subjective as faith, and, like faith, is a supernatural quality or habit in the soul. Such teaching would not differ essentially (except of course on the nature of grace) from the heretical teaching that the sacraments are "merely external signs of grace or justice received through faith."[4] True, the operative word in this condemned opinion is "merely" (*tantum*) and no Catholic theologian teaches that the sacraments are merely signs, for

[3] Cf. Joannes a St. Thoma, *Cursus Philosophicus*, "Logica," qq. XXI-XXII.
[4] Council of Trent, sess. VII, can. 6; Denziger, n. 849.

they are also causes. Yet, the causality of the sacraments is proportionate to their signification. If the Catholic notion of sacramental causality differs essentially from that of the Reformers, it would seem to follow that the Catholic notion of sacramental signification should also differ from that of the Reformers. Nevertheless, it seems to be generally assumed, in textbooks of theology at least, that the sacrament is a sign only of the faith which is a disposition for and of the grace which is the fruit of the sacrament.[5] It is a traditional doctrine, sanctioned many times by the Church, that the sacraments are signs of the grace produced by them in the soul of the recipient. This seems to be generally interpreted as meaning that the sacrament is a sign of the grace as it actually exists in the soul after the reception of the sacrament. This may not be the express teaching of theologians, for this problem does not seem to have occurred to them at all, and they are content to state that the sacrament signifies its proper effect, without inquiring how this may be so. In a certain, well-defined sense it is true that the sacrament does signify its effect in the soul of the recipient, but this appears to be only a partial view of the sacramental signification, which terminates at a reality deeper and more objective than grace.

The first reason for this statement is general and negative: it seems that in teaching that the sacrament is only a sign of the faith and grace in the soul of the recipient we are depriving the sacrament of its objective content, of its primary relationship to something which does not depend on the subject. It seems to enclose the sacrament within a network of relations which find their term in the recipient, to pluck it from its external setting, and unduly to limit its signification to the realm of subjective dispositions or effects. In other words, by overemphasizing the axiom that "the sacraments are for men" this viewpoint seeks in man the whole term of sacramental

[5] The manuals generally admit with St. Thomas (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 3) that the sacraments also signify the passion of Christ, and glory, to this extent safeguarding the objective element.

signification, and minimizes, if it does not altogether ignore, that deeper and more fundamental relation to God which must be essential and primary in all things supernatural. The temptation to subordinate divine things to the subjective world of human aspirations is most difficult to resist in an anthropocentric age, and many theologians are tainted with the tendencies of their time. But it should be evident that, especially in treating of divine things, the standpoint should be essentially theocentric and should overshadow the human aspect, the relation to man. Instances of this anthropocentric tendency in theology are to be found in the way in which some authors approach the question of reconciling the free act of man with the causality of God. Even in treating such a primarily supernatural entity as faith, the tendency is to stress the human side, its psychological aspect in relation to human reasoning, and to neglect the divine aspect, the relation to God, who is its author and object. This relationship to God is primary in all supernatural entities, and the sacraments should not be an exception.

This general observation is very much strengthened by three arguments, based, not on analogies, but on the nature of the sacraments as signs, signs which are also causes. It is agreed that sacraments are practical signs. Such signs, at least in so far as they are used by intellectual agents as means of communication, do not refer primarily to the work which they indicate or enjoin, but to the intention of the agent who uses them to make known his will. The words in which a law is framed are practical signs whereby the will of the legislator is signified to the subject; that which makes signs of them is the relation, not to the work to be performed, but to the internal command of the legislator, which is the object signified. The relations to the subject and to the work which is the object of the command are secondary and qualifying. This must be true of the sacraments, since they are practical signs, which God uses to make known to man the hidden working of the Spirit in his soul.

Moreover, we believe that the sacraments of the New Law

are causes of grace, instrumental causes it is true, but still real causes. An obvious difficulty at once arises, for the cause is not the sign of the effect; rather, the effect is the sign of the cause. The sacrament cannot be at once sign and cause. St. Thomas, in reply to this objection, points out that the sacrament can be also a sign because it is only an instrumental cause, that is, a cause which is also to some extent an effect, since it is moved by the principal cause.[6] It would seem, therefore, that the sacrament is not a sign (directly at any rate) of the effect which it produces in man, but of its principal cause, that is, of God as sanctifying man by means of the sacrament, as efficaciously decreeing, or imperating, the sanctification of man through the use of sensible rites.

Finally, it is commonly taught that the sacraments do not actually cause until that instant when the full signification of the united matter and form is completed. When the signification is completed, when the sacrament is perfectly constituted as a sign, then, and then only, does it act as a cause. Hence it cannot be a sign of the effect in the recipient; the effect is posterior in nature to the causality of the sacrament, and thus also to the signification of the sacrament. It follows that it can be only a sign of God, or of the divine activity working through the media of sensible elements to transform the soul.

These arguments seem to point conclusively to the objectively divine aspect of sacramental signification, to reveal the term of such signification as something primarily divine, something pertaining in itself to the Godhead, but having reference to the sanctification of man, " a sign of a sacred thing in as much as it makes men holy," as St. Thomas put it.[7] This " holy thing " (*res sacra*) as the majority of theologian teach, is sacramental grace. But, for the reason just given, it cannot be this grace as already existing in the soul as the effect of the sacrament. We must unite in a higher synthesis these two aspects of the truth, that the sacrament is a sign primarily of the divine intention

[6] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 1, ad 1um.
[7] *Ibid.*, q. 60, a. 2.

which it signifies, and that it also signifies the sacramental effect. We can do this by regarding the divine intention as efficacious, as a cause which is pregnant with its effects. The effect is signified, not in itself, nor in the soul of the recipient, but in its cause; this cause is God under the aspect of the principal cause of sacramental signification. God is such a cause by His intellect and will, uniting in what we can only conceive as an " imperium " or efficacious decree, which is the source of the efficacy of the sacraments and, through this efficacy, of the supernatural effect in the soul of man. It is this divine " imperium," this efficacious intention of bestowing grace through the sacraments, which is the primary term of sacramental signification; thus grace also is signified, but only mediately, through its cause.

In this conception of sacramental signification it is clearly seen how the sacraments of the Old Law agree univocally in their formal elements, that of sign, with those of the New Law. Both are essentially signs of the divine " imperium " which causes man's sanctification, and signs of the grace to be conferred. The way in which such grace is to be given, through the sacraments or on the occasion of their reception, does not enter the term of signification; the efficacious decree of God is the formal term, and the different ways in which this decree is actually realized are but material with regard to this formal term.

If we now limit ourselves to the Christian sacraments, and introduce the notion of causality, we see that the sacrament does not merely signify the divine imperium or decree, but it is a means whereby God, as it were, applies it to a particular subject in order to enrich it with grace. The signification is thus extended beyond its formal term in such a way as to attain to the divine imperium, not only in its origin and source, but also as it is participated in the symbolic instrumental action. The sacrament signifies something transcendent in its source, but actually communicated as a supernatural efficacy of fruitfulness to the sacrament itself. In this connection, St. Thomas

speaks of a similar mediation of the creature in God's activity, in the part played by rational creatures in the working of miracles.[8] The parity between this case and the one we are considering is evident, and is referred to by St. Thomas in his conclusion to this article: "It is not to be wondered at that God thus uses a spiritual creature as an instrument to bring about marvelous effects in corporeal nature, since He uses a corporeal creature as an instrument in the justification of spirits in the sacraments." [9]

St. Thomas thus envisages creatures as instruments through which the divine will is revealed and efficaciously fulfilled in virtue of a transient sharing in the power of God. The divine imperium is formally immanent in God, but virtually transient; it is communicated to the created mediator as a transient supernatural activity. Thus there is something actually in the sacrament which is signified, not immediately, but mediately; the sacrament signifies what it contains in virtue of a previous relation to God. The sacrament may thus be said to signify grace in the same way in which it contains grace; and St. Thomas teaches us that grace is contained in the sacrament "not as effects in non-univocal causes . . . but as to a certain instrumental power transient and incomplete in its natural being." [10] Grace is thus signified, not as it is in the soul of the subject, but as it is present in the sacrament itself, where it is contained as that transient activity which is the divine im-

[8] Constat autem quod Deus solo imperio miracula operatur. Videmus autem quod imperium divinum ad inferiores rationales spiritus, scilicet humanos, mediantibus superioribus, scilicet angelis, pervenit, ut in legis veteris latione apparet; et per hunc modum per spiritus angelicos vel humanos imperium divinum ad corporales creaturas pervenire potest, ut quodammodo naturae praesentetur divinum praeceptum; et sic agant quodammodo spiritus humani vel angelici ut instrumentum divinae virtutis ad miraculi perfectionem; nom quasi aliqua virtute in eos manente, vel gratuita vel naturali, in actum miraculi possint . . . sed virtus ad cooperandum Deo in miraculis in sanctis intelligi potest ad modum formarum imperfectarum, quae intentiones vocantur, quae no permanent nisi per praesentiam agentis principalis, sicut lumen in aere et motus in instrumento (*De Potentia*, q. 6, a. 4.).

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 3.

perium communicated to the creature and realized through it. The importance of this conclusion may be seen when we remember that the Holy Eucharist is certainly a sign of a reality which it contains; this manner of signification should not be proper to the Eucharist, for all the sacraments are univocal in their class, which is formally determined by the relation of signification. Our explanation does seem to provide a univocal signification for all the sacraments.

Perhaps this is what St. Thomas had in mind when he wrote those otherwise puzzling words: " Since a sacrament signifies that which sanctifies, it must signify the effect which is implied in the sanctifying cause as such." [11] Pallavicini, in his History of the Council of Trent, describes the difference between the old and the new sacraments in such a way as to suggest the same conclusion: " The former pre-signify the grace which is to be conferred by the sacraments yet to come, while the latter signify the grace to be conferred by themselves, in much the same way as frogs croaking in the marshes and the clouds compacted in the air signify rain; the frogs signify the rain which will fall from the clouds yet to come, while the clouds signify the rain with which they themselves and which they will pour forth." [12]

It is evident that the divine activity, transiently communicated to the sacrament, could not, in itself, be the term which gives specification to the sacramental signification. Such transient activity is not anything definite in its own right, for it has no meaning except as a sharing in the efficacy of God, and as ordained to produce a supernatural effect. The signification will be specified by the divine activity as pointing to the sacramental effect. We should, indeed, expect this, for signification is a relation, and relations are specified through their foundation

[11] *Ibid.*, q. 60, a. 3, ad 2um.

[12] *Lib.* IX, cap. 4: Altera gratiam praesignificabant per futura sacramenta novae legis conferendam, altera vero significant tamquam conferendam a seipsis, eo fere modo quo pluviam significant tam ranae in paludibus coaxantes, tum nubes in aere constrictae; illae significant pluciam a venturis nubibus effundendam, hae vero pluviam qua ipsae gravidae sunt, et quam ipsae profundent.

or cause in respect of their term. The sacramental signification is thus specified through its foundation, the divine imperium, as connoting the effect, sacramental grace. We should then determine the formal and specifying term of sacramental signification as the divine imperium, working through the created instrument to produce the particular grace to which the sacrament is ordained; or, if we prefer, it is this sacramental grace as " produced " (*producenda*), as virtually present in the divine intention, and in the transient activity which is the created counterpart and reflection of the divine imperium.[13]

When we speak, therefore, of grace as being the term of sacramental signification, we do not mean grace as *in fieri*. We mean grace as *in facto esse*, but not as *facta*, rather as *facienda*. Similarly, the idea which specifies the creative work of the artist is the intellectual image of the effect. It is not this effect as *in fieri*, but as *in facto esse*, the perfectly completed house or statue, for instance. Neither is it the effect as already produced, but as it is destined to exist and as still awaiting effective external realization. This distinction is made by St. Thomas in a stimulating passage which we may quote without comment: " The form of a sacrament ought to denote what is done in the sacrament. Consequently, the form for the consecration of the bread ought to signify the actual conversion of the bread

[13] Since the sacraments, and their corresponding effects, are specifically distinct among themselves, the ultimate specific differentiation of any individual sacrament lies in its relation to this effect; in this article the effect is referred to as grace, but what is said of grace in this connection is equally true of the character, which may be regarded as in some ways a more immediate effect than grace in those sacraments which confer it. We may therefore regard the sacramental signification as pointing to a double term, to the divine and efficacious intention of the Author of the sacraments, and to the specific effect of the sacrament, which is, as it were, foreshadowed and virtually contained in that intention. The relation to the divine imperium may then be regarded as the generic element of the definition of the sacrament (as belonging to the sacrament as such), whereas the relation to the particular effect would constitute its specific element (of this determined sacrament); both elements pertain to the definition and essence of the sacrament. This fits in very well with the common Thomistic teaching that the specific difference of the sacraments of the New Law is not causality, but the relation of signification to the effect as produced by the causality of the sacrament.

into the body of Christ. Conversion can be considered in two ways, first *in becoming*, secondly, *in being*. But the conversion ought not to be signified in this form as *in becoming*, but as *in being*. First, because such conversion is not successive, but instantaneous; and in such changes the *becoming* is nothing else than the *being*. Secondly, because the sacramental forms bear the same relation to the signification of the sacramental effect as artificial forms to the representation of the effect of art. Now an artificial form is the likeness of the ultimate effect, on which the artist's intension is fixed; just as the art-form in the builder's mind is principally the form of the house constructed, and secondarily of the constructing. Accordingly, in this form also the conversion ought to be expressed as in *being*, to which the intention is referred." [14] The sacrament, therefore, when actually being administered, like the instrument in the hands of the artist (it is also a sign), signifies the effect, not as already made, but as existing in the mind of the principal agent, and as being given external existence through the activity of the instrument.

To appreciate the bearing of this conclusion in sacramental theory, it is necessary to draw attention to a distinction which seems to have been quite overlooked by the defenders of the so-called intentional causality of the sacraments. In the sacraments there are two quite distinct significations. The sacramental action has its own proper or natural signification, which results from many partial significations—of the action or thing, of the words, and of the words as determining the action. Baptism, for instance, has one natural signification—cleansing through water—which is materially composite, but formally one by reason of the thing signified.[15] It is to this natural signification that St. Thomas refers when he says that the

[14] *Summa Theol*, III, q. 78, a. 2. This sacrament provides us with another confirmation of our thesis, in so far as the consecrated species are a sign, not directly of grace as in the soul of the recipient, but of the Body and Blood of Our Lord as really present under such species in the form of food destined to cause such grace in the soul.

[15] Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. VIII, q. 2, a. 3 ad 6um; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 78, a. 4.

sacrament has a certain (passive) aptitude to be assumed by God as a fitting instrument in the production of grace.[16] Since this signification is entirely natural, antecedent to the institution of the sacraments by Our Lord, of itself it has no reference to a sacramental effect. It is indeed the formal element of the action proper to the sacrament [17] as distinct from its sacramental activity in the hands of the principal agent, but this proper activity has no relation, either of signification or of causality, to the instrumental effect, when the effect is supernatural. It would be a serious mistake to endeavour to determine the effect of the sacrament by reference to this purely natural signification; and one is not surprised to find that such an attempt has led to assigning as the immediate effect of the sacrament that mysterious *res et sacramentum* which is neither grace nor the character.[18]

The properly sacramental, or supernatural signification, which alone can determine the effect of the sacrament, is distinct from this natural signification. Between the action proper to the instrument and the supernatural effect there is not even a proportion, although there is a " proportionality " or proportion of proportions between the two relations of causality and signification.[19] The instrument has, of itself, a remote suitableness, a passive aptitude, that it should be elevated by God to

[16] *De Veritate*, q. 27, a. 4, ad 13um.

[17] Formally, such proper action is *actio sensibilis symbolica.*

[18] According to Billot (*De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, Rome, 1931, p. 59 sqq.) the *res et sacramentum* is the effect of the proper action of the sacrament and, as such, must be purely natural; yet it is described as a *dispositio sive titulus de se exigens infusionem gratiae* (p. 102). Such an entity must be supernatural, and could not therefore be the effect of the *actio praevia* of the sacrament. Similarly, by teaching that the sacrament is a sign, not of grace, but of this *res et sacramentum*, that is, the sign of a sign, he seems to forget that " intelligible effects do not have the nature of a sign unless they are manifested by signs of some sort " (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 60, a. 4, ad 4um). The *res et sacramentum* could be a sign only in so far as it is infallibly connected with the outward sensible action of the sacrament; its signification is but a participation in the signification of the outward rite. If this later signification does not terminate at grace, neither does that of the *res et sacramentum*, not even indirectly.

[19] Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. I, q. 1, a. 1.

signify a supernatural effect; after the divine institution of the sacrament it has an active aptitude to signify such an effect, and in this sense St. Thomas often says that a divine power dwells in the sacrament in an incipient state (inchoative) even before the actual confection of the sacrament. Billot is perfectly correct when he teaches that such signification, and such active aptitude, are purely intentional entities, totally depending on the divine intention and institution. Such signification is not natural, not only because its cause and term are supernatural, but also because it is arbitrary, and as such is an entity of reason (*ens rationis*) which has objective existence only in the divine mind. The sacramental signification draws any reality it possesses from its cause and source, the divine intention or imperium; it is not something to be found as a real entity in the sacrament itself. Materially, the natural and the sacramental significations are one and the same thing, since the natural signification is elevated to signify a divine effect; from this point of view the following words of Cardinal Cajetan are verified: " the power of the words (in the form of the Eucharist) is not a super-added quality, as if it were something distinct from the signifying prayer, but it is the signifying prayer itself as the instrument of God in the consecration." [20] Formally, however, the sacramental signification is divine, and is not distinct from the divine institution of the sacrament; it is the divine decree itself, ordaining the sanctification of man through sensible rites, as denominating or pertaining to those rites themselves.[21]

This same distinction between the natural and the supernatural significations provides an answer to the famous objection against the physical causality of the sacraments which Billot bases upon their valid but unfruitful reception.[22] The supernatural signification depends entirely upon the divine intention; in fact it is this very intention, and so is never

[20] *Comm. in III*, q. 78, a. 4.

[21] The two significations are distinguished in *IV Sent.*, d. VIII, q. 2, a. 3, ad 6um.

[22] Cf. Billot, *loc. cit.*, pp. 123 *sqq.*

frustrated. This intention is to cause grace through the valid sacrament, when it is received with the proper dispositions (*non ponentibus obicem*), and this intention or signification is always verified. The natural signification may, indeed, be falsified, if grace is not actually conferred through the sacrament. Billot's objection envisages this signification alone, but just as this signification when verified, does not make the sacrament to be a true and efficacious sign, so too, when it is not verified, it does not render it false and inefficacious. Further, this objection assumes that the sacramental signification terminates at grace as actually produced in the soul of the recipient, whereas, as we have seen, the formal term is the divine intention of conferring grace through the sacraments when received with the proper dispositions.

We seem to be confronted with a paradox when we collate the two conclusions at which we have arrived, namely, (1) that the principal term of sacramental signification is the divine imperium which transforms created agents into instruments pregnant with divine life, and (2) that the sacramental signification itself is really nothing more than this divine imperium, elevating the natural signification of the sacrament to a supernatural plane. Thus it appears that the signification, formally considered, and its formal term, are identified; that which is signified is that which signifies, but through the medium of sensible things from which alone man can learn in a way befitting his composite nature. Spontaneously we think of that other paradox, the paradox of faith, wherein that which we believe is that by which we believe—God made known by God, God revealing Himself to us, once more in terms of human thought and of human nature. The sacraments are sacraments of faith, like to the Blessed Eucharist in that they are mysteries of faith. If they share in the mystery of faith, they also, like faith, point to God, and are signs of God. They are signs by which we profess externally the faith that is within us; that is their subjective aspect. But this faith reveals to us the mystery of the sharing by man in the fruits of redemption gained for us through the

sufferings of Christ and applied to our souls by means of the sacraments. They signify the sanctification of man by that grace which has been gained for us by the passion of Our Lord, and which by divine decree is communicated to souls in order to lead them on to the complete transformation to the image of Christ in glory. They make known to the world the divine intention of transforming souls to the image of the suffering Christ, and they are raised to a sharing in His redemptive activity. They signify the actual realization of the divine plan of man's sanctification through the use of sensible elements which are active with the activity of their author and principal cause; they signify something eminently objective, something divine, with all fecundity and infinity of the divine. We may define the immediate term of this signification, but we can set no limits to the extension of such signification to other supernatural realities, included in or flowing from this term, since the divine decree embraces all time and all being.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism. By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. Pp. 248, with index. $3.00.

The title of this book, "The Origins of Christian Supernaturalism," is not easy to understand; in the book Judaism is mentioned, Jesus is noticed, as it were in passing, for the Saviour of the world always remains in the shadows, but what is stressed is the influence of pagan philosophy and pagan religious cults on the beginnings of Christianity. The author (p. vi) states that the "present volume presents a survey of historical data." The digest of pagan philosophy and pagan religious myths is well done. It is clear that the Mediterranean world, at the time Christianity came to it, held to a belief that the activity of the world, in some obscure way, was controlled by superhuman powers. But it is not clear what the author attempts to prove from this. His thesis seems to be that the supernatural element in Christianity is not supernatural at all but is due to the religious conditions of the time; it was a better and more potent form of supernaturalism than the Greek form and so conquered the Greek world. Dr. Case concludes the book: "Christian supernaturalism arose to serve a functional need in the course of the new religion's expansion within its particular environment and in relation to characteristic modes of thinking prevalent in that day," and since these modes of thinking are no longer influential on the modern world, "to maintain rigid adhesion to an outworn type of interpretation might prove in reality detrimental to Christianity" (p. 224). The thesis, of course, is not new; it was enunciated by Loisy and others a long time ago and under various forms. At the present time it is not so prominent. The book, therefore, belongs to that class of books which come under the heading: "Comparative Study of Religions." Hence the title is misleading or, at least, ambiguous; the book is not concerned with the real origin of Christian supernaturalism at all.

The comparative study of religions is not something new nor is it to be censured. If this science did not exist it would have to be devised; analogies between diverse religions cannot be denied. People, no matter how far you go back in history, do not live in hermetically sealed compartments. Nations did not develop in isolation; peoples, tribes, and nations influenced one another; even prehistoric time has its influence on historic time. Neither did the religions of nations develop in isolation; the advanced form of religions among the Greeks is not due to the Greeks alone. Nor did

Christianity develop in isolation. But development is one thing and origin is quite another.

It was necessary, for instance, for a new religion to speak the language of the time in which it appeared. If it did not it could have no contact with the time nor any influence on the religion or the people of the time. Christianity spoke the language of the Greeks; there was no other language in common use in the Mediterranean world of that time. The writers of the New Testament used the language of the religious writers of the Greeks and, in point of fact, a great number of terms passed over from the religions of Greece and of Rome to the religion of Jesus Christ. But widely divergent spiritual attitudes and beliefs may creep in under the same symbols and the same language. Religions may present similarities of language or of externals but these will not necessarily indicate a common origin or even the borrowing of one from the other. The vocabulary of the New Testament and of the early Fathers of the Church is certainly the vocabulary of the Greeks and sometimes even of the religion of the Greeks. But the content of the vocabulary is not the same and we should not confound the expression with the thought. Hence, there is grave danger of exaggerating the importance of analogies between religious rites and of concluding a dependance where only a resemblance exists, which may be traced to the general laws of language and to the common basis of human nature.

Criticism of Christian origins often pays no attention to tradition and excludes the supernatural in constant search for purely human origins or antecedents to explain the most stupendous religious fact in history, namely, the rise of Christianity. Christianity, it is said, invaded and conquered the Graeco-Roman world because it is a fusion of Jewish and pagan religious and philosophical elements. To sustain this thesis and reduce Christianity to the plane of other naturalistic religions the vast field of history has been investigated. Authors have turned to India, Babylon, to all forms of Greek piety and to oriental syncretism; Semites, Iranians, Egyptians, and Greeks cooperated to produce the religion of Christ. Dr. Case states: "In less than four hundred years of historical development Christianity had acquired a full supernatural equipment. No area of Jewish or gentile thinking was left uninvaded. Every form of supernatural belief was revised or transformed and supplemented to serve the purpose of the new religion" (p. 220). Now, no one calls into question the superiority of Christianity in relation to Judaism nor will any one seriously deny that it is successor to that religion but Christianity certainly does not go back to a grafting process of pagan religious cults. Aside from doctrinal considerations, the sensual and barbaric atmosphere of these rites renders it highly improbable that any Christian preacher or religous leader would borrow from them, even unconsciously. Also, the hypothesis is futile because of a singular fact: Jesus. Christian tradition explains Christianity very simply.

Jesus saw his mission clearly. He told it to the disciples and they told it to the world. Of course St. Paul was not a disciple but he knew Christ and his mission by special contact with Christ and also through his association with the other disciples. Neither Paul nor the others needed to go to the Greeks; indeed they knew little about the Greeks and what they knew was abhorrent to them. Such an explanation may seem naive to some but any other is a broad and watered-down variety of Christianity. And it is difficult to see how a broad and watered-down Christianity, which would be nothing more than a refined paganism, could be made acceptable to a pagan world and conquer it. The Greeks would have been breached by their own petard.

This has to do with the very origin of Christianity; the origin and impulse came from Jesus. But to a certain extent the development of Christianity could have been favored by the religions of the Greeks. There was a providential preparation for the true faith in the very midst of paganism. The people who longed ardently for communication and union with the gods were prepared by their religions, to a certain extent, to welcome the good news of the Incarnation; they accepted Jesus because they felt that through him they could come to God. Both Judea and Greece, therefore, had a say in the development of Christianity. We are the heirs of both. From the Jews we received the Sacred Scriptures; from the Greeks our confidence in human reason. We love both and we adhere to both; we follow the footsteps of the prophets but we do not desert the way of the philosophers. But at the same time we maintain firmly that Jesus was independent of both Jew and Gentile; in other words, we do not explain the religion promulgated by Jesus on naturalistic grounds. But this seems to be the assumption of Dr. Case. In referring to the supernaturalism of the early Church he speaks of it as being acquired. "Christians . . . believed themselves to be in possession of unusual miracle-working power" (p. 15). "Mark . . . and subsequent gospel writers excelled even Mark in the use of supernaturalism to interpret the career of Jesus" (p. 20). "The growth of Christianity early acquired a full set of supernatural sanctions" (p. 20). "In the next century the meal became an actual absorption of the flesh and blood of Christ and insured immortality for the believer's body" (p. 21). "In less than a century of historical growth the movement had acquired an elaborate set of supernatural sanctions . . . it now claimed superiority in this domain" (p. 21). Christian writers did not wait a century to claim superiority; they claimed it from the very beginning and the only way to deny this is to throw out the New Testament or to date it long after it was written. Nor did the Eucharist become the sacrament and sacrifice of Christ's body and blood only after a century. Christ Himself asserted it, Paul insisted on it, whether one believes that they knew what they were talking about or not. The Gospel attests to the supernatural character of Jesus because

He so imposed Himself on the Gospel writers; they did not make Jesus, Jesus made them and to such a fashion that they were willing to die for Him. Miracles were worked; there must have been something very visible that struck the eyes of the Greeks, otherwise the sudden spread of Christianity is an enigma. Even the miracles of the Apocrypha of later ages suppose and do not exclude miracles that were well established, else the Apocryphal writers would have been vainly beating the air.

After asserting that Christianity acquired a panoply of supernaturalism (Dr. Case does not say just how), he goes on to assert that the pagan world was prepared to accept Christianity because it saw in Christianity something it already had. The second chapter is entitled," The Value of Apparitions." " A belief in apparitions was fundamental to early Christians . . . the Christian preacher staked everything upon his conviction that Jesus had been seen in the days following his crucifixion. Nowadays one in inclined to smile at ghost stories " (p. 22). " In general," says Dr. Case, " Christians found it exceedingly advantageous to adopt and revise the apparitional imagery so widely current in their gentile environment " (p. 42). It was something more than ghost stories, however, that overcame the religious superstition of the ancient world. And the Resurrection is fundamental, not only to early Christians but to Christians today; demolish it and you demolish the very basis of Christianity: Jesus Christ. If the Apostles preached the Resurrection it was because it was real and rested on well attested facts. One may deny it but not as an historian; the denial comes from the gratuitous assumption that miracles are impossible.

In the third chapter, " Channels of Revelation," Dr. Case uses the term " revelation " in exactly the same sense of the revelation of Christ and of a variety of other revelations. In fact, he uses the term in this way throughout the book. The gods revealed themselves to the ancient world and " in this respect its rivals had to be surpassed " (p. 63). Certainly they were surpassed; the revelation of Christianity is a divine revelation. One has only to read the New Testament to realize how far it surpasses the revelation of the Greeks. Such revelation is not a refined pagan revelation coming through the Greeks but a real supernatural revelation coming from God.

In the chapter on " Heroic Saviours " (chapter 4), Jesus is put in the same class with heroes like Hercules or with gods like Isis, Osiris, Dionysius, Demeter, and others. Dr. Case further assumes that the New Testament writers got their ideas relative to the death of Christ and the redemption from these pagan sources. " A belief that salvation was to be attained through trust in the accomplishment of a deceased historical individual, later apotheosized as a reward for his self-sacrificing service to humanity, sounds strange on the lips of Paul, who boasted of his competence in the Jewish religion of his youth " (p. 92). " Certainly," says Dr. Case, " Paul

found nothing there to suggest that salvation was to be attained through the death of a man who would subsequently be elevated to the dignity of a God." Dr. Case asserts that Paul persuaded himself that it was there. Of course Paul found nothing in the Old Testament about a man being elevated to a God but it did not take much persuasion on the part of Paul to find the office and the mission of the Messias there, for it is there; Paul makes frequent reference to the Old Testament about these things and he knew as much about the Old Testament as Dr. Case. But what Dr. Case seems to forget is that St. Paul is not relying on the Old Testament for the clarity of his concept of the Crucified Jesus but on his direct visions which were so real that he was willing to die for their truth and no Greek worshiper of Dionysius or Mithras had such a vision or such a spirit of Martyrdom.

In the chapter, " On the Human Approach to the Gods " (chapter 5), the author says that the Greeks and the Romans were a praying people and, therefore, were prepared to accept a praying Christian missionary. " Christianity triumphed not by abolishing the yearnings of the heathen for access to the supernatural but by intensifying and heightening the customary techniques for attaining this goal " (p. 129). There is nothing surprising about this; Christ came not to destroy the yearnings of nature but to perfect them and it is natural for man to pray. The matter of prayer does not explain why the Greeks accepted Jesus. The Jews also knew of prayer but they rejected Jesus. Why the Greeks accepted Jesus and the Jews rejected him is an interesting and intriguing problem but it is not to be explained by the presence or absence of prayer for both were a praying people, each in his own way.

Again, toward the end of the same chapter (p. 119) Dr. Case implies that there was little, if any, ecclesiastical organization, no priesthood, and no sacrifice. It is true that there was little but there was something and an impartial historical investigation will show that there were the beginnings of an ecclesiastical organization. And, of course, there was a sacrifice, the sacrifice of Christ's body, and a priesthood, the members of which were ordained and commissioned by Christ Himself. The priesthood and sacrifice came not by Greek imitation. If Christian missionaries did not have these things from the beginning how could they preach them to the Greeks? They would have had to preach and borrow at the same time, a rare feat of legerdemain which would hardly have gone unnoticed by the ancient world.

In the chapter, " Protection for Society (Church and State)," concerning providential care of the individual, the destiny and immortality of the soul, Dr. Case points out certain ideas that were prevalent in the Roman and Greek world. In none of these things is the Christian beholden to the Roman or the Greek. The Christians learned a lot from the Greeks and the Romans and they assimilated what was good into their system, but the system was theirs.

In the last two chapters Dr. Case is overly concerned with the suppression of the mind and the survival of Christianity because of supernaturalism. Supernaturalism keeps intellectualism in bondage to religion, thinks Dr. Case; " the activities of the mind had to be suppressed in the interests of an allegedly infallible ecclesiastical institution " (p. 209). " Early in its career Christianity declared itself to be a divine institution . . . intellectualism can thrive only where perfect liberty is accorded the scholar, etc." (p. 217). Dr. Case is needlessly concerned; an infallible and divine Christianity never interfered with the legitimate aim or research of scholars. Of its very nature it cannot; the object of the human intellect is truth and that is also the object of Divine Revelation, but truth of a higher order. We are speaking, of course, of the divine and infallible institution founded by Christ and not of a deified and infallible man-made institution like the mystery religions of Greece and other religions. What is to be feared is this defied humanism.

Dr. Case then synopsizes the long history of the relations between supernaturalism and the human intellect, that is, between faith and reason. Up to the time of the modern rationalists, Christian theologians and philosophers attempted to reconcile faith with reason; the moderns dispense completely with faith and the supernatural. In passing, Dr. Case notes the distinction that St. Thomas Aquinas makes between the " light of natural reason " and the " light of divine revelation " whereby some things can be known by human reason alone and other things only by revelation, but the supreme arbiter is always revelation. Thus, says Dr. Case: " Supernaturalism was still supreme " (p. 229). Naturally, for St. Thomas man always remains man and does not become God. But the moderns make the fallible human intellect supreme; in other words, they deify it and make it infallible, although, of course, they do this unconsciously. The euhemerism of the Greeks has returned. A Christian cannot subscribe to such a doctrine without repudiating Christ. Either the religion of Christ is divine, and, therefore, supreme or it is not. If it is divine it will survive because of its supernaturalism, and there is nothing that one can do against it. If it were not divine it would have gone the way of the mystery religions of bygone days in spite of an acquired supernaturalism and there is nothing one can do for it.

Enough has been cited to show the tendency of this work. It is, in general, a good digest of pagan religions and even of pagan religious philosophy. In this latter respect it might be noted that Dr. Case makes Aristotle conclude to what he certainly does not conclude (p. 174). The Stagirite never denied the immortality of the soul. Although his doctrine is confused and conditioned by his teaching concerning the active intellect, from his principles one would conclude to the survival rather than to a denial of the immortality of the soul.

Dr. Case's thesis, then, is hardly novel nor at the present time particularly pertinent. The study of Christianity in its beginnings can be rewarding. But, the reality of Christian supernaturalism and its origin and, therefore, the reason for the rise and survival of Christianity, entirely escape this book.

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The Myth of the State. By Ernst Cassirer. Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut, 1946. Pp. 303 with Foreword. $3.75.

This is the last book written by Mr. Ernst Cassirer. His other books, especially *The Problem of Knowledge*, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, and *Essay on Man* aroused widespread interest and established him as one of the most influential writers of contemporary times.

In the foreword to this book, Mr. Charles W. Hendel, colleague and critic of the present work, states the occasion for the writing of " The Myth of the State." It came about because of the " dark, troubled times in which we were living," and " the friends of Professor Cassirer looked to him as the man who could speak with the wisest judgment, since he could interpret the situation of our time in the two great perspectives of history and philosophy."

The book is divided into three parts. Part I is " What is Myth? " In this part, Mr. Cassirer outlines what various authorities have analyzed myth to be. These include such writers as Sir James Frazer, Lévy-Bruhl, F. Max Müller, Herbert Spencer, and Sigmund Freud. Mr. Cassirer examines them critically and finds that all tend to over-emphasize this or that element. His own conclusions on myth may be summarized as follows. As opposed to science, which gives a unity of thought, " religion and myth give us a unity of feeling." The myth is built up in an entirely fantastic world. Its only " objective " aspect is the objectification of feelings. " Myth does not arise solely from intellectual processes; it sprouts forth from deep human emotions." The myth is an emotion turned into an image. It is concerned not so much with individual experiences as with the objectification of man's social experiences. The genuine myth lives in a world of images which are not known as images but are regarded as realities. Mr. Cassirer particularly asociates myth with the difficult task of explaining death: it is myth that persuades us that death does not mean extinction of man's life, but rather only a change in the form of life. " In mythical thought the mystery of death is ' turned into an image '—and by this trans-

formation, death ceases being a hard, unbearable physical fact; it becomes understandable and supportable."—If this brief summary of Mr. Cassirer's notion of myth entails some ambiguity, I think, nevertheless, it reflects accurately his treatment. The notion of myth is not clearly distinguished and there is a somewhat subtle identification of myth with religion.

Part II is "The Struggle against Myth in the History of Political Theory." This is the major part of the book and analyzes thinkers who have struggled against myth in the history of political theory. It starts with the early Greeks and continues through Socrates, Plato, Aristotle (insufficiently), St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Machiavelli, the various adherents to the Social Contract, the thinkers of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism. Some of Mr. Cassirer's best work as a "critical historian of ideas" appears in this section.

Part III is "The Myth of the Twentieth Century." This section treats those who began the accomplishment of the twentieth century myth and those who fulfilled it. It starts with Thomas Carlyle and continues through Gobineau, Hegel, and the various political myth makers of the present century, particularly in Germany. At the conclusion of this, Mr. Cassirer adds a brief, final summary.

It appears that a rather important question remains unresolved at the conclusion of the book. This question concerns the title itself of the book: Why the *myth* of the state? What is Mr. Cassirer's problem and why should it be stated in terms of myth? The problem presumably is the political disorder of the present time. Are we to accept mythical thinking as the real cause of this disorder? In this book, myth becomes the principle for interpreting all intellectual and moral disorder in man. Yet it seems, rather, that myth itself is a part of this disorder and must point to something else as its cause. The degeneracy of the political order in our times assuredly involves more than the influence of myth, even if myth is revealing by way of exploring political disorder. But what we have in fact is a profound perversion of all levels, moral, philosophical, and especially theological. If it were agreed that theological principles are the highest and that any perversion can be measured to the degree it denies the highest, we would have a clear principle of measure. In this way, we might understand myth in the perverse sense of superstitition, and hence a denial of theology and religion. But for Mr. Cassirer, so far as he is explicit on this point, religion seems to be a form of myth, and no other sound, literal principle is presented by way of measuring myth.

Also with respect to the question of the title of the book, it is significant to note that Mr. Cassirer scarcely treats Aristotle in an analysis of political thought while he devotes considerable space to Plato. I do not intend by this to oppose Aristotle and Plato; in fact, I think it can be shown that they are not in any fundamental opposition. But the point is that in

Aristotle, literal principles and distinctions will be found on the nature of the state, its function, and the different forms of government; these are necessary for any political critique. Mr. Cassirer makes no use of them. In Plato, such literal distinctions are not made explicit, which is not to say they are not present. Plato's intention is other than Aristotle's and his approach and method are symbolical rather than literal. However, without a good grasp of aristotelian principles, a platonic analysis will be inevitably misconstrued; even with a good aristotelian basis, Plato can be misconstrued. Hence, Plato and Aristotle are usually put in opposition since the one opposing them is only an aristotelian or only a platonist. A symbolic analysis is good only if it does not contradict literal truths, and Aristotle has the literal truths. Aristotle shows throughout his works that if Plato is taken literally, Plato is false. Hence we must first know Aristotle if we are to understand Plato even if it tells us only how not to read Plato. And we certainly need Aristotle if we are going to do any critical work on the state and on distinctions of good and bad government.

The relevance of this to Mr. Cassirer's book is this. By ignoring Aristotle (in an historical criticism of political theory), he has ignored the literal basis needed to discuss good and bad government. This is also related to titling the book "The Myth of the State." Without the literal, scientific distinctions, there is no solid basis for evaluating good and bad government, and even less for discussing the state in terms of myth. And without theological principles, there is no basis for determining the most profound causes of the disorder even on the political level. I am not concerned with the question whether Mr. Cassirer could or should have had a theological critique; it is enough to see the problem objectively and understand how it requires also a theological analysis for a resolution. I shall discuss briefly two writers Mr. Cassirer considers (Plato and Machiavelli) by way of making this general criticism more explicit.

In the first section of his part on Plato, Mr. Cassirer writes: "I cannot accept, however, the thesis of Jaeger that Plato regarded the Republic as the 'true home of the philosopher.' If the Republic means the 'earthly state,' this judgment is contradicted by Plato himself. To him as well as to St. Augustine the home of the philosopher was the *civitas divina*, not the *civitas terrena*. But Plato did not allow this religious tendency to influence his political judgment. He became a political thinker and a statesman not by inclination but from duty. And he inculcated this duty in the minds of his philosophers. If they would follow their own way they would prefer by far a speculative life to a political life. But they must be summoned back to earth, and, if necessary, compelled to participate in the life of the state. The philosopher, the man who constantly holds converse with the divine order, will not easily return to the political arena. . . . The conflict between the two tendencies in Plato's thought, the one tending to surpass

all limits of the empirical world, the other leading him back to this world in order to organize it and to bring it into rational rules, is never resolved. . . . Even after having written his *Republic*, after having become a political reformer, Plato, as a metaphysician and as an ethical thinker, never feels completely at home in his earthly state" (pp. 63-64).

Mr. Cassirer is quite sound in rejecting the Jaeger thesis, and he shows an initial grasp of Plato's thought that is better than many interpreters. Yet he also fails to see fully the intention of Plato when he states there is an unresolved "conflict between two tendencies in Plato's thought." He does see the ordering of Plato's thought in so far as it seeks to transcend the "limits of the empirical world." He might have seen further that Plato's fundamental intention, manifest in various places throughout the dialogues, is to transcend human reason itself, so far as possible, at least in the negative sense of showing the limitations of human reason. Positively, this intention is to manifest things in their relation to God even though this is often obscure to human reason. Consequently, what often looks like a conflict in Plato is, instead, the radical insufficiency of human reason to treat the ultimate problems raised, problems which center on the relation of man to God. It is Aristotle who gives literal solutions to problems. Plato raises questions (or "conflicts") which extend beyond human reason.

In this sense, then, we may speak of a "conflict" present in Plato's writings. It is not, however, a contradictory element in Plato's thinking; it is a conflict he deliberately makes evident. Such is the conflict Mr. Cassirer is referring to when he speaks of the "philosophers" in the *Republic* who would prefer a speculative life to a political life and who will "not easily condescend to return to the political arena." This can be rightly construed, as Mr. Cassirer implies, as a kind of conflict between the contemplative life and the life of action, a natural opposition for even a well-ordered human being. Plato's philosophers, whether intended by Plato or not, are like the saints who are ordered primarily to contemplation (which is like Plato's "speculation" and not like Aristotle's "speculation"). Yet even the saints have the conflict of the cares of the world to consider and the cares of the political state. And they must return to it, even if not easily, as a duty. In this way there is a conflict, but not one which is Plato's, nor one which cannot be resolved. Plato himself says, as quoted by Mr. Cassirer: "A man whose thoughts are fixed on true reality has no leisure to look downwards on the affairs of man, to take part in their quarrels, and to catch the infection of their jealousies and hates. He contemplates a world of unchanging and harmonious order, where reason governs and nothing can do or suffer wrong. . . . So the philosopher, in constant companionship with the divine order of the world, will reproduce that order in his soul and, so far as man may, become godlike. . . . Suppose,

then, he should find himself compelled to mould other characters besides his own and to shape the pattern of public and private life into conformity with his vision of the ideal, he will not lack the skill to produce such counterparts of temperance, justice, and all the virtues as can exist in the ordinary man" (*Republic*, 500).

Mr. Cassirer, by not employing the sound, literal basis of Aristotle to see that Plato's method is symbolical and that Plato's intention, in one sense of the term, is theological, misses the real intention of Plato. This becomes more evident in Mr. Cassirer's treatment of the *Republic* as a "theory of the legal state." If Plato's *Republic* becomes a state in a purely literal and political sense (as Aristotle treats the state), then difficulties and incongruities multiply, as Mr. Cassirer accordingly notes. But if Plato's *Republic* is an approximation of a heavenly state so far as possible in this human world, and clouded with the many imperfections of human understanding—the danger of which Plato constantly warns us—then the so-called inconsistencies and contradictions do not arise.

This is important for the problem of the myth in relation to the state, which Mr. Cassirer is raising. What is the "ideal" state for which Plato is looking? In Mr. Cassirer's words: "The model he is looking for is far beyond the empirical and historical world" (p. 71). In Plato's words, it is "laid up somewhere in heaven." Now, is such an "ideal" state a reality in any sense, or is it to be relegated to the domain of myth? In treating myth, Mr. Cassirer has described it as being remote from "empirical reality." Plato's *Republic* is also remote from empirical reality. Is it not, then, as much myth as the modern totalitarian tyranny? If not, how, in terms of Mr. Cassirer's analysis, can it be distinguished? If anything removed from empirical reality is myth, is there then "good" myth as well as "bad" myth? And how do we know, in the absence of a literal critique, what makes a state good or bad?

How, in particular, does Mr. Cassirer treat Plato and myth, especially in view of the way in which Plato himself employs myth? Mr. Cassirer claims that Plato "had to break the power of the myth. But here Plato encountered the greatest difficulties. He could not solve the problem without, in a certain sense, surpassing himself and going beyond his own limits. Plato felt the whole charm of the myth. He was endowed with a most powerful imagination that enabled him to become one of the greatest myth makers in human history. For we cannot think of Platonic philosophy without thinking of the Platonic myths. In these myths—in the myths of the 'supercelestial place,' of the prisoners in the cave, of the soul's choice of its future destiny, of the judgment after death, Plato expressed his most profound metaphysical thoughts and intuitions. . . . How is it to be accounted for that the same thinker who admitted mythical concepts and mythical language so readily into his metaphysics and his natural philosophy

spoke in an entirely different vein when developing his political theories? For in this field Plato became the professed enemy of myth. If we tolerate myth in our political systems, he declared, all our hopes for a reconstruction and reformation of our political and social life are lost. There is only one alternative: we have to make our choice between an ethical and a mythical conception of the state. In the Legal State, the state of justice, there is no room left for the conceptions of mythology, for the gods of Homer and Hesiod" (pp. 71-72).

It seems a bit incredible that Mr. Cassirer senses no change in meaning between the "myth" of the prisoners of the cave, etc., and the "myth" the poets tell in the *Republic*. The "myth" Plato denounces in the *Republic* is not at all the same as the "myth" of the prisoners in the cave or even of the whole Platonic Republic itself. The myth which Plato denounces, the myth of the fable, is the idolatry of human invention, the lies men tell about God, and such myths Plato would outlaw in the *Republic*. The Platonic symbol of the cave, of the *Republic*, etc. (also called "myth") is the attempt to reach the understanding of the divine within the limits of human reason. The myth of the fable is the perversion of human reason, the myth against which Mr. Cassirer is also writing. The other is above human reason which we can approach only through the symbolic mode, but which gives something of an understanding we could not otherwise attain.

It is not to be wondered, then, that Plato condemns the one and employs the other. To fail to distinguish the two is to fail to see the real contribution Plato made against the anti-rational and superstitious myth. And, on the other hand, it is a failure to see a primary purpose of the *Republic*, which is to induce man to become more like God, so far as man is able. But to introduce the notion of myth, especially if it is ambiguous, into a critique of the state seems rather to confuse than to clarify. Apparently we would have to distinguish between good myth and bad myth, but when we do this the point of relating tyrannical government to the myth loses its force and cogency because there is no principle for distinguishing the good and the bad. And at best, it would still camouflage the proper principles for a scientific criticism of the bad state. Mr. Cassirer's own lengthy consideration of Plato, who is the master of the symbol, is unsuccessful at the very point where he should have distinguished the perverse myth from the reasoned myth (if this terminology is to be employed). He is unsuccessful because he himself wishes to criticize contemporary political disorder without a sound, literal basis, i. e., without real and objective distinctions for determining good and bad government. This sort of approach, in effect, is to be symbolical without the literal or, (without intending a play with words) to be mythical about the state as a myth.

Perhaps the best critical work of Mr. Cassirer appears in his section on

Machiavelli. It covers nearly fifty pages of his book and gives a certain intelligibility to Machiavelli perhaps found nowhere else.

An important part of his analysis shows how Machiavelli is the " child of his age," the typical witness to the Renaissance and the first great proponent of the modern, secular state. For example, Machiavelli's admiration for Cesare Borgia was not for the man himself, but for " *the structure of the new state* that had been created by him " (p. 134). Machiavelli " was the first who, decidedly and unquestionably, broke away from the whole scholastic tradition. He destroyed the cornerstone of this tradition—the hierarchic system " (p. 135). Religion, in Machiavelli's view, is useful for the state in the modern sense: ". . . religion is no longer an end in itself; it has become a mere tool in the hands of political rulers . . . Religion no longer bears any relation to a transcendant order of things and it has lost all its spiritual values. The process of secularization has come to its close; for the secular state exists not only *de facto* but also *de jure*; it has found its definite theoretical legitimization " (pp. 138-139).

This, and other passages in Mr. Cassirer's book, expose well the content of Machiavelli's doctrine and its implications. But it is otherwise with respect to any critique on Machiavelli's thought. This can be illustrated by his chapter on " The Moral Problem in Machiavelli." The problem arises from the highly immoral practices advised in *The Prince* for the ruler of the state. Mr. Cassirer notes: " It remains, however, one of the great puzzles in the history of human civilization how a man like Machiavelli, a great and noble mind, could become the advocate of ' splendid wickedness.' " (p. 145). Mr. Cassirer's explanation is that Machiavelli accepts as a first principle in the formation of the state that all men are bad by nature and that this depravity cannot be cured by laws, but only by force. A prince must know this to be successful. Hence, as matters stand, a prince should also learn the art of craft and treachery. As Machiavelli's famous simile tells us: " A prince ought to know how to resemble a beast as well as a man upon occasion . . . he should make the lion and the fox his pattern . . . so that he must be a fox to enable him to find out the snares and a lion in order to terrify the wolves." (*The Prince*, chap. XVIII, as quoted by Mr. Cassirer, p. 150). Since, then, political life is full of crimes and treacheries, Machiavelli consciously undertook to teach this art of crime; in political life, no distinction is to be drawn between " virtue " and " vice."

One would expect in a book concerned with explaining the rise of modern tyranny some refutation of those points of doctrine which laid the foundation for political perversity. Such points can be found in Machiavelli and they are most illuminating with respect to modern tyranny. But Mr. Cassirer proceeds thus: " Yet if *The Prince* is anything but a moral or a pedagogical treatise, it does not follow that, for this reason, it is an im-

moral book. Both judgments are equally wrong. *The Prince* is neither a moral nor an immoral book; it is simply a technical book. In a technical book we do not seek for rules of ethical conduct, of good and evil. It is enough if we are told what is useful or useless. Every word in *The Prince* must be read and interpreted in that way" (p. 153).

It is in such a place as this that one particularly would expect some distinction of good and evil in the political order, perhaps based on a scientific analysis of the relation of the political and the moral order. Instead, we have the insistence that there is no moral problem. Mr. Cassirer's distinction between the technical and the ethical in political matters resembles very much the sort of distinction inserted by the tyrannies of modern times, against which he is presumably writing. One of the chief elements contributing to the rise of the political tyrannies of the twentieth century is the denial of the supremacy of moral principles in political conduct. Mr. Cassirer could have fortified his whole thesis enormously had he noted the inception of this type of denial in Machiavelli and the consequences it entailed in later political thought and action. Instead, he approves a distinction whose force is to justify theoretically the very disorder in political life he wishes to attack.

It is here that a reasoned principle, not to say a theological understanding, of the nature of man as a political animal would provide a sound basis of criticism. For Machiavelli's notion of man is faulty, and it needs criticism if only to make Machiavelli himself intelligible. Machiavell's prince is based on accepting the denial of the virtue of prudence in a ruler. This is not to argue that Machiavelli himself should have recognized that prudence should be the chief virtue in the ruler. Mr. Cassirer has well shown how foreign this would be to Machiavelli's thought. Yet the most revealing analysis of Machiavelli's prince would be to show what happens if, as Machiavelli intends, the ruler is not to be a prudent man, but rather an artist—a technician—defying prudence. For it is in just this way that an *artist of crime* develops, and if there is one thing the modern tyranny has created it is the artist of crime. The only answer to it, the only alternative to it, is to recognize that prudence, as an intellectual and a moral virtue, is necessary as directive of the art of the "political technician."

I think the very ignoring of this point in Mr. Cassirer's account of Machiavelli arises also from the lack of literal distinctions and principles which he could have obtained originally from Aristotle. Further, his failure to grasp a moral problem as moral is related to treating the state in terms of myth. For the contemporary political disorder stems from the radical intellectual and moral disorder, and to understand such disorder only as "myth" is to miss the real significance of what is happening today.

Much could be written in detail about Mr. Cassirer's book. Much could be written by way of emphasizing some undeniably good qualities in Mr.

Cassirer as a " critical historian," able to read the various political theorists with an admirable penetration. Much, too, could be said by way of questioning further the interpretation he makes of different writers. But all this, I believe, would in reality add little to a review.

The question still remains, in part, of the use of myth as a principle of criticizing the state. It seems to me that the more one reads the book the more apparent it becomes how singularly myth fails to explain political disorder. The reason for this is that putting the problem in terms of myth keeps it in the intellectual order and excludes it from the moral order. Thus the myth does not adequately cope with the problem; it reaches no real conclusion; and it offers no constructive basis for refuting political tyranny.

That the myth is not really a critical principle seems evident enough from the ordering of the book. Thus, Part II concerns those who " struggled against myth." Among those included are Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Schlegel, etc. To fail to see in them the theoretical anticipation of consequent intellectual and moral disorder argues strongly enough that myth is a barren critical principle. Mr. Cassirer does occasionally suggest points of disorder in these men, but because of his pre-occupation with myth he sees no radical principle of disorder in them. Even when he discusses Carlyle, Gobineau, and Hegel in the concluding part of the book, he disassociates them from consciously propagating myth; by implication, then, there is no fundamental disorder in them either. Hence, to argue that, in varying degrees all these men either " struggled against myth " or at least did not intentionally propagate myth tells us very little about their real doctrine. Instead of emphasizing what they " struggled against " should we not discover what they were " struggling for? " What is it they want? And do we now have what their doctrines entail?

Further, that interpretation in terms of myth offers no real conclusion seems evident enough from Mr. Cassirer's own summary:

" It is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy the political myths. A myth is in a sense invulnerable. It is impervious to rational arguments; it cannot be refuted by syllogisms. But philosophy can do us another important service. It can make us understand the adversary. In order to fight an enemy you must know him. That is one of the first principles of a sound strategy. To know him means not only to know his defects and weaknesses; it means to know his strength. All of us have been liable to underrate his strength. When we first heard of the political myths we found them so absurd and incongruous, so fantastic and ludicrous that we could hardly be prevailed upon to take them seriously. By now it has become clear to all of us that this was a great mistake. We should not commit the same error a second time. We should carefully study the origin, the struc-

ture, the methods, and the technique of the political myths. We should see the adversary face to face in order to know how to combat him" (p. 296).

In the final conclusion to the book, Mr. Cassirer adds: "What we have learned in the hard school of our modern political life is the fact that human culture is by no means the firmly established thing that we once supposed it to be. The great thinkers, the scientists, the poets, and artists who laid the foundation of our Western civilization were often convinced that they had built for eternity. . . . But the mythical monsters were not entirely destroyed. They were used for the creation of a new universe, and they still survive in this universe. The powers of myth were checked and subdued by superior forces. As long as these forces, intellectual, ethical, and artistic, are in full strength, myth is tamed and subdued. But once they begin to lose their strength chaos is come again. Mythical thought then starts to rise anew and to pervade the whole of man's cultural and social life" (pp. 297-298).

A significant fact overlooked in this conclusion is that what Mr. Cassirer calls "myth" can and has existed simultaneously with presumably full intellectual, ethical, and artistic strength. For when have we had apparently highed cultural activity, according to "scholars'" views, than during the last four hundred years? But during that time, have we not also had the intellectual indoctrination and preparation for the disorder of the twentieth century? Are we not then led to suspect that the disorder we have now has a real relation to the culture of this period and to the intellectual leaders of this time? And does not the use of myth obscure this real relation? The struggle I am sure Mr. Cassirer wants to write about is, simply, the struggle between truth and error, and between good and evil. But then such a book has to be explicitly and profoundly theological. For it is within a theological ordering that we comprehend fully truth and error, and good and evil. And only through theological principles can we interpret what is really happening.

In this way, by something of a paradox, Mr. Cassirer's use of myth becomes revealing. He intends something anti-rational by the myth. We can understand this, theologically, in terms of original sin, which accounts for man's inclination toward evil. Perhaps Mr. Cassirer would classify original sin as myth. But it becomes apparent, rather, that myth—at least the perverse myth—arises from original sin. I do not intend to offer original sin as a simplistic solution of the problem, but rather as the principle of interpretation in place of myth. Nor do I mean to state original sin as the proper cause of the intellectual and moral disorder in the world, for that requires a wholly deficient cause found only in the will of man. But it is a principle which explains the origin of evil and the origin of the perverse myth as well.

To investigate this further in an adequate manner and to indicate how theological principles could illumine this particular problem would extend far beyond the limits of a review. It should be mentioned, however, by way of noting the positive criticism which can be made. It is enough, for the present purpose, to underline the insufficiency of myth as the explanation of our contemporary disorder. I think this can be done summarily by the following question: Is it the " mythical thinker " who remains at the root of our continuing political disorder? Is it the " mythical thinker " who blocks the way to international peace and political order? Naziism, whose apostles Mr. Cassirer considers to be the primary exponents of myth, is officially dead. Yet our problems of tyranny and disorder continue to grow. Clearly, then, the men from whom we can fear the most are decidedly not the myth makers. They are, rather, the presumably educated men whose only unity consists in an increasing denial of the theological order and therefore of the natural order as well. They are found chiefly among philosophers, scientists, politicians, and educators. They are men who deny the objectivity of truth, the objectivity of moral principles, the objectivity of the natural law, and so on. They are men who would claim that they are especially struggling against myth.

To them, and to all of us in our foolishness and self-sufficiency, God has said and continues to say: " Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in me."

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Meaning and Truth in the Arts. By JOHN HOSPERS. Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946. Pp. 238, with index. $4.00.

It may be said, though not without risking oversimplification, that there are three fundamental attitudes which have been taken, or may now be taken, toward the role which meaning and truth play in art. One is the view which maintains that art is not only an intellectual habit and experience, but, in being so, is essentially ratiocinative. The artist is simply a rational craftsman, quite like any other, and the pleasure which his work gives is the pleasure of a formed rational judgment on the part of the auditor. In addition, because a rational judgment has been made, it is sometimes said that the auditor comes from art in possession of logically formulated " truth " which is subsequently useful to him in a practical way. As a result, this view sometimes calls itself " functional " and is almost always favorably disposed toward the " didactic " potentialities of art. When in

conflict with other attitudes toward art, this first view rather vigorously claims the intellectual nature of art for itself exclusively, charging that all anti-ratiocinative positions are necessarily irrational and sentimental. It will be noted in passing, however, that in order to make this assertion the proponents of this view must also make an absolute and exhaustive identification of the intellect with the ratiocinative processes, supposing one to be the other in an exclusive sense.

A second, and more " modern " view, in nearly every way antagonistic to the first, holds that the reasoning processes either are not involved in art at all (music), or, if they are involved (literature, the verbal arts), are serviceable merely as occasional tools to assist the artist and audience toward an end of a completely different and anti-intellectual character: the evocation of pleasurable affective states. In this view, " meaning " in art becomes a relative and subjective factor, without metaphysical correspondence. " Truth " as correspondence with reality is irrelevant to the quality of the artefact, although there may be some " truthful " correspondence with similar affective states experienced in life. Knowledge, in this view, is altogether absent. Because the ratiocinative operation of art has been denied, the intellectual nature of art has been denied also. Here again it will be noticed that an absolute identification of the reasoning processes and the intellect has been made, though to the precisely opposite effect of that in the first view above.

A third view is possible, and is the object of much contemporary study. It would insist that both the creative inspiration of the artist and the final delight of the auditor are to be located in the intellect, that this consitutes a *knowing* in both cases, but that the mode of knowing is intuitive rather than discursively ratiocinative. The creative knowing of the artist which through his vision in-forms the imitation and is the really imitative part of it, and the appreciative knowing of the imitation by the auditor are possessed of valid correspondence with reality and acceptable as truth. On the other hand, since this mode of knowing is imperfect in man, and since this truth has not been scientifically achieved, the artefact or imitation has no further " utility " in subsequent operations of a scientific kind, but must rest content in its own imperfect but nevertheless proper particular end: simple delight in the immediate knowledge of created being. The functional and didactic interpretations of art, in this view, naturally disappear. It will be seen, then, that this projected third position represents something of a mean between the first two, and conflicting, views above, accepting as it does the intellectual emphasis of the first and the non-ratiocinative insistence of the second. It may be that, when this third study shall have matured a reconciliation between two emphatically opposed traditional positions will be effected.

Whatever position may finally be taken, it must be said at once that

the volume now under consideration represents no forward step in the solution of a long-standing disagreement. It simply takes its stand, and with surprisingly little awareness of what is to be said for other views, in the second of the camps outlined above. Dr. Hospers, in his anxiety to exclude the ratiocinative processes as essential to art, takes an anti-intellectual position altogether and is thereby forced to deny knowledge ("What art gives us . . . is something which is not knowledge but perhaps more valuable than knowledge—the enrichment of experience itself"); to disallow any correspondence with reality ("Are not our esthetic experiences just as rich and rewarding without a transcendental metaphysics to bolster them up?"); and to limit the esthetic experience to affective states:

> . . . a work of art means to us whatever effects (not necessarily emotions) it evokes in us; a work which has no effects on us means nothing to us, and whatever effects it does evoke constitute its meaning for us. As we become more acquainted with the work of art, the effects it evokes in us gradually change, but in that case its meaning for us (as I have defined it) gradually changes too. The work of art is one term in the relationship, the evoked reactions the other; and the gradual changing of the latter as we hear or see the work again constitutes a gradual change in its meaning for us. Its meaning may or may not be describable in words—in most cases it is not, since few if any states of mind (particularly affective states) are describable to the satisfaction of the person who experiences them.

The subjectivity of his position naturally leads the author into a prolonged duel with subject-matter in art: if art requires no correspondence with reality, then what of those borrowings from reality (characters, actions, even emotions) which turn up again and again? It is a simple enough matter for Dr. Hospers to dispose of any literal correspondence of a scientific or historical kind between actual persons and/or events and the artefacts in which they may appear; this has been done before, and better, and is by now a truism. But what of universals (man, revense, sadness)? Is there no correspondence with reality in these? In the largest view which he takes, Dr. Hospers would say no ("I do not mean to say that every work of art must be true-to something or convey some 'reality'"), although in some cases (and only some) he would allow a certain "truth-to" which is merely affective and without metaphysical source: "But certainly the character or situation presented is true-to something *outside* the poem; not true-to any single physical appearance or historical event, but true-to some salient character or essence . . ." At the same time, ". . . I have no objection to this kind of language provided that the 'essence' is not hypostatized into a metaphysical entity." In other words, the auditor receives a very strong sense impression that the affective state which he is now undergoing in the presence of a work of art is similar to certain other affective states which he has previously experienced. He may

subsequently verify the " truthfulness " of one affective state to another by repeating the esthetic experience in similar life-situations (this, by the way, is one of the more curious undocumented notions which the author offers us). In any event, this correspondence of sensed experience to sensed experience is the very most that can be said for the presence of " truth " in art. Dr. Hospers is aware, though not critically, that there are other positions: " Many critics . . . feel inclined to give [the esthetic] emotion some cosmic status by saying that ' reality ' is its source, etc. They are apparently not satisfied, as we were . . . with saying that art conveys communicable essences, ways of perceiving the world which are fruitful in experience; they must add a metaphysics." Dr. Hospers does not discuss the position of these " other critics," nor does his bibliography indicate that he has read them. He is simply content to place " Reality " in prejudicial quotation-marks in his chapter heading, call the term a " weasel-word," and, in touching briefly on the view of the " many critics," dismiss the entire notion with: " In any event, I do not see how any such ' reality ' could be of help to us in art."

In the paragraphs directly above, I have tried to indicate not only the general position taken by Dr. Hospers, but also his rather cavalier method of dealing with the terminology, and the understanding, of rival positions. This technique of summary, and sometimes contemptuous, dismissal of notions common to a great many esthetic systems is by no means confined to the conclusions of the book, but is immediately apparent in its first premises, and at once raises a question as to the service which the book may perform even for its own school of thought.

Particularly is the author's method suspect at the outset in his treatment of " imitation." That so fundamental a concept in the history of esthetic formulation should be given less attention than the concepts of " Representation " and " Expression " is startling, but perhaps a possible arrangement in a particular system. That, however, it should be so little understood in its traditional meaning, and on the basis of a superficial understanding so hastily discarded, is unforgiveable in a work of these pretensions. Rather than investigate thoroughly the meaning of the term to discover whether or no it might have value for his study, Dr. Hospers quickly adopts the shallow interpretation which the realistic-naturalistic critics have given it: " To continue to use the term ' imitation ' as the departure from exactness increases is misleading and dangerous." Or, ". . . nature is always transformed, interpreted, ' distorted ' in art . . . but to the extent that there *is* this ' distortion,' nature is not accurately imitated . . ." and so on. With these statements, imitation is abandoned as a useful concept; imitation is simply precise reproduction (what has been neglected here, of course, is the distinction between imitation and identity, the absolute necessity of dissimilarity in some measure before imitation can exist at all) and since

precise reproduction is clearly inartistic, imitation has no place whatever in the discussion. Had the author exposed himself sufficiently to any deeper understanding of the term he might have been greatly assisted in his prolonged bout with subject-matter; indeed some of his more Quixotic battles perhaps need not have been fought at all.

In the last analysis, however, it is seen to be imperative that Dr. Hospers avoid becoming entangled in the traditional doctrine of mimesis. On the one hand, it is too generally agreed that literal precision at the surface of things is inartistic. On the other, the author is preparing to disallow any metaphysical reality, any form (other than the sensed balance of things) which might become the actual object of imitation. Between these two negations, there is no room for mimesis, and the author is quick to rule it out before it becomes troublesome. He is finally forced, by certain of his other conclusions, to admit it briefly into the discussion on pp. 193-4. The best he can do with it at this juncture is the following:

> . . . some philosophers have said that what the artist imitates or is true-to is an essence, an objective essence which, though it does not exist in the perceivable universe, exists (or perhaps subsists) in some metaphysical realm beyond the senses. But such an hypothesis is certainly not necessary to account for our esthetic experiences; indeed, it would be of no help at all, since that which is beyond the realm of the senses cannot, by definition, be sensed. Accordingly, when we say that the artist reveals an essence we need not be saying anything as metaphysical as this; we mean something *in* the realm of actual or possible experience which the artist captures, a new way of seeing or feeling things which we can share with him. Without this sharability it could not be universal. Perhaps the essence he captures is true-to his own vision—it probably is; but it is not the truth-to his own vision that is important; what is important is that his vision is and can be the vision of others—that he can 'dive into the flux' and come back with a vision that we find 'true,' that stands the test of experience. The essence is verified by our being conditioned by it in our subsequent perceptions. And it is verified *in* experience: we need not hypostatize it to lend it dignity and importance.

We may, however, need to hypostatize it to explain it. Dr. Hospers does no better by way of ultimate explanation than the above. It is a curious characteristic of those philosophical schools which pride themselves on their exclusive attention to tangibles that their conclusions are so remarkably misty and their terminology for dealing with tangibles so poverty-stricken. This poverty of language, and failure of explicit definition, reaches its zenith, I think, in this particular work when the author, confronted by the facts that some works of art *do* contain referents in reality (a Rembrandt portrait) and that even he is inclined to place some value on this (irrelevant) content, offers by way of solution a division of art into a *thick* sense and a *thin* sense. The thick sense is achieved where the content is

in some measure recognizably lifelike, the thin sense where it is exclusively formal (sensed balances, music). Nor does the author wish to prejudice the division in favor of the *thick*: it is simply there, and one may, or may not, prefer it; it is never essential to art, nor a properly relevant part of it. Artistic " greatness " is in no wise dependent on it, since no hierarchy of metaphysical form is admitted as the object of imitation.

The author's cursory method of dealing with premises sometimes leads him into too great generosity rather than too great exclusiveness. This, I think, is the case with his handling of the concept " symbol," leading him as it does through the least conclusive maze within the work. At the outset Dr. Hospers announces " I think it is most convenient to apply the term ' symbol ' to all cases of ' standing for ' . . ." He immediately includes the artistic " image " within this perhaps too generous referent, and is forced to spend an entire chapter in trying, unsuccessfully, to disentangle them again. He might have found it considerably more convenient to attempt an initial distinction between image and symbol, as the simplest Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary does: a symbol is " something that (not being a portrait) stands for something else." He might have found in Funk and Wagnalls, under the term " representation " which in his book follows very dependently upon the discussion of symbol, no mention of symbol at all.

Indeed, it seems to me that immediate consideration of the distinction between image and symbol is due on all esthetic fronts, not Dr. Hospers' alone. We endlessly recognize this distinction without applying it effectively to our study of the esthetic processes. For instance, we are everlastingly saying that man is made in the image and likeness of God. We never say that man is a symbol of God. Indeed, we never *mean* that man is a symbol of God, though we do very literally mean that he is made in God's image. An image, though owing a tremendous mimetic debt, has a further independent existence of its own, is in a measure, and within the character of its creation, free and self-contained, may be known for itself; a symbol has no independent vitality once created, is indeed utterly meaningless and unknowable except in terms of its referent. Sometimes the symbol borrows upon image-technique; onomatopoeia is a case in point, though this borrowing is always superficial and unessential. Sometimes the process is reversed, but here again the borrowing can be only superficial and unessential: a halo is a poor substitute, in a painting, for actually seen (known) spirituality. The two may be distinguished, and their distinctive modes play a large part in the study, and certainly in the resolution, of the problems of " meaning " and " truth." Unfortunately, Dr. Hospers has neglected a distinction which, if successfully made, might again have rendered unnecessary some of his more difficult jousts.

The author is at his best in those passages devoted to rejecting the Zolaesque doctrine of the " scientific " function of art (though his work here

is merely assimilative, and no fresh contribution), and to analyzing the function of word-symbols in literature as prerequisites to the esthetic experience but as not in themselves constituting that experience. It is in the second of these that Dr. Hospers offers his clearest and most original thinking.

It must be said, however, that on the whole Dr. Hospers' thought suffers seriously from certain *a priori* judgments on fundamental issues, from inadequate acquaintance with traditional interpretations of his subject matter, and from a prejudicial rigidity of philosophical outlook which invariably causes him to stop short of, and substitute vague and rhetorical phrases for, a real coming-to-grips with his problem. It is to be doubted that the book will serve as an advance in explication even for the constrained philosophical position to which he is unquestioningly committed.

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An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy. By JAMES FEIBLEMAN. New York: Harper, 1946. Pp. 503.

I

The name of Charles S. Peirce is usually met in historical prefaces to pragmatism and symbolic logic. It can be said of him what has been said of Bergson: that he died with many admirers but not one disciple. But like Bergson, Peirce dug a deep groove through the generation following him. In fact, his tradition has been positively continued while Bergson lives not in word but in the general spirit of revolt against Positivism which he mustered. Fragments of Peirce's thought appear in the pragmatism of James; the instrumentalism of Dewey; mathematical logic; semiotic; and logical positivism, especially in the formulations of Von Neurath. Thus Peirce's influence, unlike that of Bacon who also stood at the gateway to a new age, is much more than a name. Indeed, no American thinker has had so vast, so varied, and so unheralded an influence. Symbolically enough, as if to emphasize the critical position of Peirce, his life overlapped the turn of the present century (1839-1914).

Those who have been accustomed to find portions of Peirce's thought displayed here and there throughout modern philosophy are often unaware that behind these scattered surfaces lies the firm heart-beat of a complete philosophical system. Peirce the logician and Peirce the pragmatist were not aspects of a split personality. They were the connective tissue of an organic world view. Yet this synthesis, because of historical circumstances, has remained unstudied and, for the most part, unknown. Indeed, during

his life-time, Peirce did not publish a single philosophical book. The standard encyclopedia of his thought has been the *Collected Papers*, published in 1931 and, because it is a six-volume work, it is available more for specialists' consultation than for systematic reading. It is the great merit of Mr. Feibleman's book to have disengaged the underlying system of one of America's seminal minds and to have revealed a native genius in American philosophy whose originality and synthetic force stand without peer.

II

Peirce's thought is represented as the fruit of five positive historical influences: the philosophy of Kant, the lessons of empirical science, the realism and voluntarism of Duns Scotus, the dynamism of Darwin, and the revolt against Descartes.

Like Kant, Peirce discloses, by his conception of logic, the architectonic of his whole system. Metaphysics, Peirce held, would be "shaky and insecure," unless it were founded on logic. But Kant had confined his categories to the subjective order, whereas Peirce insisted that logic must be founded on experience, thus possessing objective references. It was as a logician, reacting against Kantian subjectivism toward a noetic realism, that Peirce was led to pragmatism.

In his lifetime, Peirce was much more successful as a scientist than as a professional philosopher. He had first-hand experience in both mathematics and the empirical sciences. When he came to explore the locus of scientific values, he was once more impelled to a statement of realism. He perceived that only on such a philosophy could the separate sciences operate. The exemplar of this realism, which is perhaps the primary concern of Peirce's thought, was found in Duns Scotus. The formalism of Scotus enabled Peirce to apply his logic to the real world and to account for the intelligibility of the individual as pragmatism suggests.

Darwinism provided Peirce with an historical mold for his doctrines that chance is objective, that existence is associated with opposition and resistance, and that there is constant evolution in reality. Darwinism, to Peirce, was another affirmation of realism. Finally, it was realism which led Peirce away from the Cartesian view of the primacy of consciousness.

III

For Peirce, logic is divided into three parts: Speculative Grammar, dealing with signs; Critical Logic, dealing with arguments; and Speculative Rhetoric, dealing with discovery and communication. The key to each branch of logic, as well as to the Peircean philosophy as a whole, is the notion of a sign. There are really five aspects of a sign. First of all, it is "anything which determines something else (its *interpretant*) to refer to

an object to which itself refers (its *object*) " (p. 89). The sign itself is called the *representamen*. Also, " a sign stands for an object to an interpretant in some respect, that is, it represents the ' common characters ' of the object, and this respect is called the *ground* " (p. 89). There is not only the interpretant which Peirce seemed to describe as a mental state. There is also the *interpreter*, namely, man.

Pierce divided signs into three classes of triadic relations: (p. 90 ff.)

First are the " ' triadic relations of comparison ' or logical possibilities based on the kind of sign . . .": a) the *qualisign*, " a quality which is a sign "; b) the *sinsign*, " an actual existent thing or event which is a sign "; and c) the *legisign*, " a law that is a sign." Mr. Feibleman, in general, does not supply the needed examples to clarify such definitions. Peirce himself, though not in connection with this present discussion, suggests concrete cases that are illuminating. (*Collected Papers*, vol. ii, p. 147 ff.) A qualisign would be " a feeling of ' red.' " A sinsign would be " an individual diagram." A legisign would be " a diagram apart from its factual individuality."

The next class of triads deals with performance or actual fact; it is based on the kind of ground: a) " the *icon*, a sign which refers to an object by virtue of characters of its own which it possesses whether the object exists or not "; b) " the *index*, ' a sign which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that object ' "; and c) " the *symbol*, ' a sign which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object.' " Peirce writes (*op. cit.* p. 266): " Take, for instance, ' it rains.' Here the icon is the mental composite photograph of all the rainy days the thinker has experienced. The index is all whereby he distinguishes *that day*, as it is placed in his experience. The symbol is the mental act whereby [he] stamps that day as rainy . . ." (p. 92).

The third class of signs, dealing with thought or law, is: a) " the *rheme*, a sign which represents a possible object "; b) " the *dicent*, a sign which represents an actual object "; and c) " the *argument*, a sign which represents a legal object." Examples of these signs may be adduced. A rheme would be ' a demonstrative pronoun ' or ' a common noun.' A dicent sign would be ' a street cry.' An argument would be a deduction or induction. (Peirce, *op. cit.* p. 147 ff.)

Within the arc of these distinctions and divisions, Peirce's whole system is found to swing. Related to the triadic dialectic described in logic are the phenomenological categories; the modes of being; and the modes of existence.

Phenomenology is " a science that does not draw any distinction of good and bad in any sense whatever, but just contemplates phenomena as they are, simply opens its eyes and describes what it sees . . ." (p. 145). On the level of phenomena, three categories of elements thus emerge: quality, fact

(reaction), and law (representation) which are commonly referred to in Peircean terms as firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Quality is associated with the notion of originality, spontaneity, and chance. Secondness may be regarded either as an individual thing (in which case it is called fact) or as a field of individual things (in which case it is called existence). A fact is always a coincidence (in the literal sense). It thus involves duality. With regard to existence, Peirce wrote: "*Hic et nunc* is the phrase perpetually in the mouth of Duns Scotus, who first elucidated individual existence. It is a forcible phrase if understood as Duns did understand it, not as describing individual existence, but as suggesting it by an example of the attributes found in the world to accompany it" (p. 163). Thirdness is representation. It is betweeness, mediation, and continuity (p. 164).

As distinct from the phenomenological categories are the metaphysical categories of possibility, actuality, and destiny. In Mr. Feibleman's words: "What distinguishes the metaphysical from the phenomenological categories is the overlay of generality which pervades all three of the metaphysical categories. They are the ultimate and irreducible broad divisions into which the phenomenological categories fall" (p. 184).

Finally, there are the modes of existence. "Blind force, in its phenomenological aspect of secondness," Mr. Feibleman writes, "we had already learned, is an effort of resistance, of opposition, of reaction. But the repetition of such an effort in the course of actuality leads to certain patterns which can be detected. For resistance can only be effected, opposition conducted, and reaction exerted in terms of further categories which the repetition compels them to reveal. These categories are the modes of existence. Peirce described them as (a) chance, (b) law, and (c) habit" (p. 190). Chance is irregularity; law is regularity. Habit is a certain fixed mode of behavior in the ontal order, according to the Peircean scheme. It seems, in the Darwinian universe of Peirce, to represent the overlay on chance and law. The triadic logico-ontological system of Peirce thus has obvious analogies with Hegelian dialectic. In fact, though Peirce disavowed Hegel's system, Hegel seems to have exerted a much deeper influence than Peirce and, as a result, Mr. Feibleman seems to acknowledge. Marx showed an affinity between Darwin and Hegel. Hegelianism failed to keep distinct the natures of logical and ontal being.

IV

The pragmatism of Peirce originates, it was said, in the attempt to found knowledge in experience as opposed to the Kantian categories. Logically, pragmatism is a system of meaning. When Peirce wrote: "The meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated into," (p. 131), he was simply stating the general theme of pragmatism that we know and/or validate anything in terms of its effects. Thus, Peirce could write that "the *meaning*

of a proposition embraces every obvious necessary deduction from it" (p. 134). Bain had defined belief as "that upon which a man is prepared to act," and Peirce was merely transcribing this statement when he wrote that "different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise" (p. 237). What had been in the logical order a verification by deducible results has become now in the practical order the pragmatic test, as Peirce viewed it. "The peculiarity of my philosophy," Peirce said, "is that it leads to positive predictions comparable with observation" (p. 288). The sense in which the logical and the practical (exterior) order were different in Peirce's thought will be approached later.

For Peirce, pragmatism is not a philosophy. It is a method within a larger philosophical system. It is a material logic, a theory of meaning. "Pragmatism," Peirce wrote, "is not a Weltanschauung but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear" (p. 296). Elsewhere, he stated: "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of that conception" (p. 295). Peirce emphasized that the action need not actually take place. It need only be *conceived* action. Thus he avoided the extreme of holding that experience must be experienced in order to be experience. Peirce did not believe that he was proposing a new system but that the concept of pragmatism could be found even in Socrates.

Both James, the pragmatist, and Dewey, the instrumentalist, acknowledge Peirce to be the founding father of their systems. Yet Peirce disavowed the philosophies of these two would-be disciples. Bergson had said once against exaggerations which were being passed off in the name of Bergsonism: "I am Bergson; I am not Bergsonian."

James was much more concerned with the 'particularity' of consequences than with their 'practicality.' His system ends in nominalism. It is antimetaphysical in the extreme. Peirce, on the other hand, always insisted on the priority of realism. "James's attitude is that of a nominalistic psychologist; Peirce's that of the realistic logician. James was concerned chiefly with the effect of thought on the individual and his particular acts; Peirce was concerned chiefly with the clarification of ideas" (p. 304). Peirce's spirit was much deeper and wider than that of James.

Still narrower is the horizon of Dewey in his interpretation of the pragmatic principle. Peirce wrote of Dewey that he seemed "to regard what he calls 'logic' as a natural history of thought" (p. 480). Dewey seems to hold that men create their experience (p. 478). His position is thus intensely subjective, entirely counter to the cast of Peirce's thought. Attempting to dissociate himself from the direction taken by James and Dewey, Peirce proposed to call his doctrine 'pragmaticism.' The name, however, was never widely adopted.

Because pragmatism occupies only a small portion of Peirce's philosophical system, it is incorrect to pass him off as a pragmatist without benefit of adjectives. He was much closer to the medieval system than his contemporaries, as his preference for Duns Scotus suggests. He attempted to see the whole wholly. In this respect, he far excels the water-level of typically American thought. Philosophy must reach to the boundaries of being itself and cannot halt, as so often is the contemporary case, where experience gives place to the probing of man's intellect into ultimate causes and reasons. Peirce's architectonic principle—his triadic dialectic—gave rise to a psychology, ethics, cosmology, aesthetics, and theology. Peirce had a system rather than a mere method. He can no more be dismissed as a pragmatist than he can be relegated to the background chapter of modern mathematical logic.

V

Mr. Feibleman has wisely confined his present work to the proportions of a factual presentation of Peirce. He indicates that a full-blown commentary on Peirce's system is in order. Obviously, there are grave questions that only an extensive critique could resolve. What are the historical origins (or parallels) of Peirce's triadic dialectic, and to what extent was he really influenced by Hegel whom he so admired? Did Peirce really succeed in safeguarding his realism? How can Peirce maintain side by side the apparent formalism of Scotus and the dynamism of Darwin? What is the relation of method to system in Peirce? Is his system only a system or is it in conformity with the real world and thus a *true* representation of the real? All of these and kindred questions are aspects of a persistent problem in philosophy which is found in Plato and which every modern system, pragmatism, positivism, and idealism on the one hand and existentialism on the other, brings to continual dawn: it is the relation of the logical to the ontological order. It may be more than an historical accident that Heidegger, the leader of existentialism, and Peirce, a patron of pragmatism and—by his influences—of positivism, were both influenced by Scotism whose principal axis is the relation of the logical and ontological order. In this same problem of the the so-called universals, it may be pointed out that Stallo, in the nineteenth century, and Russell, in the twentieth, were both propelled to a statement of realism as the world of science, though Russell has since abandoned this position. But this realism, as that of Peirce would seem to be, is an aspect of the formalism and mechanism which is inexorably embedded in the so-called scientific method. It is not the realism of reason, which discovers in being itself the presence of potentiality and actuality as a basis for explaining the universals in mind and in things.

Though a thorough comparison would be required to throw light on Peirce's philosophy from the viewpoint of traditional thought, there is a preview of the way in which the two philosophies would be related. Peirce

held to a view of truth much closer to that of Hegel and modern physics than to the scholastics in their notion of conformity between thought and thing. If Peirce accepted the correspondence doctrine of truth in name (p. 197), he was actually much closer to the so-called coherence theory, as enunciated for instance by Bradley and Joachim. Peirce wrote: " Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth " (p. 212). Peirce was naturally influenced in his philosophy by his experience in physical science whose truth standard then as now fits neatly into the above definition of truth. The discovery of truth is really an endless investigation not toward the fullness and the unlimited, as genuine philosophy would affirm, but toward the ideal *limit*, as physics would tend to aim. There is, Peirce further held, only a high degree of probability in all our knowledge, and it is always possible that our present views may, with the continued progress of jet-propelled modern man, be redistributed into a more ' significant whole,' to use Joachim's phrase. Peirce again refers to truth as ' the universe of all universes.' It is as though man were standing by as a contemplator rather than an actor in reality and were fitting all the universes into one universe as an exterior system. This is the Hegelian concept of truth. But there is a bituminously deep and underlying affinity between the philosophies of Hegel, Plato, pragmatism, Darwinism, mechanism, and modern positivism in general, not to mention the mirror (*otobraznie*) theory of truth in dialectical materialism. They are all based on an essentialist metaphysic, and they lead man on an infinite chase.

Peirce realized the ultimately aimless character of man's search for truth in his doctrine of probabilism or, as he labelled it, fallibilism. Despite Prof. Weiss' statement that pragmatism recognizes a realistic universe to which man's action must conform, it does not do so as pragmatic. Pragmatism, unaided and unarmed, leads man nowhere. There is simply an egalitarian systemism in the Essentialist metaphysics to which pragmatism and scientific method point, putting things together but never relating the things to man, the thinker who identifies himself with reality rather than merely ' observes ' it, the doer who has a destiny to achieve as an actor in the spectacle which he himself contemplates.

Peirce's preference for systemism, for Essentialism, and for a logical universe is much stronger than his stated preference for realism would seem to indicate. He even reifies the non-being; he makes no hierarchical distinction between the term and proposition, the proposition and syllogism, the particular and universal; he sees the present as only infinitesimally different from the past; he discounts self-evidence, preferring to test by deducibility rather than by insight.

Peirce's universe is not a hierarchical one. It is a universe dominated by the principle of continuity as formulated by Leibnitz, Hegel, Darwin, Newton's theory of 'fluxions' which became the calculus and, one might also say with proper modifications, by Duns Scotus. Only in a universe which is pervaded by existence do we have hierarchy. By reference to existence, we can explain how the order of denotation and connotation is inverse. In Peirce's system they are parallel with the result that there is too much emphasis on categories and not enough emphasis on the real unity of our universe which derives from being.

Peirce belied his realism when he began with the logical order. The real starting point is neither logic nor ontology. It is in being, as known through a confused primary experience that is later differentiated into subjective and objective aspects. It is a mistake of the 'either/or' mentality of modern man to say that being must be either subjective or objective. Reflex analysis proves being to be both. There is a difference in being and mind and yet a likeness. Pierce's formalism could never account for this distinction. It tends to infinity, the lot of any metaphysics that does not come to rest in being. The extended critique of Peirce would have to confront the question: whether reason and the scientific method are really driven to the Peircean realism or whether the philosophy of physics, for the preservation of the subjective character of knowledge and the objective character of object, does not impose the so-called moderate realism developed by John of Salisbury and perfected by Aquinas.

VI

Mr. Feibleman has performed a most commendable service in his painstaking book which will be important not only for American thought but for European scholarship where such thinkers as James and Royce have had a much more benign and constructive influence than in the United States. Considering that this is an introductory work as the title indicates, the content, in part, might have been rendered clearer if the author had used that minimum of interpretation necessary to illustrate such weighty matters as the notion and division of signs. More examples could easily have been introduced without changing Peirce's thought. As it is, however, the book should be understandable reading for a specialist in philosophy; it cannot fail to stir the exponents of modern and traditional philosophy alike into a greater consciousness of Peirce and of the deep, crucial problems which his great genius perceived, and failed to answer satisfactorily.

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The Existence of God. A Commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways. By Eric G. Jay. London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge (New York: Macmillan), 1946. Pp. 70. $1.25.

Does God Exist? By A. E. Taylor. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. 172. $2.00.

The perennial question of the existence of a Supreme Being still agitates the heart and fascinates the mind of man. These two books, one a translation of the voice of a great teacher of the Middle Ages, the other the voice of a great teacher of our own age, complement one another, and reach the same conclusion.

The significance of Mr. Jay's work to Thomists lies not so much in its contents—the traditional proofs—as in its background. What a surprise to discover, when Catholic schools and seminaries are still turning out students to whom he is only a name is the fine print of footnotes, that St. Thomas Aquinas has joined the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. Of further interest (and, may it be hoped, worthy of emulation) to our Catholic schools where the study of Latin is declining, is the fact that St. Thomas serves Anglican deacons as a source whence not only doctrine but also the Latin tongue may be learned.

The present volume is a series of lectures given to serious-minded service men, but based on others arranged for Anglican seminarians. After a foreword which states that it was written "to arm with sound reasons, and with confidence in those reasons, any who . . . give a reason for the faith that is in them . . ." we have a brief and confusing biographical note on St. Thomas, which apparently sends Thomas to Cologne before his Baccalaureate at Paris. The first three chapters clear the way, as it were, for the Five Ways by considering the relation between faith and reason (*Summa Theologica* I, q. 1, a. 1), by rejecting the Ontological argument and exposing its roots in the Platonic world of Ideas (*ibid.* q. 2, a. 1), and by sketching the Aristotelian notions of matter and form, potency and act, causality and finality, from the analysis of which St. Thomas will demonstrate the existence of a Being Who is Pure Act, First Cause, All Wise, All Good and All Perfect. Then in a chapter for each, the Five Ways are presented in translation from the *Summa*, with an explanation and commentary. A final chapter on all five ways shows how, taken together, one supplements the limitations of the other to give us a broad concept of a personal living God. A short bibliography of six books evenly divided between Anglicans and Catholics, and a short index complete this precious and profitable little book.

It is, on the whole, a good piece of work, and it would be unduly captious to point out the defects almost inevitable to one who attempts to interpret a part of St. Thomas without being well acquainted with the

" broad and spacious garden " of St. Thomas' mind. Some of the translation seems *ad hoc*, some of the reasonings go slightly askew, but no serious damage is done. Indeed, since the old objections can be and are restated in many new ways, the old arguments can be refurbished as well. We can be thankful to Mr. Jay for having placed within the grasp of almost any literate person one of the richest veins of doctrine in St. Thomas, and for having defended man's reason and his knowledge of God from the blight of Barthian Fideism.

Professor Taylor's little essay is very different. It is personal rather than traditional, and argumentative rather than expository. His purpose, however, " is not to demonstrate ' the being of a God,' but only to argue that some alleged and widely entertained ' scientific objectons ' to theistic belief are unsound, and that it is unbelief (not belief) that is the unreasonable attitude . . . ."

Since the modern objections to the existence of God are based on science, Professor Taylor proceeds to destroy on science's own principles its competence to either affirm or deny God. He first shows the irrationality of the rationalistic acceptance of only one of two inseparable principles, the existence of a uniform pattern in nature (which " science " accepts), and the existence of objective norms of right and wrong and divine purpose in nature (which " science " rejects). The moral *law* is no less a reality than the *law* of gravitation. By pointing out that science and its methods are only a very narrow and limited department of knowledge, he throws the problem of God and His existence into the realm of metaphysics, or as he prefers to call it, for the sake of his scientific opponents, " pre-scientific knowledge " or " alert and critical common sense." Thus by examining the assumptions on which objections drawn from science are often unconsciously based, he shows that they are indefensible on scientific grounds precisely because they are the primary assumptions, and in some cases " palpably false " on the grounds of common sense. Science then cannot be the supreme and ultimate norm of all human thought and activity. This paragraph is too timely to miss:

> If there is any characteristic of the last age which, it may be hoped, is really ' doomed,' it is that ' Science ' divorced from fear of God and love of men which has long vaunted its pretensions to be the only foundation of human life. We all hope for a better Europe when the present calamity is overpast, but the better Europe will never be seen until ' science ' has been gently but firmly ' put in its place,' that *Second* place which rightfully belongs to it as a servant of man's estate, not his master . . . It is such science divorced from wisdom and fear of God which the world has directly to thank for the worst evils of ' modern war,' and if there is anything in the adage that the tree is known by its fruits, must we not say that a theory which produces such fruits is as false as its harvest in deeds is deadly?

Nor is Professor Taylor alone in his several accusations; Lecomte de Nouy repeats them again and again in *Human Destiny*. Now, theoretically this is all quite correct and logical, but its practical efficacy remains doubtful. The same defect of logic which leads scientists to a denial of God should also blind them to the logical untenableness of their position.

Whatever his success with the case for Theism, Professor Taylor's presentation of the case for Christianity, from the eighth chapter on, leaves something to be desired. His own assumptions, in fact, betray him. Like all Anglicans, at time of writing, he cannot fully trust the logic he needs as a shield against the rationalists lest it lead him whither he simply will not go, and so at the last moment of the argument he must turn to faith, not even a supernatural (and therefore objective) faith, but a comfortable subjective feeling of good-fellowship and trust.

> My object in the pages which follow is not to produce a substantive *apologia* for the Christian or any other positive creed, but simply to offer some considerations in rebuttal of this anti-theological prejudice. My purpose is not here to contend that the specific beliefs of any denomination of Christians are in fact true, but . . . that some reasons which are often complacently regarded as disposing of their claim to be true are irrelevant (p. 130).

This is done by an appeal to our trust in the testimony of our fellow men on which all social and business intercourse is based, and the universal conviction of the existence of "fundamental decencies." But it is not unreasonable, e. g., to deny the official infallibility of the Pope. Thus his confusion and uncertainty about the demonstrative value of the arguments of Catholic apologetics blur the clarity of his arguments and reduce his last chapters to mere sophistic exercises. This is the more unfortunate since the desired "better Europe" in the founding and direction of which "science" must take its proper second place depends upon the stable occupation of first place by a Faith that is itself one.

Curiously enough, Professor Taylor feeling the need of the Barthian support which Mr. Jay rejects, arrives at substantially the same conclusion, that it is necessary for God Himself to communicate to men more knowledge of Himself than is possible of attainment by unaided reason. In other words, they realize what St. Thomas pointed out long ago, that a knowledge of the existence of God is the preamble to supernatural faith and the riches of revelation.

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Spinoza, Portrait of a Spiritual Hero. By Rudolph Kayser. With an introduction by Albert Einstein. Translated by Amy Allen and Maxim Newmark. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Pp. xix + 326. $3.75.

To the available biographies of Spinoza this work is added. In the preface it is stated: "Industrious scholars have collected and sorted the material for us. But if we wish to hear a man's heart beating behind this material, we must be able to listen long and carefully to the inner music of his soul. And that is the intention of this book" (pp. xviii, xix).

To fulfill his intention the author devotes fifty-three pages to the oft-told tales of the Marranos in Spain and Portugal and of the beginnings of the Jewish colony in Holland. The reader meets some strange assertions. Of the Jesuits it is said, that they "were secular priests who knew and understood the habits of the upper classes of society. Hence, young Gabriel [Uriel da Costa] was bound to have a fine and easy existence" (p. 30). For the Spanish Jews the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment is described as "an age in which the great witches' sabbath of the Counter-Reformation was celebrated" (p. 11). The Dominicans "became the real 'domini canes,' the bloodhounds of God. . . . A mass frenzy surged through the world and lusted for death, a lust that could only be sated with the blood of its victims, and could only be appeased when the hands that had heaped thousands onto the execution pyres became tired of their own gruesome performance" (p. 14). In the midst of twentieth-century facts, Bjelinsky, a Russian writer, is quoted with approval as naming "the Spanish Inquisition as the most horrible sacrifice that chance and superstition had ever exacted" (p. 15).

Rembrandt, Jan de Witt, and Spinoza are all described as enacting in their lives "great tragedies . . . in which the creative individual went along his way to Calvary. . . . All three men were not understood by their contemporaries; they were rendered powerless, or were put to death. Their lives were filled to the brim with a loneliness which they themselves created and of which they themselves were the martyrs" (p. xv). These quotations will give an idea of the author's style, modes of thought, and approach to his subject. It is unfortunate that Spinoza's life is again presented in this mode and strain. After three centuries it would be well if his story were told in a more objective way. It is more than time for writers to forget the myths and legends of the "poor persecuted Jew" and "the God-intoxicated man." Spinoza needs to be read and written about in a spirit akin to that in which other thinkers are approached.

In his introduction Prof. Einstein writes that "the spiritual situation with which Spinoza had to cope peculiarly resembles our own" (p. xi). Just how our age, the age of world wars and world revolutions, of collapsing

civilizations and cultures, of dictators and dialectical materialism, and of mass rape and mass murder, peculiarly resembles the *grand siècle* is not apparent. Prof. Einstein also writes that "Spinoza had no doubt that our notion of possessing a free will (i.e. independent of causality) was an illusion resulting from our ignorance of the causes operative within us. In the study of the causal relationship he saw a remedy for fear, hate, and bitterness, the only remedy to which a genuinely spiritual man can have recourse" (p. xi). One may speculate upon how much philosophy Prof. Einstein has studied and what manner of scholarly research he has devoted to the doctrine of free will so as to understand that doctrine and the problem with which it deals. Aside from such speculation, it is difficult to see how a scientist can write with such dogmatism and such lack of reflection. Does the deterministic doctrine really answer the great moral problems? If it does, we must cease to condemn the Nazis for their plan and practice of genocide, the keepers of Dachau for their murders and human vivisection, and Stalin and his associates for their program of treachery, destruction, and enslavement.

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BRIEF NOTICES

L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme. Par JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Paris: Nagel, 1946. Pp. 141.

The word "humanism" is equivocal, ranging from its description of the Renaissance spirit down, through a whole spectrum of meanings, to its more recent applications by Maritain and La Chance. Sartre argues that his existentialism is a humanism because it makes man, unaided and alone, completely responsible for his own destiny and that of all mankind. Man, existing before he acquires an essence according to Sartre's familiar theme, must in his own solitary anguish make an original choice that sets the pattern of his life. Even in seeking counsel, he must choose a counsellor according to the personal, uncounselled decision of his closed self. He is his own legislator. In a fashion described by Heidegger and suggested by Kierkegaard, man awakens to himself in his thrust toward the future, being—as Sartre, following Heidegger, calls him—nothing but a projection of his own self.

Sartre, apart from the mention of *l'humanité* of Comte, nowhere differentiates his humanism from that of more classical philosophies associated with this confusing word. But it is clear that by humanism Sartre means to take man as he finds him. It is a misfortune that Sartre never finds man at all. What results from the existentialist dialectic is not man but a pure subjectivity, with no nature, freedom, or intelligence, with no social relations, with only inert experience that is constantly in the act of being realized. In his typical sophisms, Sartre attempts to establish a social community of understanding on the basis that one man can go through the same experience as others and thus learn what that experience is (pp. 69, 70). However, such a duplication must involve recognizing the other as other (*fieri aliud in tantum aliud*)—a difficulty that Sartre does not see. This is really a focal phase of existentialism in general. Until it is clarified, existentialism must remain a humanism dehumanized.

Robert Boyle Devout Naturalist. By MITCHELL SALEM FISHER. Philadelphia: Oshiver Studio Press, 1945. Pp. 184.

The aim of this book is to present Robert Boyle as a chemist of the seventeenth century who sought to reconcile his science with an orthodox philosophy and religion. Boyle is depicted as developing the basic principles of the experimental method. As Mr. Fisher shows with ample

documentation, Boyle had a very definite logic of scientific proof and a very definite, though less clearly formulated, mechanical view of the world which he sought to reconcile with the existence of a personal God, Supreme Author and Designer. Boyle was thus not simply the father of the law that now bears his name.

Though Mr. Fisher has succeeded in giving a coherent and commendable synthesis of Boyle's *Lebensanschauung*, he has perhaps not always kept in mind the circumstances of Boyle's age. The seventeenth century with its political turmoil and the scientific struggles against traditional thought is not an easy century to portray, and Mr. Fisher's portrayal does not provide a full enough setting for Boyle's work. The incipient deistic currents of this century Mr. Fisher unfortunately neglects, and Boyle cannot be duly assessed apart from such a trend. In fact, Boyle, in his mechanical concept of matter guided by a somewhat Newtonian God, played into the hand of deism since the very nature of mechanism is to seek for matter's explanation within matter, keeping God so far out of the picture that He eventually disappears altogether. If Boyle did not draw this conclusion, others of our own day have finally done so. Mr. Fisher, sketching the intellectual conflicts of the seventeenth century does not see their full meaning and present them meaningfully enough. A devout naturalism can be defined apart from history but can be much more clearly appreciated within history.

It must be further remarked that it is an error in perspective to think of Boyle as " the father of the experimental method " (p. 64). Implicitly, it had been formed by such men as Gilbert, Tycho, Kepler, Da Vinci, and Newton, and explicitly it had been stated by Bacon and even by Descartes.

Éléments de Critique des Sciences et de Cosmologie. Par Fernand Renoirte. Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1945. Pp. 235.

This is one of a series of books on the general field of philosophy published by the University of Louvain, where the author is a professor. He deals with his critico-cosmological subject matter in three parts: an exposition of some data in chemistry and physics; a critique of scientific laws and theories; and the philosophy of structure embodied in atomism, dynamism and hylomorphism.

Though the Père Renoirte gives a lucid and somewhat detailed picture of the structure of matter in classical chemistry and physics, he stops on the threshold of the really contemporary problems raised by quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity. Thus his work was scientifically out of date when it was written.

In his discussion of laws and theories, the author does not sufficiently

differentiate their respective references to reality. Law itself has, for him, only a provisional status. Thus there is nowhere encountered a satisfactory explanation for the way in which the scientist meets the existential universe, enabling him to produce and predict not only laboratory data but real changes in the real world.

By far the most serious objection to the book is the treatment of matter and form. The author believes in hylomorphism, but the only argument which he can marshal in its favor is a duality with space as one term and time as the other. The argument from substantial change is dismissed because, the author says, the scientist had cast doubt on the traditional differentiations of substances. Yet, if the multiplicity of substances and the reality of substantial changes are questioned by pure science, then one may question also, and on the premise, the author's own attitude toward space and time. The traditional arguments from passivity-activity, unity-multiplicity, and determination-indetermination are not developed.

What the author has done has been to accord too little to science in its contact with reality from the point of view of its laws and then accord too much to it in dismissing the arguments for hylomorphism. Physics in reality has not disproved any of the traditional arguments for hylomorphism. An empirical science, as such, cannot change a philosophical truth if it is really philosophical. The problem is not to abandon the philosophy but to interpret the physics against the truth which philosophy makes available. The author has not interpreted physics. He has simply repeated it, on a philosophical level.

The Great Beyond. By MAURICE MAETERLINCK. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1947. Pp. 226. $3.00.

In a half dozen brief, unformed plays, and in hundreds of gnomic paragraphs, M. Maeterlinck, a firm believer in a life " which precedes our earthly existence," here greedily hunts down death. Toward life after death, as indeed toward life itself, the Belgian playwright continues to maintain a quizzical attitude whose acceptance is rejection and whose submission is open rebellion. He has raised the denial of the principle of contradiction to the status of epigram, and he goes about putting old wine into old bottles with a kind of bleak insouciance. Imbibing the Pascalian spirit with the form, he multiplies rubrics on his master's *Je mourirai seul.* He believes in God, in the soul, and in death; but God is " the summit of the inexplicable," the soul presumably exists to understand God's " psychology," and death seems to be life, for " To be or not to be is the same thing." Vedism, Gnosticism, and Calvinism are a few of the metals from which

Maeterlinck strikes sparks on a random anvil. On almost every page there is material blasphemy, always—and this is curiously characteristic—reverently unintended.

The A Priori In Physical Theory. By Arthur Pap. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. Pp. 102.

Modern philosophy has failed to satisfy man's thirst after certitude, and the story of this philosophy from age to age is very much a process of correcting previous errors. The error which Mr. Pap clearly perceives has been the view, inherited from Kant, that the *a priori* in physics is in a regulative category by itself having no experiential verification. The correction for this error proposed by Mr. Pap, who carries out the conventionalism of Poincaré, is that principles considered inductive generalizations in one stage of physics grow to the status of so-called *a priori* truths for the next stage. Whether a principle is viewed as inductive or *a priori* depends on the context. It is conventional to adopt a well verified inductive truth as an *a priori* matrix to guide experiment toward new inductive generalizations. This process seems to go on without limit, according to Mr. Pap's philosophy.

The question now arises as to whether there may be an inadequacy in Mr. Pap's thesis which would inspire another corrective stop-gap or even provide a settled basis to resolve the continual shifting of modern philosophical soil. Perhaps such an answer can be found if attention is directed to a meaning of induction that is not synonymous with empirical generalization but with that immediate insight which brings man into contact with the very immediacies in reality itself. Such a frame of reference in immediate insight Mr. Pap unwittingly used in comparing inductive and *a priori* principles, for nothing could ever be related if all relations are mediate. Certainly the physicist has such an insight, for without it he could never relate the real. Acknowledging this insight into the *being that is* and not simply *being* as related to *is* mediately, one can then reverse Mr. Pap's statement "that a concept *is* what it is *defined* to be" (p. 23), showing instead that a thing is defined to be what it is.

Medieval Islam. By Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. Pp. 372, with index. $4.00.

Approximately three-sixths of the world is pagan, one-sixth Catholic, another sixth Protestant, and the remaining sixth Mohammedan. Islam is not a mere historical fact but a religious phenomenon whose beginnings

stretch back some 1400 years to Mohammed (c. 600), and which once almost engulfed Europe in a pincers movement whose anchors were Spain and southeastern Europe. The average modern gives comparatively little thought to Islam, although it still claims the allegiance of many millions in the Near East. Here however is a study of Islam at the moment of its greatest glory; *Medieval Islam* is a careful historical examination by a competent scholar thoroughly familiar with the Koran and authoritative Muslim sources.

Islam was successful because it simplified the important questions of human life: man's relationship with God, his responsibility before God, his salvation or damnation. Mohammed preached the equality of all believers before God, and was on fire to prevent men from falling into hell. His converts were rewarded by "the consciousness of belonging to a divinely favored commonwealth of unprecedented and ever growing strength, a privilege which was paid for by maintaining and spreading certain carelessly worn verities and by complying with certain patterns of behavior" (p. 89).

Muslim prayer (obligatory five times a day) is not so much an effort to achieve personal communication with a remote, inscrutable Allah as a set of ceremonies expressing the Muslim's obedience, worship, and devotion (p. 114). Trust in God, fear of God, silence, humility, and even poverty, are recommended. But when all is said and done, the Muslim's only hope is in his reliance on the divine mercy (Islam means "resignation to God"), which will be assured him through the intercession of the prophet (pp. 124, 347).

Thus many terms are common both to Islam and to Christianity, but the similarity stops there. Despite its dealings with the deepest surgings of the human heart toward God, and despite the fact that "the most genuinely Islamic contribution to the religious experience of mankind . . . is the great movement of mysticism" (p. 137 f), Islam produced no genuine saints; aside from one or two possible exceptions (e. g. Al-Hallaj) true mystics do not make their appearance in Muslim circles.

In the following paragraph, each word of which has been amply demonstrated in preceding chapters, the author admirably has summed up the results of his investigations:

> Conservatism expressing itself as the determination never to let go of past achievement and thus unduly accentuating the crudeness of its origins, and the tendency natural to despotism and orthodoxy to discourage revision and reform, combined with Islam's catholic curiosity and receptiveness, are responsible for that lack of integration of the component elements which makes Islamic civilization look like a torso. Arrested in its growth during the eleventh century, it has remained an unfulfilled promise. It lost the power of subjecting the innumerable elements to an organizing idea more comprehensive than the desire for individual

salvation. It stagnated in self-inflicted sterility. And expecting renascence from return to its beginnings, Islam in the last centuries of the Middle Ages weeded out whatever remnants of Hellenism could still be isolated from its structure (p. 322).

Muslim sources reveal Islam's many shortcomings, and at the same time insinuate by way of striking contrast the transcendent superiority both of Christendom and of the Christian scriptures. Islam's fidelity to the past, its concentration upon the stereotyped pattern and amazing accuracy of detail in preserving the past, illustrate to some extent the Semitic mind which preserved for us our sacred writings. Islam helped arouse Western interest in philosophy, especially Greek philosophy (p. 340), contributed to the advance of mathematics (p. 338), and, best of all, invested the individual Muslim with a sense of dignity, peace, and security (p. 345 f). But over and above these good points there must be balanced Islam's toleration of slavery, drastic depersonalization of the individual, discouragement of all individual initiative in thought. As the author so justly remarks, " the tenacious vitality of this civilization . . . is indeed a cause for wonder " (p. 346).

It is a pleasure to note (pp. 49-51) the considerable Dominican contribution towards an intellectual understanding of the opponent that was medieval Islam. Besides the *Summa Contra Gentiles* of Saint Thomas Aquinas, there was Ricoldus de Santa Cruce who composed one of the better controversial works against the Saracens; and in 1250 the first school of oriental studies was founded at Toledo by the Order of Preachers. It is a further pleasure to add that the same tradition is being carried on by the Order of Preachers in Jerusalem (Ecole biblique), Cairo, and Mossoul.

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